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Honest-Verifier Private Disjointness Testing Without Random Oracles

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Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4258))

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Abstract

We present an efficient construction of a private disjointness testing protocol that is secure against malicious provers and honest-but-curious (semi-honest) verifiers, without the use of random oracles. In a completely semi-honest setting, this construction implements a private intersection cardinality protocol. We formally define both private intersection cardinality and private disjointness testing protocols. We prove that our construction is secure under the subgroup decision and subgroup computation assumptions. A major advantage of our construction is that it does not require bilinear groups, random oracles, or non-interactive zero knowledge proofs. Applications of private intersection cardinality and disjointness testing protocols include privacy-preserving data mining and anonymous login systems.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA

    Susan Hohenberger & Stephen A. Weis

Authors
  1. Susan Hohenberger
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  2. Stephen A. Weis
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Microsoft Research, Cambridge, UK

    George Danezis

  2. Palo Alto Research Center, 3333 Coyote Hill Rd, 94304, Palo Alto, CA, USA

    Philippe Golle

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Hohenberger, S., Weis, S.A. (2006). Honest-Verifier Private Disjointness Testing Without Random Oracles. In: Danezis, G., Golle, P. (eds) Privacy Enhancing Technologies. PET 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4258. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11957454_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11957454_16

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-68790-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-68793-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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