Skip to main content
Log in

An Accuracy Argument in Favor of Ranking Theory

  • Published:
Journal of Philosophical Logic Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Fitelson and McCarthy (2014) have proposed an accuracy measure for confidence orders which favors probability measures and Dempster-Shafer belief functions as accounts of degrees of belief and excludes ranking functions. Their accuracy measure only penalizes mistakes in confidence comparisons. We propose an alternative accuracy measure that also rewards correct confidence comparisons. Thus we conform to both of William James’ maxims: “Believe truth! Shun error!” We combine the two maxims, penalties and rewards, into one criterion that we call prioritized accuracy optimization (PAO). That is, PAO punishes wrong comparisons (preferring the false to the true) and rewards right comparisons (preferring the true to the false). And it requires to prioritize being right und avoiding to be wrong in a specific way. Thus PAO is both, a scoring rule and a decision rule. It turns out that precisely confidence orders representable by two-sided ranking functions satisfy PAO. The point is not to argue that PAO is the better accuracy goal. The point is only that ranking theory can also be supported by accuracy considerations. Thus, those considerations by themselves cannot decide about rational formats for degrees of belief, but are part and parcel of an overall normative assessment of those formats.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. One could in fact establish >, showing non-surjectivity.

  2. Restricting R (and L) to \(\mathcal {A} \setminus \{\emptyset , W\}\), we get the weaker claim: any optimal total transitive extension of ≤ is either the canonical ≼ or its irregular alternative. Compare the last two lines in the proof below.

References

  1. Dubois, D. (1984). Steps to a theory of qualitative possibility. In Proceedings of the 6th international congress on cybernetics and systems (pp. 147–152). Paris: AFCET Publication.

  2. Easwaran, K., & Fitelson, B. (2015). Accuracy, coherence and evidence. In T. Szabo Gendler, & J. Hawthorne (Eds.) Oxford studies in epistemology (Vol. 5). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  3. Fitelson, B. (2017). Two approaches to doxastic representation, presentation at the Eastern APA, Baltimore (January 2017), available at: http://fitelson.org/spohn_apa_handout.pdf.

  4. Fitelson, B., & McCarthy, D. (2014). Toward an epistemic foundation for comparative confidence, presentation, University of Wisconsin-Madison (April 2014), available at: http://fitelson.org/cc_handout.pdf.

  5. Halpern, J. (2003). Reasoning about uncertainty. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  6. James, W. (1896). The will to believe. In The will to believe and other essays in popular philosophy (p. 1956). New York: Dover Publications.

  7. Joyce, J. (1998). A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism. Philosophy of Science, 65, 575–603.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Joyce, J. (2009). Accuracy and coherence: prospects for an alethic epistemology of partial belief. In F. Huber, & C. Schmidt-Petri (Eds.) Degrees of Belief, Synthese library (Vol. 342, pp. 263–297). Berlin: Springer.

  9. Kraft, C., Pratt, J., Seidenberg, A. (1959). Intuitive probability on finite sets. Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 30(2), 408–419.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  10. Pettigrew, R. (2016). Accuracy and the laws of credence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  11. Raidl, E. (ms). Comparative belief and T-norms: a model based on ordinal valued ranking functions, Manuscript (March 2019). Earlier version available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313842085_Representation_Theory_for_Ranking_Functions.

  12. Scott, D. (1964). Measurement structures and linear inequalities. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1, 233–247.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. Shafer, G. (1976). A mathematical theory of evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  14. Spohn, W. (1988). Ordinal conditional functions. A dynamic theory of epistemic states. In W.L. Harper, & B. Skyrms (Eds.) Causation in decision, belief change, and statistics (Vol. 2, pp. 105–134). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

  15. Spohn, W. (1990). A general non-probabilistic theory of inductive reasoning. In R.D. Shachter, T.S. Levitt, J. Lemmer, L.N. Kanal (Eds.) Uncertainty in artificial intelligence 4 (pp. 149–158). Amsterdam: Elsevier.

  16. Spohn, W. (2012). The laws of belief: ranking theory and its philosophical applications. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  17. Wong, S.K.M., Yao, Y.Y., Bollmann, P., Bürger, H.C. (1991). Axiomatization of qualitative belief structure. IEEE Transactions on System, Man, and Cybernetics, 21, 726–734.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

We are indebted to Branden Fitelson for making us think about the topics that we develop in this paper and to David MacCarthy for most valuable comments.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Wolfgang Spohn.

Additional information

Publisher’s Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Eric Raidl’s work was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) Research Unit FOR 1614.

