Abstract
This paper computes the Harsanyi-Selten solution for a family of two-person bargaining games with incomplete information where one player hastwo possible types while the other player has onlyone possible type. The actual computation procedure is also outlined.
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Harsanyi, John C.: The Tracing Procedure: A Bayesian Approach to Defining a Solution forn-Person Noncooperative Games. Int. J. Game Theory4, 1975, 61–94.
—: A Solution Concept forn-Person Noncooperative Games. Int. J. Game Theory5, 1976, 211–225.
Selten, R.: Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. Int. J. Game Theory4, 1975, 25–55.
Selten, R., andW. Güth: Macht Einigkeit Stark? — Spieltheoretische Analyse einer Verhandlungssituation. Neuere Entwicklungen in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften. Berlin 1978, 197–217.
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I want to thank the National Science Foundation for supporting this research through Grant SOC77-06394 to the Center for Research in Management Science, University of California, Berkeley. I would like also to thank Professor Reinhard Selten of the University of Bielefeld, and Professor Werner Güth of the University of Köln, for pointing out errors in an earlier version of this paper; as well as to thank Professor Michael Maschler, of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, for helpful discussions a few years ago.
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Harsanyi, J.C. Analysis of a family of two-person bargaining games with incomplete information. Int J Game Theory 9, 65–89 (1980). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01769765
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01769765