Abstract
Fred moves his finger, thereby flicking the switch, turning on the light, illuminating the room and alerting the prowler (Davidson 1963). What explains the action or actions he performs?
I would like to thank Anita Avaramides, John Bigelow, Bill Brewer, John Campbell, Bill Child, Henry Fitzgerald, Elizabeth Fricker, Steve Gardner, Frank Jackson, Dale Jamieson, Jakob Hohwy, Richard Holton, Jeannette
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Smith, M. (1998). The Possibility of Philosophy of Action. In: Bransen, J., Cuypers, S.E. (eds) Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 77. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5082-8_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5082-8_2
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