Abstract
We introduce an allocation rule for measuring power in voting situations defined by a TU-game, a cooperation index and a coalition structure, and characterize it axiomatically. This rule is an extension of the Owen coalition value; in fact, a variety of previously studied game situations is embodied and unified by our model. Two numerical examples illustrate the application of the new value.
Research partially supported by project PR9509 of the Polytechnic University of Catalonia.
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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Amer, R., Carreras, F. (2001). Power, Cooperation Indices and Coalition Structures. In: Holler, M.J., Owen, G. (eds) Power Indices and Coalition Formation. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6221-1_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6221-1_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
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