Summary
We speak of a distribution conflict if at least two individuals have to share a burden or reward or both. Based on equity theory we try to outline a behavioral theory which predicts the allocation results for such situations. Whereas our conditions specify when equity considerations will be applied, the hypotheses predict the way in which individual contributions and rewards are measured in case of competing standards. As empirical evidence we provide experimental observations as well as supporting real life situations. It is also discussed how justice considerations can be incorporated into a general theory of human decision making.
I would like to thank H. Brands tatter and K. G. Grunert for helpful comments.
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Güth, W. (1994). Distributive Justice. In: Brandstätter, H., Güth, W. (eds) Essays on Economic Psychology. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48621-0_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48621-0_8
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