Abstract
This paper explores whether labour-management theory provides significant insights into the operation of the Yugoslav economy and into the process of transition in the Yugoslav successor states. It concludes that the literature offered only modest insights into the operation of the Yugoslav economy, primarily because Yugoslavia did not satisfy many of the basic assumptions of the model. The socialist features of the Yugoslav economy remained dominant, suppressing many of the elements of economic democracy. The most significant contributions of the labour-management literature were theoretical, concerning supply responses of worker-controlled firms in a decentralised source allocation mechanism and the incentive, organisational and efficiency aspects of labour-management.
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Notes
In fact, they have a remarkably contemporary feel: price liberalisation, freedom for the firm to determine its output on the basis of prices, market-based costing of labour and capital, and rules for bankruptcy.
Social compacts were agreements concluded between representatives of the political authorities, trade unions, enterprises and other organisations, on policies in specific fields, such as prices, income distribution, employment and foreign trade. Self-management agreements regulated relations between enterprises and other organisations in areas of mutual interest, such as terms for the foundation of firms and banks, or joint investment projects (see Uvalic, 1992, p. 7).
Gross Social Product, or Social Product in Yugoslav terminology, corresponds to Gross Material Product: it is the value added of the ‘productive’ sectors of the economy, thus excluding most ‘non-productive’ sectors such as education, health, defense, banking and other services. In this sense it is similar to the concept of Net Material Product that was used in other socialist countries, but it is gross of depreciation.
It could be argued that Yugoslavia became an irrelevant testing ground for any kind of labour-management in the 1970s because of political problems – the Croatian ‘spring’ and near civil war, the purges in Serbia in 1971, the energy-sapping disputes, the extreme decentralisation of the economy and republican self-sufficiency in many areas. However, we note above that political decentralisation occurred simultaneously with attempts to improve the self-management system. The 1976 Associated Labour Act was considered the ‘Workers' Bible’ because of the self-management rights supposedly guaranteed to workers.
The theory of the labour-managed firm developed in the West was first presented in the works of Horvat (1967, 1972) and Suvakovic (1977), but was for a long time ignored by some of the leading Yugoslav economists, also because of its ‘bourgeois’ and neoclassical foundations.
It is notable that the agent meant to act as entrepreneur was never fully developed in labour-management models; probably the only exception is Prasnikar et al. (1994), where a framework is employed which reflects all the three main decision-makers in Yugoslavia: workers, managers and government authorities, as well as their strategic interaction (bargaining).
This did not preclude the possibility that one party could remain dominant on the political scene, as happened in Croatia (HDZ – Croatian Democratic Alliance) and Serbia (SPS – Socialist Party of Serbia).
The contribution of the social property sector to GSP was close to the Yugoslav average in most cases, ranging from 84% in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 89.9% in Slovenia; the only real exception was Kosovo where it was exceptionally low, only 77%. The private sector was much more important in Kosovo than elsewhere because of the large share of agriculture and small-scale crafts, both predominantly in private hands. These shares have been calculated on the basis of data on GSP in constant 1972 prices reported in the Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia 1991 (Federal Office of Statistics, 1991, p. 475) (Uvalic, 2008).
Still, the laws adopted by all the successor states were more restrictive than the previous Federal privatisation law regarding discounts, repayment periods, etc.
This provision was included in the 1990 Serbian Constitution that guaranteed the equal treatment of four forms of property – social, private, state and cooperative (see Sluzbeni Glasnik Republike Srbije, 1990, Article 56). It was changed only in 2006, with the adoption of the new Serbian Constitution, which states that ‘Private, cooperative and public property is guaranteed’, whereas ‘Existing social property is to be transformed into private property under conditions, methods and deadlines envisaged by law’ (see Sluzbeni Glasnik Republike Srbije, 2006, Article 86).
By 2007, even Bosnia and Herzegovina had a private sector contributing 60% to GDP.
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Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge research assistance from Kasia Komosa and Angela Lei, as well as conversation and suggestions from Avner Ben-Ner, Joe Brada, Bozidar Cerovic, Derek Jones, Laza Kekic, Smiljan Jurin, Mario Nuti, Louis Putterman and Milan Vodopivec. Any remaining errors are their own.
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Estrin, S., Uvalic, M. From Illyria towards Capitalism: Did Labour-Management Theory Teach Us Anything about Yugoslavia and Transition in Its Successor States?. Comp Econ Stud 50, 663–696 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1057/ces.2008.41
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/ces.2008.41