Abstract
The Allais Paradox seems as fresh today as it was when first posed some 40 years ago. It has been discussed in the intervening decades and led to many suggestions for modifying, extending or abandoning standard subjective expected utility theory. It has also led to much discussion of the distinction between normative and descriptive models and their role in prescriptive decision support. It seems appropriate in a conference entitled Decision Making: towards the 21st Century to reflect on these developments, particularly in relation to recent extensions to utility theory and other mathematical models of preferences, and consider, in particular, their possible implication for prescriptive decision analysis.
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French, S., Xie, Z. (1994). A Perspective on Recent Developments in Utility Theory. In: RÃos, S. (eds) Decision Theory and Decision Analysis: Trends and Challenges. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1372-4_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1372-4_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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