Appendix A: Proofs

Appendix A: Proofs

1.1 A.1 Canonical Order

\(k: W \to \mathbb {N} \cup \{\infty \}\) is a ranking mass (or point ranking function) iff it is a total function and k− 1(0)≠. Given a ranking mass, the induced negative ranking function over \(\mathcal {A}\) is \(\kappa _{k}(A) = \min _{w \in A} k(w)\) if A and else \(\kappa _{k}(\emptyset )=\infty \). κk is indeed a negative ranking function and in fact complete, i.e., for all \(S \subseteq \mathcal {A}\), \(\kappa _{k}(\bigcup S) =\min _{A \in S} \kappa _{k}(A)\). Conversely, every complete negative ranking function κ over \(\mathcal {A}\) has a unique ranking mass kκ(w) = κ({w}) inducing it.

Definition 8

Let W be finite. Given a basic order ≤ over W (i.e., weak order), the canonical two-sided ranking function τ is recursively defined as follows:

  1. (1)

    W0 = W, \([0]=: \max _{\leq } W_{0}\),

  2. (2)

    Wn+ 1 := Wn ∖ [n] (if non-empty, else stop), \([n+1] := \max _{\leq } W_{n+1}\),

  3. (3)

    k(w) := x iff w ∈ [x], κ = κk,

  4. (4)

    \(\tau _{\leq }(A)=\kappa (\overline {A}) - \kappa (A)\).

The canonical extension of ≤ to \(\mathcal {A}\) is the order ≼ induced by τ: AB iff τ(A) ≤ τ(B) for all \(A,B \in \mathcal {A}\).

Call [m] the m-worlds. It is clear that k is a ranking mass over W (since [0]≠, by finiteness and totality), thus κ = κk is a negative ranking function and τ a two-sided ranking function over \(\mathcal {A}\), and all are regular. The canonical extension ≼ of ≤ is a weak order, ≤-compatible and clearly representable by a regular two-sided ranking function (namely by τ).

Let \(A \in \mathcal {A} \setminus \{\emptyset , W\}\) and n > 0: A is a 0-set, iff A partitions [0] non-voidly (A ∩ [0]≠ and \(\overline {A} \cap [0] \neq \emptyset \)). A is an − n-set iff the smallest world in A is an n-world. A is an n-set iff A is the complement of a − n-set. Note: there are 0-sets iff |[0]| > 1.

Lemma 1

Letbe a basic orderover finite W,itscanonical extension andAx,Ay x-and y-sets. Then

  1. (1)

    for\(A \in \mathcal {A} \setminus \{\emptyset , W\}\): A is an x-set iffτ(A) = x,

  2. (2)

    for\(A_{x}, A_{y} \in \mathcal {A} \setminus \{\emptyset , W\}\):AxAyiffxy,

  3. (3)

    an extensionofto\(\mathcal {A}\)isrepresentable by a regular two-sided ranking function iffis.

Proof

(1) holds by construction, (2) follows. (3) holds since τ is, up to order isomorphism, the only regular two-sided ranking function representing ≤. □

Let \(n \in \mathbb {N}\): A − n-set An is full iff \([n] \subseteq A_{n}\), it is non-full iff it is not full. An n-set An is void iff it is the complement of a full − n-set, it is non-void iff it is not void. \(\dot {A}_{-n}, \dot {A}_{n}\) will stand for full − n-sets and void n-sets, and be contrasted with An,An, where these are non-full − n-sets and non-void n-sets.

Denote PF(w) := {〈A,B〉 : wAB}, resp. PR(w) := {〈A,B〉 : wBA}, the set of potentially wrong, resp. right, comparisons inw . In the whole section ≼ is the canonical extension of the basic ≤.

Lemma 2 (Wrongness)

Letbe the canonicalextension of the basic.Then

  1. (1)

    F(≼,w) = PF(w) ∩{〈Ax,Ay〉 : −nx < yn} forw ∈ [n],

  2. (2)

    |F(≼,w)| = 0 forw ∈ [0],

  3. (3)

    |F(≼,w)| = |F(≼,v)| forallw,v ∈ [n],n ≥ 0.

Proof

Assume ≤,≼ as given. (1) Let 〈Ax,Ay〉∈ F(≼,w) for w ∈ [n]. Then (i) wAxAy, i.e., 〈Ax,Ay〉∈ PF(w) and (ii) AxAy. By (i) − nx and yn. By (ii) x < y (Lemma 1.2). Thus − nx < yn. Conversely, let 〈Ax,Ay〉∈ PF(w) ∩{〈Ax,Ay〉 : −nx < yn}. Thus wAxAy and − nx < yn. Hence AxAy (Lemma 1.2). (2) − 0 ≤ x < y ≤ 0 is impossible. (3) follows by permutation invariance within classes [n]. □

Lemma 3 (Logical flaws)

Letbe the canonicalextension of the basic.Then

  1. (1)

    |L(≼,w)| = 0 forw ∈ [0],

  2. (2)

    ifAy,Ax〉∈ L(≼,w) forw ∈ [n],then the witnessesAz,v ∈ [k] aresuch thaty,z < xk < nand0 < x,

  3. (3)

    ifAx,Ay〉∈ L(≼,w) forw ∈ [n],then the witnessesAz,v ∈ [k] aresuch thatn < −kx < y,zandx < 0,

  4. (4)

    |L(≼,w)| = 0 forw ∈ [1],

  5. (5)

    |L(≼,w)| = |L(≼,v)| forallw,v ∈ [n].

