Abstract
Cooperative game theory begins with descriptions of coalitional behavior. For every permissible coalition, a subset of the players of the game, there is a given set of feasible outcomes for its members. Each outcome is presupposed to arise from cooperative behavior by the members of the coalition; specific individual actions are secondary.1 Cooperative games take several forms—games with side payments, games without side payments, partition function form games, and others, including, for example, bargaining games. In this paper we focus on games with and without side payments.
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Kaneko, M., Wooders, M.H. (2004). Utility Theories in Cooperative Games. In: Barberà, S., Hammond, P.J., Seidl, C. (eds) Handbook of Utility Theory. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-7964-1_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-7964-1_6
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