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Part of the book series: Recent Economic Thought Series ((RETH,volume 50))

Abstract

The object of this article is to examine the Euskarian Parliament (in the Basque country) after the elections held on 30 November 1986. From the time of the election until 21 January 1987, the parties had to bargain with each other to form a winning coalition, since no one of them held an absolute majority.

Guillermo Owen’s research was supported by Natinal Science Foundation, Grant 08503676, Division of Decision and Management Sciences. This collaboration was made possible by a grant from the joint Spanish-U.S.A committee for cooperation in cultural matters.

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© 1996 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Carreras, F., Owen, G. (1996). An Analysis of the Euskarian Parliament. In: Schofield, N. (eds) Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 50. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8767-9_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8767-9_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5800-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8767-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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