Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

China and the BRICs: A Real (but Limited) Partnership in a Unipolar World

  • Article
  • Published:
Polity

Abstract

Although Chinese leaders and analysts believe it is too early to judge the U.S. to be in fundamental decline, they do recognize that “newly emerging powers” (xinxing daguo) are an increasingly important force in international politics. In the past couple of years, the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) have transformed themselves from an abstract notion into a more formal political grouping. For China, besides helping to minimize dependence on the U.S. and possibly to constrain American unilateralism, BRIC cooperation serves several other functions. China also benefits from this cooperation by stabilizing its international environment, helping other developing countries, strengthening its identity as a developing country, coordinating its position with other BRICs to maximize leverage, and hiding in a group to avoid negative attention. This recent cooperation and interaction with the BRICs has been important, but the space for future BRIC cooperation is limited by fundamental differences among the BRICs, the continued importance of the U.S. for each of the BRICs, and intra-BRIC competition. To date, there is little evidence that China and the BRICs are trying to overthrow the existing international order. Instead, China has accepted and joined the existing order, and has been working together with other powers to reform its shortcomings. Although this negotiation is in its early stages and will likely be difficult, the willingness of China and the BRICs to work within the system and the openness of western countries to meet some of their demands makes it much less likely that China and other rising powers will try to overthrow the order.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. See Cynthia Roberts, “Introduction,” Polity 42 (January 2010): 1, note 1.

  2. See Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18 (Fall 1993): 44–79; and Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” International Security 17 (Spring 1993): 5–51.

  3. See William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24 (Summer 1999): 5–41; and Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). For the most recent scholarship on unipolarity, see the series of essays in World Politics 61 (January 2009). For other theoretical explanations for the lack of balancing against the U.S., see G. John Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); and Stephen Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2006).

  4. See Robert Jervis, “The Compulsive Empire,” Foreign Policy 137 (July-August 2003): 83–87.

  5. See Avery Goldstein, “Parsing China's Rise: International Circumstances and National Attributes,” in China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics, ed. Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 60–61; and Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). For a theoretical discussion of the difficulty of rising into different polarities, see Randall L. Schweller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory,” in Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (London: Routledge, 1999), 1–32.

  6. See Yan Xuetong, Zhongguo Jueqi jiqi Zhanlue [The Rise of China and its Strategy] (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2005); and Men Honghua, Jiangou Zhongguo Dazhanlue de Kuangjia [Constructing a Framework for China's Grand Strategy] (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2004).

  7. See Zhu Feng, “China's Rise will be Peaceful,” in China's Ascent, 37. For a similar, though less theoretical, argument, see Wang Jisi, “China's Search for Stability with America,” Foreign Affairs (September-October 2005). All translations are the author's.

  8. See Jia Qingguo, “Jiyu yu Tiaozhan: Danji Shijie yu Zhongguo de Heping Fazhan” [Opportunities and Challenges: A Unipolar World and China's Peaceful Development], Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu [Studies in International Politics] 4 (2007): 51.

  9. See Shi Yinhong, “Guoji Zhengzhi de Shijixing Guilu jiqi dui Zhongguo de Qishi” [The Century Pattern of International Politics and Inspiration for China], Zhanlue yu Guanli [Strategy and Management] 5 (1995): 1–3; and Tang Yongsheng, “Guoji Zhengzhi Changzhouqi Guilu zai Dangdai de Yanbian” [The Contemporary Evolution of the Pattern of Long Cycles in International Politics, Zhanlue yu Guanli 1 (1996): 46–51. Even nationalists that had a grand plan for China's future role in world recognized that China needed to cooperate with the United States. For example, see Cai Jianwei, chief ed., Zhongguo Dazhanlue: Lingdao Shijie de Lantu [China's Grand Strategy: A Blueprint for Leading the World] (Haikou: Hainan Chubanshe, 1996).

  10. For an excellent discussion of the origins of the multipolarization assessment and its evolution throughout the 1990s, see Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2005 [2000]), ch. 1.

