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Organizations as constitutional systems

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Abstract

Four theoretical approaches to the study of organizations that can be identified in the relevant literature are compared: Thegoal paradigm, theexchange paradigm, thenexus of contracts paradigm, and theconstitutional paradigm. It is argued that the latter provides the more fruitful theoretical perspective in that it reconciles an individualist methodology with an account of organisations as corporate actors, as units of collective action.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. George Mason University, 22030-4444, Fairfax, VA, USA

    Viktor J. Vanberg (Professor)

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  1. Viktor J. Vanberg
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I would like to thank Richard E. Wagner for helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft.

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Vanberg, V.J. Organizations as constitutional systems. Constit Polit Econ 3, 223–253 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393121

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