Abstract
The basic theorems of ‘soft’ game theory are proved. This involves defining six ‘paradoxes’ (or dilemmas) of rationality and proving that if none of them exist, then the players all agree on a solution with strong self-reinforcing properties—a so-called ‘strict, strong equilibrium.’
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Howard, N. n-person ‘soft’ games. J Oper Res Soc 49, 144–150 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jors.2600514
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jors.2600514