Abstract
An important characteristic of recent MPC protocols is an input-independent setup phase in which most computations are offloaded, which greatly reduces the execution overhead of the online phase where parties provide their inputs. For a very efficient evaluation of arithmetic circuits in an information-theoretic online phase, the MPC protocols consume Beaver multiplication triples generated in the setup phase. Triple generation is generally the most expensive part of the protocol, and improving its efficiency is the aim of our work.
We specifically focus on computation over rings of the form \(\mathbb {Z}_{2^{\ell }}\) in the semi-honest model and the two-party setting, for which an Oblivious Transfer (OT)-based protocol is currently the best solution. To improve upon this method, we propose a protocol based on RLWE-based Additively Homomorphic Encryption. Our experiments show that our protocol is more scalable, and it outperforms the OT-based protocol in most cases. For example, we improve communication by up to 6.9x and runtime by up to 3.6x for 64-bit triple generation.
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Acknowledgements
This work was co-funded by the DFG as part of project E4 within the CRC 1119 CROSSING and project A.1 within the RTG 2050 “Privacy and Trust for Mobile Users”, and by the BMBF and the HMWK within CRISP.
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Rathee, D., Schneider, T., Shukla, K.K. (2019). Improved Multiplication Triple Generation over Rings via RLWE-Based AHE. In: Mu, Y., Deng, R., Huang, X. (eds) Cryptology and Network Security. CANS 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11829. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31578-8_19
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