Handbook on Approval Voting

  • Jean-François Laslier
  • M. Remzi Sanver

Part of the Studies in Choice and Welfare book series (WELFARE)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xviii
  2. Jean-François Laslier, M. Remzi Sanver
    Pages 1-12
  3. History of Approval Voting

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 14-14
    2. Steven J. Brams, Peter C. Fishburn
      Pages 19-37
  4. Axiomatic Theory

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 40-40
    2. Biung-Ghi Ju
      Pages 41-90
    3. Yongsheng Xu
      Pages 91-102
  5. Committees

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 104-104
    2. D. Marc Kilgour
      Pages 105-124
  6. Strategic Voting

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 152-152
    2. Jean-François Laslier, M. Remzi Sanver
      Pages 153-163
    3. Matías Núñez
      Pages 165-197
    4. Dorothea Baumeister, Gábor Erdélyi, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jörg Rothe
      Pages 199-251
  7. Probabilistic Exercises

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 254-254
    2. Mostapha Diss, Vincent Merlin, Fabrice Valognes
      Pages 255-283
    3. Jean-François Laslier
      Pages 311-335
  8. Experiments

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 338-338

About this book

Introduction

Under Approval Voting, voters can ''approve" as many candidates as they want, and the candidate approved by the largest number of voters is elected. Since the publication of the seminal book written by Steven Brams and Peter Fishburn in 1983, a variety of theoretical and empirical works have enhanced our understanding of this method. The behavior of voters in such elections has been observed both in the laboratory and in the field; social choice theorists have analyzed the method from the axiomatic point of view; game theory and computer science have been used to scrutinize various strategic aspects; and political scientists have considered the structure of electoral competition entailed by Approval Voting. This book surveys this large body of knowledge through a collection of contributions written by specialists of the various disciplines involved.

Keywords

Approval Voting Democracy Elections Electoral Voting Behavior election game theory voter voting

Editors and affiliations

  • Jean-François Laslier
    • 1
  • M. Remzi Sanver
    • 2
  1. 1.Labo. d'EconometrieÉcole PolytechniquePalaiseau CXFrance
  2. 2.Dept. EconomicsIstanbul Bilgi UniversityIstanbulTurkey

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Business and Economics
  • Print ISBN 978-3-642-02838-0
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-02839-7
  • Series Print ISSN 1614-0311
  • About this book