Abstract
This paper provides a new formulation of the Nash social welfare function for a continuum of individuals. The new formulation removes redundant assumptions of Kaneko's original formulation and in particular shows that the continuity axiom on social orderings is unnecessary. The derivation of the Nash social welfare function is also much directer and shorter than Kaneko's original derivation.
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The author thanks a referee of this journal for valuable comments on an eralier draft
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Kaneko, M. Reformulation of the Nash social welfare function for a continuum of individuals. Soc Choice Welfare 1, 33–43 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00297058
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00297058