Abstract
This chapter is devoted to computation-based simulations of voting. To perform such a simulation requires two things. On the one hand, one has to specify what might be called the “economic environment,” that is the number of voters, the number of alternatives, and the voter preferences (or tastes, values, utilities, opinions; : : :) over the alternatives. On the other hand, one has to specify the decision process, which is itself made of two ingredients: firstly the material decision procedure, for instance the formal voting rule, and secondly the individual behavior, that is how a voter decides to place in the urn one ballot rather than another, given her preferences and any other relevant information.
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Laslier, JF. (2010). In Silico Voting Experiments. In: Laslier, JF., Sanver, M. (eds) Handbook on Approval Voting. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_13
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