Abstract
A working democratic system of government is based on voting and elections. A glance at the literature reveals an astonishing variety of systems used for electing persons to political offices, for choosing policy alternatives and for enacting legislation. While it is undoubtedly true that voting is just a necessary condition for democracy, it is remarkable how many and how different systems are used for apparently the same purpose, viz. to find out the ‘will of the people’.
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Meskanen, T., Nurmi, H. (2008). Closeness Counts in Social Choice. In: Braham, M., Steffen, F. (eds) Power, Freedom, and Voting. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73382-9_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73382-9_15
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