Abstract
A number of end-to-end verifiable voting schemes have been introduced recently. These schemes aim to allow voters to verify that their votes have contributed in the way they intended to the tally and in addition allow anyone to verify that the tally has been generated correctly. These goals must be achieved while maintaining voter privacy and providing receipt-freeness. However, most of these end-to-end voting schemes are only designed to handle a single election method and the voter interface varies greatly between different schemes. In this paper, we introduce a scheme which handles many of the popular election methods that are currently used around the world. Our scheme not only ensures privacy, receipt-freeness and end-to-end verifiability, but also keeps the voter interface simple and consistent between various election methods.
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Xia, Z. et al. (2010). Versatile Prêt à Voter: Handling Multiple Election Methods with a Unified Interface. In: Gong, G., Gupta, K.C. (eds) Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2010. INDOCRYPT 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6498. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17401-8_8
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