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Security Analysis of the PACE Key-Agreement Protocol

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Information Security (ISC 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5735))

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Abstract

We analyze the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) protocol for authenticated key agreement, recently proposed by the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) for the deployment in machine readable travel documents. We show that the PACE protocol is secure in the real-or-random sense of Abdalla, Fouque and Pointcheval, under a number-theoretic assumption related to the Diffie-Hellman problem and assuming random oracles and ideal ciphers.

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Bender, J., Fischlin, M., Kügler, D. (2009). Security Analysis of the PACE Key-Agreement Protocol. In: Samarati, P., Yung, M., Martinelli, F., Ardagna, C.A. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5735. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04474-8_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04474-8_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-04473-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-04474-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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