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Private Intersection of Certified Sets

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Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5628))

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Abstract

This paper introduces certified sets to the private set intersection problem. A private set intersection protocol allows Alice and Bob to jointly compute the set intersection function without revealing their input sets. Since the inputs are private, malicious participants may choose their sets arbitrarily and may use this flexibility to affect the result or learn more about the input of an honest participant. With certified sets, a trusted party ensures the inputs are valid and binds them to each participant. The strength of the malicious model with certified inputs increases the applicability of private set intersection to real world problems. With respect to efficiency the new certified set intersection protocol improves existing malicious model private set intersection protocols by a constant factor.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Zürich Research Laboratory, IBM Research, CH-8803, Rüschlikon, Switzerland

    Jan Camenisch

  2. Cheriton School of Computer Science, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, N2L 3G1, Canada

    Gregory M. Zaverucha

Authors
  1. Jan Camenisch
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  2. Gregory M. Zaverucha
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. The Tor Project, Dedham, MA, USA

    Roger Dingledine

  2. Palo Alto Research Center, 3333 Coyote Hill Rd, 94304, Palo Alto, CA, USA

    Philippe Golle

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© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Camenisch, J., Zaverucha, G.M. (2009). Private Intersection of Certified Sets. In: Dingledine, R., Golle, P. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5628. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03549-4_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03549-4_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-03548-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-03549-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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