Abstract
Here is a little story. As he has done a hundred times before, John heads off to the local shop to buy some chocolate bars. He knows that eating so much chocolate isn’t good for him. Being over forty and doing no exercise a passion for chocolate simply adds to an already significant weight problem. But thoughts like this do not move him. Each day, fully cognizant of the effects of eating chocolate upon his health, John heads off to the local shop, arrives, buys several chocolate bars, unwraps one, and then proceeds to eat it, unwraps another, and then proceeds to it, and so on and so on and so on.
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Kennett, J., Smith, M. (1994). Philosophy and Commonsense: The Case of Weakness of Will. In: Michael, M., O’Leary-Hawthorne, J. (eds) Philosophy in Mind. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 60. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1008-2_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1008-2_10
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