Abstract
This article presents the thesis that a critique of decisions is not necessarily (except in the trivial sense) a critique of preferences. This thesis runs contrary to the fundamental assumption in economic theory that a critique of decisions will always simultaneously be a critique of (subjective) preferences, since decision behavior is after all a ‘manifestation’ of preferences. If this thesis is right, then the paradigm of so-called ‘instrumental rationality’ is in serious trouble, not for external reasons but because of imminent inconsistencies. The thesis is developed in five parts: I. A preliminary remark to the economic theory of rationality in general. II. The cooperation problem as a challenge to the economic theory of rationality. III. An account of the most interesting attempt to save the theory. IV. A critique of that attempt. V. And the conclusion: practical reason is concerned with actions and not with preferences.
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Nida-Rümelin, J. Practical reason or metapreferences? an undogmatic defense of kantian morality. Theor Decis 30, 133–162 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134121
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134121