  11. See He Fang, “Shijie Geju yu Guoji Xingshi” [World Structure and International Situation], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics] 11 (1991). In 1992, President Jiang Zemin announced a sixteen-character formulation (tifa) to guide the development of U.S.-China relations, which included “avoid confrontation” (bugao duikang).

  12. See Yan Xuetong, “Dangqian wo guo waijiao mianlin de tiaozhan he renwu” [The challenges and tasks that our country's diplomacy currently faces], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (1993).

  13. See Zhou Jianming, “Zhengque Renshi ‘Yichaoduoqiang’ de Guoji Geju” [Properly Understand the International Structure of ‘One Superpower, Many Great Powers’], Shehui Kexue [Social Sciences] 2 (1998): 34–37. Some analysts had endorsed this view in the early 1990s, but it became more widespread in the mid-1990s.

  14. See Shi Yinhong, “Zhengque Bawo Shijie Geju jiqi Fazhan Qushi” [Properly Grasp the World Structure and its Development Trend], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi Luntan [Forum on World Economics and Politics] 4 (1999): 36–37; and Liu Haijun, “Woguo Guanyu ‘Duoji (hua) Geju de Liangci Zhengming” [Two Debates on Multipolar(ization) Structure], Guoji Guancha [International Survey] 2 (2000): 41–45.

  15. See Ruan Zongze, “Yilake Zhanzheng yu Guoji Geju” [The Iraq War and International Structure], Qiushi [Seeking Truth] 12 (2003): 55–57; and Li Jingzhi, “Shijie Geju he Daguo Guanxi de Xin Bianhua” [World Structure and New Changes in Great Power Relations], Guoji Luntan [International Forum] 5 (2003): 1–8.

  16. See James C. Hsiung, “China's Omni-Directional Diplomacy: Realignment to Cope with Monopolar U.S. Power,” Asian Survey 35 (June 1995): 573–86; and Rosemary Foot, “Chinese Strategies in a US-hegemonic Global Order: Accommodating and Hedging,” International Affairs 82 (2006): 77–94.

  17. See Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge; Thomas J. Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia,” International Security 31 (Summer 2006): 81–126; and Michael A. Glosny, “Heading toward a Win-Win Future?: Recent Developments in China's Policy towards Southeast Asia,” Asian Security 2 (2006): 24–57.

  18. The emphasis in post-Cold War defense reports on preventing the rise of a potential peer competitor, and discussions of China in this context, is further evidence for hyper-sensitivity. See Lu Gang and Guo Xuetang, chief eds., Zhongguo Weixie Shei: Jiedu “Zhongguo Weixielun” [Who Does China Threaten? Interpreting “China Threat Theory”] (Shanghai: Xuelin Press, 2004).

  19. See Constantine Menges, “Russia, China, and What's Really on the Table,” Washington Post, July 29, 2001.

  20. For a similar argument, see Bonnie S. Glaser and Lyle Morris, “Chinese Perceptions of U.S. Decline and Power,” Jamestown Brief, July 9, 2009.

  21. See Li Hongmei, “The U.S. Hegemony Ends, the Era of Global Multipolarity Enters,” People's Daily (online), February 24, 2009.

  22. See Wu Jianmin, “Dashi, Dongxiang, Sikao: dui 2008nian Guoji Xingshi de Huigu yu Sikao” [Great Events, Trends and Reflections: Review and Reflections on the International Situation in 2008], Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs] December 16 (2008): 28–31.

  23. See “‘9–11’ yilai Guoji Bianju yu Zhongguo Waijiao” [Changes in the International Situation since 9–11 and China's Diplomacy], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations] 9 (2006): 1–41, 47; and “Zhongguo shi ge ‘Daguo’ ma?” [Is China a “Great Power?”], Shijie Zhishi, No. 1 (2007): 16–27.

