Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Collective bargaining: A differential game

  • Published:
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Earlier differential game models of collective bargaining deal only with the strike phase. The model proposed here allows for negotiations without and with a strike.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Starr, A. W.,Non-Zero Sum Differential Games: Concepts and Models, Harvard University, Division of Engineering and Applied Physics, TR No. 590, 1969.

  2. Case, J.,Application of the Theory of Differential Games to Economic Problems, Differential Games and Related Topics, Edited by H. W. Kuhn and G. P. Szegö, American Elsevier, New York, 1971.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Dussaix, A. M., andHaurie, A.,Un Model Dynamique de Negociation Sous Forme D'Un Jeu Semi-Différentiel, École des Hautes Études Commerciales de Montréal, Rapport de Recherche No. 5, 1971.

  4. Leitmann, G., andLiu, P. T.,A Differential Game Model of Labor-Management Negotiation During a Strike, Paper Presented at the 5th IFIP Conference on Optimization Techniques, Rome, Italy, 1973.

  5. Isaacs, R.,Differential Games, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1965.

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  6. Blaquiere, A., Gerard, F., andLeitmann, G.,Quantitative and Qualitative Games, Academic Press, New York, 1969.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Stalford, H. L., andLeitmann, G.,Sufficient Conditions for Optimality in Two-Person Zero-Sum Differential Games with State and Strategy Constraints, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1971.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of California, Berkeley, California

    G. Leitmann (Professor of Engineering Science)

Authors
  1. G. Leitmann
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Additional information

This paper is based on research supported by NSF under Grant No. GP-24205.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Leitmann, G. Collective bargaining: A differential game. J Optim Theory Appl 11, 405–412 (1973). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00932489

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00932489

Keywords

Search

Navigation