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Security Analysis of the Extended Access Control Protocol for Machine Readable Travel Documents

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Information Security (ISC 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6531))

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Abstract

We analyze the Extended Access Control (EAC) protocol for authenticated key agreement, recently proposed by the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) for the deployment in machine readable travel documents. We show that EAC is secure in the Bellare-Rogaway model under the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) problem, and assuming random oracles. Furthermore, we discuss that the protocol achieves some of the properties guaranteed by the extended CK security model of LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin (ProvSec 2008).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt - CASED, Germany

    Özgür Dagdelen

  2. Darmstadt University of Technology, Germany

    Marc Fischlin

Authors
  1. Özgür Dagdelen
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  2. Marc Fischlin
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Security and Assurance in IT (C-SAIT), Department of Computer Science, Florida State University, 32306-4530, Tallahassee, FL, USA

    Mike Burmester

  2. Department of Computer Science, University of California, Irvine, 92697-3425, CA, USA

    Gene Tsudik

  3. Center for Cryptology and Information Security (CCIS), Department of Mathematical Sciences, Florida Atlantic University, 33431-0991, Boca Raton, FL, USA

    Spyros Magliveras

  4. Mathematical Sciences Department, Florida Atlantic University, 33431-0991, Boca Raton, FL, USA

    Ivana Ilić

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Dagdelen, Ö., Fischlin, M. (2011). Security Analysis of the Extended Access Control Protocol for Machine Readable Travel Documents. In: Burmester, M., Tsudik, G., Magliveras, S., Ilić, I. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6531. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18178-8_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18178-8_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-18177-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-18178-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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