  24. See “Dangqian Guoji Jinrong Weiji yu Guoji Tixi Zhuanxing” [Contemporary International Financial Crisis and Transformation of the International System], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 4 (2009): 1–42; “Aoyunhou Shidai” Zhongguo yu Shijie de Guanxi” [China's Relations with the World in the “Post-Olympics Era”], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 9 (2008): 1–34; and Xu Jin, “Jingji Weiji Nanyi Dianfu ‘Yichaoduoqiang’ Geju” [It Will Be Difficult for the Economic Crisis to Overturn the Structure of “One Superpower, Many Great Powers], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 12 (2008): 26–27.

  25. See Qin Yaqing, “Guoji Tixi Zhuanxing yiji Zhongguo Zhanlue Jiyuqi de Yanxu” [Transformation of the International System and the Continuation of China's Period of Strategic Opportunity], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 4 (2009): 35.

  26. See Peng Guangqian, “Quanqiu Jinrong Weiji dui Guoji Geju de Yingxiang” [The Influence of the Global Financial Crisis on the International Structure], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 4 (2009): 27.

  27. See Wang Jisi, “Roundtable on U.S.-China Relations,” Nanfeng Chuang, October 20, 2008.

  28. See Fu Mengzi, “Guoji Zhengzhi Jingji Xingshi Zhengzai Jingli Jubian” [The International Political and Economic Situation is Experiencing Great Changes], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 9 (2008): 6. See also Jin Canrong, “Ruhe Renshi Guoji Daqushi” [How to Understand Major International Trends], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 9 (2008): 6.

  29. See “Zhongguo shi ge ‘Daguo’ ma?” [Is China a “Great Power?”], Shijie Zhishi 1 (2007): 16–27.

  30. See “Hu Jintao: zai Jinian Dang de shiyijie zhongquanhui zhaokai 30 zhounian dahui shang de jianghua” [Hu Jintao: Speech at Meeting to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of the Third Plenary Session of 11th CCP Central Committee], Xinhua, December 18, 2008.

  31. See Yu Xintian, chief ed., Guoji Tixi zhong de Zhongguo Juese [China's Role in International Order] (Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 2008), 3; and Wang Jisi, “Dangdai Shijie Zhengzhi Fazhan Qushi yu Zhongguo de Quanqiu Juese” [Political Development Trends in the Contemporary World and China's Global Role], Beijing Daxue Xuebao (Zhexue Shehui Kexueban) [Peking University Journal [Philosophy and Social Sciences edition]] 46 (January 2009): 13.

  32. See “China's National Defense in 2008,” Beijing, January 2009.

  33. See Liu Xinyu, “Jinzhuan Fenghui shouxiu Mouhua Hezuo Zouxiang” [BRIC Summit Plans the Future Trend of Cooperation], Huanqiu, June 15, 2009.

  34. Author's interviews with Chinese academics, Washington, DC, spring 2009.

  35. See Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the New Geopolitics (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 43, 46, 177.

  36. One analyst observed: “Establishing an anti-hegemonic united front has costs and no benefits.” See Yan Xuetong, “Guoji Huanjing ji Waijiao Sikao” [International Environment and Reflections on Diplomacy], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 8 (1999): 11.

  37. See Ma Jiali, “ZhongEYin Sanjiao Guanxi de Xin Fazhan” [New Developments in Sino-Russian-Indian Triangular Relations], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 7 (2005): 59–62.

  38. See Liu Xinyu, “Jinzhuan Fenghui shouxiu Mouhua Hezuo Zouxiang.”

  39. See “‘BRICs Xianxiang’ de Pouxi” [An Analysis of the BRICs Phenomenon], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 9 (2004).

  40. For example, see “Yang Jiechi Attends the Chinese, Russian, Indian, and Brazilian Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” Xinhua, May 16, 2008.

  41. Zhang Yunling, the Director of the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) characterizes China's moves to improve relations with Russia as an attempt to “strive to create a more favorable space for survival and development under the current international structure.” See Zhang Yunling, chief ed., Huoban haishi Duishou: Tiaozhengzhong de ZhongMeiRiE Guanxi [Partner or Adversary: Adjustments in Sino-American-Japanese-Russian Relations] (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2001), 40.

