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Flaws in Some Robust Optimistic Mix-Nets

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Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2003)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2727))

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Abstract

This paper introduces weaknesses of two robust Mix-nets proposed in [10] and [7]. First, we show that [10] can lose anonymity in the presence of a malicious user even though all servers are honest. Second, we show that [7] can lose anonymity through the collaboration of a malicious user and the first server. The user can identify the plaintext sent from the targeted user by invoking two mix sessions at the risk of the colluding server receiving an accusation. We also point out that in a certain case, anonymity is violated solely by the user without colluding to any server. Practical repairs are provided for both schemes. Since such flaws are due to their weak security definitions, we present a stronger security definition by regarding a Mix-net as a batch decryption algorithm of a CCA secure public-key encryption scheme.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. NTT Laboratories, Japan

    Masayuki Abe

  2. Information & Systems, Institute of Industrial Science, University of Tokyo, Tokyo

    Hideki Imai

Authors
  1. Masayuki Abe
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  2. Hideki Imai
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Information Technology and Computer Science, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, 2522, Australia

    Rei Safavi-Naini  & Jennifer Seberry  & 

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Abe, M., Imai, H. (2003). Flaws in Some Robust Optimistic Mix-Nets. In: Safavi-Naini, R., Seberry, J. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2727. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45067-X_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45067-X_4

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-40515-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45067-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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