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Complete independence of clones in the ranked pairs rule

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Abstract

The “ranked pairs” voting rule introduced in Tideman [2] is independent of clones (not materially affected by the replication of a candidate) in all but a small domain of cases. Appending a particular tie-breaking rule to the ranked pairs rule generates a rule that is completely independent of clones.

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References

  1. Kemeny JG, Snell JL (1962) Mathematical models in the social sciences. MIT Press, Cambridge

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  2. Tideman TN (1987) Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules. Soc Choice Welfare 4: 185–206

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 1221 Lamar, Suite 1200, 77010, Houston, TX, USA

    T. M. Zavist

  2. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 24061, Blacksburg, VA, USA

    T. N. Tideman

Authors
  1. T. M. Zavist
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  2. T. N. Tideman
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Zavist, T.M., Tideman, T.N. Complete independence of clones in the ranked pairs rule. Soc Choice Welfare 6, 167–173 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00303170

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00303170

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