  42. See Huang Renwei, “Guoji Tixi Zhuanxing yu Zhongguo Heping Fazhan Daolu” [Transformation of International System and China's Peaceful Development Road], Guoji Tixi yu Zhongguo de Ruan Liliang [The International System and China's Soft Power] (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 2006), 18.

  43. See Liu Xinyu, “Jinzhuan Fenghui shouxiu Mouhua Hezuo Zouxiang.” For a discussion of the importance of exchange of ideas in a RIC context, see Chu Shulong, “Jiaqiang Hezuo zhengfeng shi” [Strengthening Cooperation at Meeting], Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], July 19, 2006.

  44. See Cao Lingjun, chief ed., Baguo Jituan yu Dangdai Shijie Geju [G8 and Contemporary World Structure], (Renmin Chubanshe, 2005), 194.

  45. See Li Hong, “BRIC Not Yet Full-Blown,” People's Daily, June 18, 2009.

  46. For an excellent discussion of this increased emphasis on coordination, see Pang Zhongying, “Xinxing Daguo, youxian Hezuo” [Newly Emerging Great Powers, Limited Cooperation], Dongfang Zaobao [Oriental Morning Post], December 30, 2008.

  47. See Xue Lei, “Zhongguo Waijiao Zoujin Duobian Xietiao Shidai” [China's Diplomacy Enters the Era of Multilateral Coordination], Wen Hui Bao, June 18, 2009.

  48. See Vladimir Radyuhin, “BRIC Nations Played Crucial Role at G20 Summit,” Guardian, November 26, 2008; and Song Guoyou, “Buyao Qingyan G20 Daiti G8” [Do Not Casually Declare that the G20 has Replaced the G8], Guoji Xianqu Daobao [International Herald Leader], November 20, 2008.

  49. See Sun Shangwu, “G5 Leaders Urge Action from G8,” China Daily, July 10, 2009.

  50. Author's interviews with Chinese scholars and think tank researchers, Washington, DC, spring 2009.

  51. For a discussion of the continued logic behind this approach, see Yuan Peng, “Meiguo Weixielun: Rang Bieren Shuo ba” [U.S. Threat Theory: Let Others Say It], Huanqiu Shibao [Global Times], February 14, 2007.

  52. See “BRIC Nations Say No IMF Cash without Representation,” Reuters, March 13, 2009.

  53. For thorough discussions of these numerous challenges, see Lo, Axis of Convenience; and Dmitri Trenin, “Russia leaves the West,” Foreign Affairs (July-August 2006).

  54. See Andrew Hurrell and Amrita Narlikar, “A New Politics of Confrontation? Brazil and India in Multilateral Trade Negotiations,” Global Society 20 (2006): 415–33.

  55. Author's interviews with Chinese scholars, Washington, DC, spring 2009.

  56. See Gregory T. Chin, “China's Evolving G8 Engagement: Complex Interests and Multiple Identity in Global Governance Reform,” in Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process, ed. Andrew F. Cooper and Agata Antkiewicz (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008), 83–114.

  57. See “Address at the Inauguration of Pre-BRIC Summit Preparatory Meeting by H. E. Mr. Zhang Yan, Chinese Ambassador to India,” May 13, 2009.

  58. See Liu Jianfei, “‘Zhongguo Zerenlun’ Kaoyan Heping Fazhan” [“China Responsibility Theory” Tests Peaceful Development], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 4 (2007): 22–26; and Liu Ming, “Zhongguo Guoji Zerenlun Pingxi” [Assessment of China International Responsibility Theory], Mao Zedong Deng Xiaoping Lilun Yanjiu [Theoretical Research on Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping], 50–55.

  59. See Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-be Great Powers,” International Affairs 82 (January 2006): 18.

  60. See Wang Jisi, “Meiguo Baquan de Luoji” [The Logic of American Hegemony], Meiguo Yanjiu [American Studies] 3 (2003): 7–29.

  61. See Evan S. Medeiros, “China's International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification,” Joint Forces Quarterly 47 (4th quarter 2007): 33.

  62. See Shen Guofang, “Zhongguo Xin Waijiao de Linian yu Shijian” [Ideas and Practice in China's New Diplomacy], Shijie Zhishi 13 (2007): 42.

