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On Affine Incentives for Dynamic Decision Problems

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Dynamic Games and Applications in Economics

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 265))

Abstract

Construction of optimal incentive strategies for continuous time two-person game problems described by integral convex cost criteria is considered. The strategies are affine in the data available and they are represented by means of Stieltjes measures.

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© 1986 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Ehtamo, H., Hämäläinen, R.P. (1986). On Affine Incentives for Dynamic Decision Problems. In: Başar, T. (eds) Dynamic Games and Applications in Economics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 265. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61636-5_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61636-5_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-16435-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-61636-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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