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A characterization of polyhedral market games

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Abstract

The class of games without side payments obtainable from markets having finitely many commodities and continuous concave utility functions is considered. It is first shown that each of these so-called market games is totally balanced, for a reasonable generalization of the idea of a balanced side payment game. It is then shown that among polyhedral games (i.e., games for which each (V(S) is a polyhedron), this property characterizes the market games.

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Operations Research, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York

    L. J. Billera

  2. Department of Mathematics, University of Kentucky, 40506, Lexington, Kentucky

    R. E. Bixby

Authors
  1. L. J. Billera
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  2. R. E. Bixby
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Additional information

Partially supported by the National Science Foundation under grants GK 29838 and GP 32314X.

Partially supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship and by National Science Foundation grant GK 29838 at Cornell University.

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Billera, L.J., Bixby, R.E. A characterization of polyhedral market games. Int J Game Theory 2, 253–261 (1973). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01737574

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01737574

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