  63. See “China's National Defense in 2008,” Beijing, January 2009.

  64. Deng Xiaoping first used this formulation in 1988 and it was subsequently endorsed by all of Chinese leaders, and included in the work reports of the Party Congresses. See “China Eager to Establish New International Order,” Xinhua, February 28, 1991.

  65. Although this change may appear small, changing a tifa that was first enunciated by Deng Xiaoping and had been repeated for almost twenty years is very significant.

  66. See Fu Ying, “China and Asia in a New Era,” China: An International Journal 1 (September 2003): 311; and Secretary Colin L. Powell, “Briefing on Trip to East Asia,” July 29, 2001.

  67. See Pang Zhongying, “Zhongguo zai Guoji Tixizhong de Diwei yu Zuoyong” [China's Position and Role in the International System], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 4 (2006): 20. China's view on the international order also experienced an “identity transformation from victim of order to beneficiary of order.” See Guo Shuyong, “Lun Zhongguo Jueqi yu Shijie Zhixu de Guanxi” [On the Relationship between China's Rise and International Order], Taipingyang Xuebao 6 (2005): 5.

  68. See Cui Liru, “The Absence of a Model,” China Security 4 (Spring 2008): 9.

  69. See Jin Canrong, “Welai 30nian qujueyu meiguo nengfou Jiena Zhongguo Jueqi” [The Next 30 Years Depend on whether or not the U.S. can accept China's Rise], Dongfang Zaobao, January 7, 2009.

  70. See Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27 (Spring 2003): 5–56; Bates Gill, Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007); and Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, eds., China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998).

  71. See Yang Jiemian, “Xinxing Daguo Qunti zai Guoji Tixi Zhuanxingzhong de Zhanlue Xuanze” [The Strategic Choices on Newly Emerging Powers in the Transformation of the International System], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 6 (2008): 6. For a similar argument, see Zhang Tuosheng, “Defining China's Role on the World Stage,” China Daily, December 22, 2006.

  72. See Shen Guofang, “Zhongguo Xin Waijiao de Linian yu Shijian;” and Ruan Zongze, “Shixian Zhongguo Waijiao ‘Huayuquan’” [Achieving China's Diplomatic ‘Right to Speak’], Shijie Zhishi 32 (2005): 28.

  73. See Pang Zhongying, “Zhongguo zai Guoji Tixizhong de Diwei yu Zuoyong,” 19.

  74. See Men Honghua, Jiangou Zhongguo Dazhanlue de Kuangjia.

  75. For discussions of this critique, see Bob Davis, “Brazil, Russia, India, China Offer IMF Financial Aid for Wider Policy Role,” Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2009; and “Zhongguo shi ge Daguo ma?”

  76. Wang Jisi has referred to a “global governance deficit” and an “international regime deficit.” See Wang Jisi “Dangdai Shijie Zhengzhi Fazhan Qushi yu Zhongguo de Quanqiu Juese” [Development Trends in Contemporary World Politics and China's Global Role], Beijing Daxue Xuebao [Peking University Journal] 46 (January 2009): 13.

  77. See Lin Limin and Chang Shanshan, “Guanyu Zhongguo Chengzhang wei Shijie di’er da Jingjiti hou de Guoji Zhanlue Sikao” [Reflections on International Strategy after China Rises to become the World's Second Largest Economic Entity], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 10 (2008): 40.

  78. See Andrew S. Weiss, “BRIC-a-Brac,” Foreign Policy (online), June 2009.

  79. It is usually summarized as consisting of the principles of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation. See “China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept,” June 8, 2002.

  80. See “Hu Calls for a Harmonious World at Summit,” China Daily, September 16, 2005. Chinese leaders and experts have also increasingly emphasized vague concepts such as “diversification of the world” (shijie duoyanghua), “cultural diversification”(wenhua duoyuanhua), and the Confucian principle of “harmony with differences” (he’erbutong). See “Hexie Shijie yu Zhongguo Waijiao” [Harmonious World and China's Diplomacy], Waijiao Pinglun [Foreign Affairs Review] 87 (February 2006): 15–20.

