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Prêt à Voter Providing Everlasting Privacy

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E-Voting and Identify (Vote-ID 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7985))

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Abstract

This paper shows how Prêt à Voter can be adjusted in order to provide everlasting privacy. This is achieved by adapting the ballot generation and anonymisation process, such that only unconditional hiding commitments and zero knowledge proofs are published for verification, thus ensuring privacy towards the public. This paper presents a security analysis carried out in a collaboration between computer scientists and legal researchers. On the technical side it is shown that the modified Prêt à Voter provides verifiability, robustness, and everlasting privacy towards the public. Everlasting privacy towards the authorities can be achieved by implementing several organisational measures. A legal evaluation of these measures demonstrates that the level of privacy achieved would be acceptable under German law.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. CASED, Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany

    Denise Demirel & Johannes Buchmann

  2. Project Group Constitutionally Compatible Technology Design (provet), Universität Kassel, Germany

    Maria Henning

  3. Departamento de Ciência da Computação, Universidade Federal de Minas, Gerais, CEP 31270-901, Brazil

    Jeroen van de Graaf

  4. Interdisciplinary Centre for Security and Trust, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg

    Peter Y. A. Ryan

Authors
  1. Denise Demirel
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  2. Maria Henning
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  3. Jeroen van de Graaf
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  4. Peter Y. A. Ryan
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  5. Johannes Buchmann
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Surrey, Guildford, UK

    James Heather

  2. University of Surrey, GU2 7XH, Guildford, Surrey, UK

    Steve Schneider

  3. Dept. Computer Science and Software, The University of Melbourne, 3010, Parkville, VIC, Australia

    Vanessa Teague

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Demirel, D., Henning, M., van de Graaf, J., Ryan, P.Y.A., Buchmann, J. (2013). Prêt à Voter Providing Everlasting Privacy. In: Heather, J., Schneider, S., Teague, V. (eds) E-Voting and Identify. Vote-ID 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7985. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39185-9_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39185-9_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-39184-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-39185-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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