Abstract
The situation in which two groups of people have conflicts of interest is considered as a two-team zero-sum game problem. Two special cases of this problem are solved to illustrate that communication among members of a team may not be worth-while and extra information need not always be desired by decision makers. In the appendix, it is shown that the optimal saddle-point solution exists and is still affine for the general problem with quadratic Gaussian performance index.
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Witsenhausen, H. S.,On the Relations Between the Values of a Game and Its Information Structure, Information and Control, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1971.
Ho, Y. C., andBasar, T.,Note on Informational Properties of Games, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1974.
Radner, R.,Team Decision Problem, Annals of Mathematical Statistics, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1962.
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Dedicated to Professor M. R. Hestenes
The research reported in this paper was made possible through support extended to the Division of Engineering and Applied Physics, Harvard University, by the U.S. Office of Naval Research under the Joint Services Electronics Program, Contract No. N00014-67-A-0298-0006, and by the National Science Foundation, Grant No. GK-31511.
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Ho, Y.C., Sun, F.K. Value of information in two-team zero-sum problems. J Optim Theory Appl 14, 557–571 (1974). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00932848
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00932848