  81. See Ding Yuanhong, “Jianli Gongzheng Guoji Zhixu” [Establishment of a Just International Order], Heping yu Fazhan [Peace and Development] 2 (2005): 15–16, 14.

  82. Pang Zhongying, then a professor at Nankai University, argues that China's “proposals are empty, too focused on principle and have the flavor of political propaganda. There are few proposals that are concrete and workable or can be implemented.” See Pang Zhongying, “Zhongguo zai Guoji Tixizhong de Diwei yu Zuoyong,” 18.

  83. In addition to President Hu's speeches at the G20 summits and BRICs leader's summit, see Wang Qishan, “G20 Must Look Beyond the Needs of the Top 20,” The Times, March 27, 2009.

  84. See “China Central Bank Governor Suggests Creating Super-Sovereign Reserve Currency,” Xinhua, March 24, 2009.

  85. See Jonathan Kirshner, “Dollar Primacy and American Power: What's at Stake?” Review of International Political Economy 15 (August 2008): 418–38.

  86. See John Pomfret, “The End of Dollar Dominance?” Washington Post, March 23, 2009; Alison Klayman, “China Calls for New World Reserve Currency,” Voice of America, March 26, 2009; and Paul Krugman, “China's Dollar Trap,” New York Times, April 2, 2009.

  87. See Wang Xu, “Experts Cool to Zhou Proposal,” China Daily, March 25, 2009.

  88. See Chris Buckley, “Much-Trumpeted BRIC Summit Ends Quietly,” Reuters, June 17, 2009.

  89. See “Summit Talks Likely to Turn to Dollar,” China Daily, July 3, 2009.

  90. See “Vice FM: US Should Maintain Stability of Dollar,” China Daily, July 6, 2009.

  91. See “China Reassures on Dollar Debate before G8,” China Daily, July 6, 2009.

  92. See “Nobel Laureate Stiglitz Calls for New Global Reserve Currency System,” Xinhua, March 27, 2009; and “Experts Call for Diversified Reserve Currency Ahead of G8 Summit,” China Daily, July 5, 2009.

  93. See “Yuan Small Step,” Economist, July 9, 2009; “Lula: Let's Trade in our own Currencies,” Xinhua, May 21, 2009; “China, Brazil Working on Trade FX Deal,” Reuters, June 28, 2009.

  94. See Steve Levine, “China's Yuan: The Next Reserve Currency?” Business Week, May 26, 2009.

  95. See “BRIC Nations Say No IMF Cash without Representation,” Reuters, March 14, 2009; and Jeffrey E. Garten, “The G-20 and the Future of Capitalism: Part I,” YaleGlobal, March 30, 2009. According to the statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “President Hu made it clear that China is ready to make active contributions to increasing resources of the IMF and stressed at the same time that the IMF should seek a balance between rights and obligations.” See “President Hu Jintao's Attendance at the Second Financial Summit of G20 Leaders Achieves Major Outcomes,” April 2, 2009.

  96. See “At G20, China Finds a Way to Raise Stature in World Finance,” Xinhua, April 4, 2009.

  97. See Zhang Ran, “IMF Reform ‘Key to Tackling Downturn,’” China Daily, July 9, 2009.

  98. See Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Foreign Policy Address at the Council on Foreign Relations,” Washington, DC, July 15, 2009.

  99. See “China Hails G20 Progress,” The Times, April 3, 2009; “President Hu Jintao Accepts a Joint Interview by the Japanese Media Institutions Stationed in Beijing,” May 4, 2008; and Fu Mengzi, “Daweiji Cuisheng Xinzhixu” [Great Crisis Gives Birth to New Order], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, No. 4 (2009): 19–21.

  100. See Huangfu Pinglin, “G20 Fenghui de Tiaozheng Qidai” [Expectation of Adjustments at G20 Summit], Liaowang Xinwen Zhoukan, March 23, 2009, 56–7; Liu Liwei, “Xunqiu Gongying de Shuguang” [The Dawn of Seeking Win-Win], Liaowang Xinwen Zhoukan, April 6, 2009, 8–10; and “How Does G8 Summit Play its Role in World Affairs?” Xinhua, July 10, 2009.

