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Competition and Production in Higher Education

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Economics of Higher Education

Abstract

In this chapter, we focus on the behavior of colleges and universities in the markets for students. We begin by providing some background information on the pioneering work of economists on production, competition, and market structures. We then turn to the alternative goals and objectives that have been offered for postsecondary institutions. Unlike typical industries where the behavioral assumption is made that the organization is trying to maximize profits, postsecondary institutions have been described by economists as striving to maximize a range of things such as revenues, utility, prestige, or discretionary budgets. In the next section of the chapter we review the different structures that economists commonly use to describe product markets, and how postsecondary markets compare to these models. Following the discussion of market structures, we turn to the topic of competition in postsecondary education. Despite the impression that competition is something new to higher education, in fact colleges have a long history of competing with each other in ways that extend beyond athletics. In postsecondary education, colleges engage in price and non-price competition for students. The next topic that we cover is education production. Economists use a production function or model to describe how organizations convert inputs into outputs to work towards their goals. We believe that the production function analogy holds quite well for a number of reasons, and yet we will discuss some of the important differences in the production function between the typical for-profit sector and higher education that complicate the comparison. In the Extensions section, we discuss how online and distance education may affect the markets in which colleges and universities compete. Finally, in the Policy Focus section, we examine how states use funding formulas to distribute appropriations to public institutions and impact their behavior.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    A. R. J. Turgot (1767) is largely credited with being the first to describe how a firm’s total output can be modeled as a function of inputs based on assumptions about the marginal productivity and cross-productivity of inputs. Malthus (1798) later extended this notion to a logarithmic relationship between inputs and output. Excellent reviews of the early economic literature on production can be found in Humphrey (1997) and Mishra (2007).

  2. 2.

    See von Thunen (1863), Cobb and Douglas (1928), Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau (1972), and Uzawa (1962).

  3. 3.

    Among the early economists who examined competition among sellers are Steuart (1767), Turgot (1767), Hume (1955), and Cantillon (1755). For more details of the early economic literature on competition, see Monroe (1948), Schumpeter (1954), Stigler (1957), McNulty (1967), and Moss (1984).

  4. 4.

    The model of perfect competition can be traced to the work of Cournot (1929). Readers who are interested in how the concept of perfect competition developed are referred to Hayek (1948), Stigler (1957), and McNulty (1967).

  5. 5.

    Key pieces of antitrust legislation in the United States include the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914.

  6. 6.

    The concept of monopolistic competition traces back to the pioneering work of Chamberlin (1933) and Robinson (1933). Discussions of monopolistic competition and its evolution can be found in Chamberlin (1961), Keppler (1994) and Hart (1979).

  7. 7.

    Readers who are interested in the development of oligopoly and game theory are referred to Stigler (1950), Schumpeter (1954), Shapiro (1989), Puu and Sushko (2002), Edgeworth (1889), Bertrand (1883), and Nash (1950, 1951).

  8. 8.

    The marginal revenue curve will be linear and downward-sloping when the demand curve (i.e., the average revenue curve) is also linear and downward-sloping. Both are derived from the total revenue function. The relationships between total, marginal and average revenue functions can be readily defined mathematically as follows:

    \( TR={\alpha}_1Q - {Q}^2 \)

    \( MR=\partial TR/\partial Q={\alpha}_1-2Q \)

    \( AR=TR/Q={\alpha}_1-Q \)

    The U-shaped marginal cost curve follows from the assumption that there are economies and diseconomies of scale in the provision of services. However, the same basic results discussed here also hold for other situations where the marginal revenue and/or marginal cost curves have different shapes.

  9. 9.

    See Rothschild and White (1995). The discretionary budget model is described in detail by Paulsen (2000). His model builds on the work of Migue and Belanger (1974), Niskanen (1975) and Blais and Dion (1991).

  10. 10.

    See Bowen (1980) for more details.

  11. 11.

    In this framework, costs rise as non-discretionary revenues rise, leading to what Winston (1999) referred to as a positional arms race among colleges and universities for financial resources. Interested readers are also referred to Clotfelter (1996) for more discussion.

  12. 12.

    Other economists who assumed that the goal of postsecondary institutions is to maximize utility or prestige include James (1978, 1990) and Winston (1999). Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006) posited that the goal of postsecondary institutions is to maximize the quality of experiences for students. For further discussion see Garvin (1980), James (1990), Winston (1999), and Melguizo and Strober (2007).

  13. 13.

    Economists have also developed versions of oligopoly in which sellers produce heterogeneous goods and services (see Kuenne, 1992). However, the usual case is to consider a market with only a few large sellers whose products are viewed as being very similar to each other.

  14. 14.

    See Becker and Toutkoushian (2013) for a more detailed discussion of these issues.

  15. 15.

    For more details on this antitrust case, see Barro (1991), Salop and White (1991), Carlton, Bamberger, and Epstein (1995), and Austin (2006).

  16. 16.

    The Herfindahl Index could be calculated on a 0–1 scale or a 0–10,000 scale depending on the units of measure for market shares. For example, a firm with a 5 % market share would have a value of 5 rather than 0.05. In this instance, the rescaled Herfindahl Index is bounded between 0 and 10,000.

