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Theories of the Firm, Strategic Management, and Leadership

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Resource-Based and Evolutionary Theories of the Firm: Towards a Synthesis

Abstract

Economics and strategic management have, for many years, been developing relatively independently of one another, and they have only to a limited extent mutually stimulated one another. One reason is that economists have focussed little attention on the individual firm and its specific competencies. Indeed, although economists have for a long time been occupied by something they called “the theory of the firm,” the purpose has never been to enable them to say something about the individual firm. On the contrary, the theory of the firm has merely been a sub-theory of a more general theory of prices and markets. A more important explanation of the absent collaboration between economists and strategic management theorists is probably that for many years economists have based their work on a conceptual model which actually excludes the very existence of the phenomenon which is the raison d’etre or the justification for the field of strategic management. By basing their theorizing on the assumption that firms within the same industry are subject to identical cost and demand conditions, economists have actually assumed a world in which heterogeneity among firms cannot occur. However, this heterogeneity is the very precondition for the domain of strategic management.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Industrial Economics and Strategy, Copenhagen Business School, USA

    Christian Knudsen

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  1. Christian Knudsen
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Harvard Business School, USA

    Cynthia A. Montgomery

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© 1995 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Knudsen, C. (1995). Theories of the Firm, Strategic Management, and Leadership. In: Montgomery, C.A. (eds) Resource-Based and Evolutionary Theories of the Firm: Towards a Synthesis. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-2201-0_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-2201-0_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-5923-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-2201-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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