Abstract
The results presented in this chapter belong to the long tradition of evaluating the voting rules on their propensity to select the Condorcet winner. This tradition dates back to de Borda (1781), who first noticed that just voting for one name and then selecting as a winner the candidate with more votes, could lead to the selection of an option that is beaten by all the other candidates in pairwise comparisons. In order to replace the rule that is now known as the Plurality rule, he suggested a new voting mechanism, which now bares his name, the Borda Count (BC). When m candidates are in competition, Borda suggested that each voter could give m — 1 points to his first choice, m — 2 points to his second choice, and so on down to one point for his next to the last alternative and zero point for the candidate he ranks last. Next, the candidate who receives the highest number of points is declared as the winner.
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Diss, M., Merlin, V., Valognes, F. (2010). On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives. In: Laslier, JF., Sanver, M. (eds) Handbook on Approval Voting. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_11
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