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An impossibility result concerningn-person bargaining games

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Abstract

In this note we show that a solution proposed byRaiffa for two-person bargaining games, which has recently been axiomatized byKalai/Smorodinsky, does not generalize in a straightforward manner to generaln-person bargaining games. Specifically, the solution is not Pareto optimal on the class of alln-person bargaining games, and no solution which is can possess the other properties which characterizeRaiffa's solution in the two-person case.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Business Administration, University of Illinois, 61801, Urbana, Ill., USA

    A. E. Roth

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  1. A. E. Roth
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Additional information

This work was supported by National Science Foundation Grant SOC 78-09928 to the University of Illinois. It has also benefitted from discussion and correspondence with H. Imai, E. Kalai, and M. Maschler.

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Roth, A.E. An impossibility result concerningn-person bargaining games. Int J Game Theory 8, 129–132 (1979). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01770063

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01770063

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