Abstract
In this paper, we consider the models of bargaining, both cooperative and non-cooperative, that have appeared in the literature, with a view to understanding what insights these models might have for practitioners. The main conclusion is that the models help us tailor our strategies to specific features of the environment in which bargaining takes place. Bargaining powe is related to these features of the environment and the institutional nature of the bargaining.
This chapter is a revised and updated version of my earlier paper, “Game Theory and the Practice of Bargaining,” which originally appeared in Group Decision and Negotiation, 1995. The revision has greatly benefited from detailed comments by William Samuelson. I apologize to the reader for the numerous references to my own work. Because I have not attempted a general survey of the literature; it is probably inevitable that this discussion is biased toward current topics in which I’ve been particularly involved and interested.
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Chatterjee, K. (2014). Game Theory and the Practice of Bargaining. In: Chatterjee, K., Samuelson, W. (eds) Game Theory and Business Applications. International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, vol 194. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7095-3_7
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