Dynamic Games and Applications in Economics

  • Tamer Başar
Conference proceedings

Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 265)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages I-IX
  2. Lex Meijdam, Aart de Zeeuw
    Pages 26-46
  3. Harri Ehtamo, Raimo P. Hämäläinen
    Pages 47-63
  4. Michèle Breton, Jerzy A. Filar, Alain Haurle, Todd A. Schultz
    Pages 64-87
  5. Tamer Başar, Stephen J. Turnovsky, Vasco D’Orey
    Pages 134-178
  6. Engelbert Dockner, Gustav Feichtinger
    Pages 238-251
  7. Back Matter
    Pages 293-294

About these proceedings

Introduction

This volume contains eleven articles which deal with different aspects of dynaoic and differential game theory and its applications in economic modeling and decision making. All but one of these were presented as invited papers in special sessions I organized at the 7th Annual Conference on Economic Dynamics and Control in London, England, during the period June 26-28, 1985. The first article, which comprises Chapter 1, provides a general introduction to the topic of dynamic and differential game theory, discusses various noncooperative equilibrium solution concepts, includ­ ing Nash, Stackelberg, and Consistent Conjectural Variations equilibria, and a number of issues such as feedback and time-consistency. The second chapter deals with the role of information in Nash equilibria and the role of leadership in Stackelberg problems. A special type of a Stackelberg problem is the one in which one dominant player (leader) acquires dynamic information involving the actions of the others (followers), and constructs policies (so-called incentives) which enforce a certain type of behavior on the followers; Chapter 3 deals with such a class of problems and presents some new theoretical results on the existence of affine incentive policies. The topic of Chapter 4 is the computation of equilibria in discounted stochastic dynamic games. Here, for problems with finite state and decision spaces, existing algorithms are reviewed, with a comparative study of their speeds of convergence, and a new algorithm for the computation of nonzero-sum game equilibria is presented.

Keywords

decision making economic dynamics economics equilibrium game theory macroeconomics modeling

Editors and affiliations

  • Tamer Başar
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering and Coordinated Science LaboratoryUniversity of IllinoisUrbanaUSA

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61636-5
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1986
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-3-540-16435-7
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-61636-5
  • Series Print ISSN 0075-8442
  • About this book