  17. 17.

    For a more complete diagrammatic and mathematical presentation of all elements of his model, see Breneman (1994). For a statistical test and validation of the model see Breneman, Doti, and Lapovsky (2001).

  18. 18.

    Interested readers are referred to Baum, Lapovsky, and Ma (2010) and Davis (2003) for more details.

  19. 19.

    Discussions of the evolution of tuition discounting can be found in Davis (2003), McPherson and Schapiro (2006), and Redd (2000).

  20. 20.

    See Baum and Lapovsky (2006), Baum et al. (2010), and Hillman (2012).

  21. 21.

    These statistics were obtained from Trends in College Pricing 2014. Washington, DC: The College Board.

  22. 22.

    See, for example, Hansen and Weisbrod (1969), Hearn and Longanecker (1985), Hoenack (1971), and Toutkoushian and Shafiq (2010).

  23. 23.

    For example, in a recent study, Leeds and DesJardins (2015) found that The University of Iowa’s National Scholars Awards have successfully increased the probability of enrollment among high-ability non-resident students.

  24. 24.

    See, for example, Hanushek (1986, 1997, 2003).

  25. 25.

    See Astin (1970a, 1970b).

  26. 26.

    See, for example, Pascarella and Terenzini (2005).

  27. 27.

    The complete mission statement for the University of Georgia can be found at http://www.uga.edu/profile/mission/.

  28. 28.

    The complete mission statement for the University of Iowa can be found at https://provost.uiowa.edu/ui-academic-mission.

  29. 29.

    See, for example, Winston (1999).

  30. 30.

    See, for example, Rothschild and White (1995).

  31. 31.

    The Cobb-Douglas production function is most often attributed to the work of Paul Douglas and Charles Cobb in 1928. Among the appealing features of this production function are that it allows for increasing, decreasing, or constant returns to scale, and it exhibits diminishing marginal returns to scale for each factor of production. Interestingly, the production function developed by von Thunen in the mid nineteenth century is the same as the more widely-cited Cobb-Douglas function which was developed 65 years later in 1928. Humphrey (1997) shows the equivalence between von Thunen’s production function and the Cobb-Douglas production function. Other economists of note who developed versions of the Cobb-Douglas production function include Wicksteed (1894) and Wicksell (1893). Readers who are interested in more details on the development and use of the Cobb-Douglas production function are referred to Douglas (1976) and Filipe and Adams (2005).

  32. 32.

    The CES production function was introduced by Arrow, Chenery, Minhas, and Solow (1961). For more details on the CES production function, see Uzawa (1962), Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau (1972) and Miller (2008).

  33. 33.

    The translog production function can be traced back to the work of Kmenta (1967), Christensen et al. (1972) and Berndt and Christensen (1973). More details on the translog production function can be found in Boisvert (1982).

  34. 34.

    There are many different ways to classify states by the funding mechanisms that they use (Layzell & McKeown, 1992). According to a report produced by MGT of America, in 2006 there were 26 states using “funding formulas” driven by enrollments, 14 states using “benchmark or peer funding,” and 11 states using “performance funding”.

  35. 35.

    A number of researchers have focused on this first wave of performance funding systems, including Massy (1996), Layzell (1999), Alexander (2000), Burke (2002), Liefner (2003), and McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton (2006).

  36. 36.

    Studies of performance funding outside of the United States include Jongbloed (2001), Jongbloed and Vossensteyn (2001), Butler (2003), and Orr, Jaeger and Schwartzenberger (2007).

  37. 37.

    The differences between the earlier interest of some states in performance funding—where a small portion of funding was based on performance measures—and the renewed, more expansive and widespread interest in performance funding have been referred to as PF 1.0 and PF 2.0, respectively (Dougherty & Reddy, 2013).

  38. 38.

    See Tandberg and Hillman (2014) and Hillman, Tandberg, and Gross (2014).

  39. 39.

    See, for example, Dougherty and Reddy (2013), Tandberg and Hillman (2014), and Hillman et al. (2014).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Glossary

Glossary

Symbol

Definition

TR

Total revenue

Q

Quantity of output

MR

Marginal revenue

AR

Average revenue

CR

Concentration ratio

Rj

Revenues for the j-th largest firm in an industry

HI

Herfindahl Index

PR

Price for resident (in-state) students

PNR

Price for non-resident (out-of-state) students

QR

Quantity of resident students

QNR

Quantity of non-resident students

L

Quantity of labor

K

Quantity of capital

Zj

Production input of j-th type (labor, capital, raw materials)

Ojk

Output of the j-th type for the k-th institution for performance funding models

WOk

Weighted total outcomes for the k-th institution

wjk

Priority weight for the j-th output and k-th institution

sj

Scale weight for j-th output in performance funding models

Gk

Total government funding for the k-th institution

\( \overline{\mathrm{Y}} \)

Average faculty salary

gk

Supplemental government funding for designated operations

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Toutkoushian, R.K., Paulsen, M.B. (2016). Competition and Production in Higher Education. In: Economics of Higher Education. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-7506-9_8

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-017-7504-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-7506-9

  • eBook Packages: EducationEducation (R0)

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