  101. See Cai Hong, “A Group Depends on What Leaders Make of It,” China Daily, July 9, 2009.

  102. See Shi Yinhong, “ZhongMei Guanxi Xianzhu Fazhan de yi da keneng Qianjing” [One Great Possible Prospect for Notable Development in Sino-American Relations], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies] 1 (2007): 5.

  103. See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 206. For other analysis of peaceful change, see Edward Hallett Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1946 [2nd edition]); and Charles A. Kupchan et al., eds., Power in Transition: The Peaceful Change of International Order (New York, United Nations University Press, 2001).

  104. See Yuan Peng, “Zhong-Mei Guanxi Xin Tedian” [New Characteristics in Sino-American Relations], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 1 (2007): 10–11.

  105. See Leslie Elliott Armijo, “The BRICs Countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight,” Asian Perspective 31 (2007): 9. For other discussions of these differences, see Andrew Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-be Great Powers.”

  106. See “‘BRICs Xianxiang’ de Pouxi.”

  107. See “Jinzhuan Siguo Shounao Fenghui: Cong “Huobi Gongshi” dao “Fenghui Jizhihua;” and Wang Yusheng, “‘Jinzhuan Siguo’ Fenghui jiang Juxing” [BRIC Summit will be held], Jiefang Ribao, June 12, 2009.

  108. See Harsh V. Pant, “Feasibility of the Russia-China-India ‘Strategic Triangle’: Assessment of Theoretical and Empirical Issues,” International Studies 43 (2006): 51–72. For an explicit connection between the importance of the U.S. and limits on BRIC cooperation, see Pang Zhongying, “Xinxing Daguo, youxian Hezuo.”

  109. See Jing-dong Yuan, “The Dragon and the Elephant: Chinese-Indian Relations in the 21st Century,” Washington Quarterly 30 (Summer 2007): 131–44; and John W. Garver, “China's Influence in Central and South Asia: Is It Increasing?” in Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 205–27.

  110. See Lo, Axis of Convenience; and Yu Bin, “China and Russia: Normalizing their Strategic Partnership,” in Power Shift, 228–46.

  111. See Zhao Gancheng, “ZhongMeiE Zhanlue Guanxi de Zhengce Yiyi yu Fazhan Qianjing” [Political Implications and Development Prospects for Sino-American-Russian Strategic Relations], Nanya Yanjiu [South Asian Studies] 2 (2005): 4.

  112. See “Chinese Premier Rejects Allegation of China, U.S. Monopolizing World Affairs in Future,” Xinhua, May 21, 2009; Wu Jianmin, “‘G2’ de Tifa butuo” [The “G2” Forumlation is Inappropriate], Renmin Ribao Haiwaiban, May 25, 2009; and Chu Guofei and Chen Wenxin, “ZhongMei ‘Liangguo Jituan’ Gouxiang de youlai ji kexingxing Fenxi” [An Analysis of the Origins and Feasibility of the U.S.-China “G2” Concept], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 6 (2009): 18–22, 42.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Massachusetts Institute of Technology,

    Michael A Glosny

Authors
  1. Michael A Glosny
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Additional information

The author is indebted to Stephen Brooks, Joshua Busby, Matthew Ferchen, Rosemary Foot, Bonnie Glaser, James Green, Parag Khanna, Christopher Layne, Matthew Oresman, Andrew Polsky, Philip Potter, Cynthia Roberts, Joshua Rovner, Wang Wenfeng, and William Wohlforth for comments on earlier drafts. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or positions of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

For an excellent review of these arguments, see Christopher Layne, “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony: Myth or Realty,” International Security 34 (Summer 2009): 147–72.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Glosny, M. China and the BRICs: A Real (but Limited) Partnership in a Unipolar World. Polity 42, 100–129 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1057/pol.2009.14

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/pol.2009.14

Keywords

Search

Navigation