Proof

(1) There are no better worlds than 0-worlds (in the sense of ≤ or F), thus there can be no world-witness for flaws. (2) Let 〈Ay,Ax〉∈ L(≼,w) for w ∈ [n]. Thus, according to Definition 7, the witnesses Az, v ∈ [k] for k < n satisfy (i) AyAx, (ii) AzAx, (iii) wAxAy, (iv) Ax = AyAz, (v) vAx. k < x contradicts (v). Hence xk < n. We know x > 0: For suppose (for reductio) x ≤ 0. Since y,z < x, we have − x < −y,−z. But then Ax contains a − x-world and Ay,Az none, contradicting (iv). (3) follows by a similar reasoning as for (2). (4) is a corollary to (2) and (3). (5) is due to permutation invariance within classes [n]. □

Lemma 4 (Rightness)

Letbe the canonicalextension of the basic.Then forw ∈ [n],n ≥ 0:

  1. (1)

    R(≼,w) = PR(w) ∖{〈Ay,Ax〉 : −nxyn},

  2. (2)

    R(≼,w) = PR(w) ∖{〈Ax,Ay〉 : x = y = 0},ifn = 0,

  3. (3)

    |R(≼,w)| = |R(≼,v)| forallw,v ∈ [n],n ≥ 0.

Proof

(1) Let 〈Ay,Ax〉∈ R(≼,w). Then (i) AyAx and (ii) wAxAy, i.e., 〈Ay,Ax〉∈ PR(w). We show that, given (ii), (i) is equivalent to 〈Ay,Ax〉∉{〈Ay,Ax〉 : −nxyn}. Since w ∈ [n], (ii) implies (a) x ≥−n and (b) yn. Therefore:

$$\begin{array}{clr} & \langle A_{y}, A_{x}\rangle \notin \{\langle A_{y}, A_{x}\rangle : -n \leq x\leq y \leq n\} &\\ \text{iff} & x< -n \vee y <x \vee n< y & (\text{logic})\\ \text{iff} & y < x & (\text{ii a, b})\\ \text{iff} & A_{y} \prec A_{x} & (\text{canonical } \preceq) \end{array}$$

(2) is a corollary to (1). (3) is due to permutation invariance within classes [n]. □

Definition 2

Let ≼ be a relation over \(\mathcal {A}\) and ≼ the canonical extension of the basic ≤.

  • agrees weakly withup to n iff ≼ agrees with the transitive closure of the relation determined by:

    $$ A_{y} \prec A_{z}, $$
    (A.1)
    $$ A_{-t} \prec A_{-n} ~~~ , ~~~ A_{n} \prec A_{t}, $$
    (A.2)
    $$ A_{x} \sim A^{\prime}_{x}, $$
    (A.3)

    where − ny < zn, n < t, − n < x < n.

  • agrees strongly with ≼ up to n iff ≼ agrees with the transitive closure of the relation determined by Eqs. A.1A.2A.3 and

    $$ A_{-n} \sim A^{\prime}_{-n} ~~~,~~~ A_{n} \sim A^{\prime}_{n}. $$
    (A.4)
  • agrees with ≼up to n iff agreement is strong in case |[n]| > 1 and agreement is weak in case |[n]| = 1.

Lemma 5

Letbea basic order over W,its canonical extension andanotherextension which agrees weakly withup to n. Then forw ∈ [n + 1] andv ∈ [t] wheret > n + 1,we have |F(≼,v)| > |F(≼,w)|.

Proof

Let ≼,≼,≤,w,v,t as assumed. Define ψ : F(≼,w) → F(≼,v) by

$$\psi(\langle A_{x}, A_{y}\rangle ) = \left\{\begin{array}{ll} \langle A_{x}, A_{y} \rangle & \text{if } v \in A_{x}, v \notin A_{y},\\ \langle A_{x}, (A_{y} \cup \{w\}) \setminus \{v\}\rangle & \text{if } v \in A_{x}, v \in A_{y},\\ \langle (A_{x} \cup \{v\}) \setminus \{w\} , A_{y}\rangle & \text{if } v \notin A_{x}, v \notin A_{y},\\ \langle (A_{x} \cup \{v\}) \setminus \{w\} , (A_{y} \cup \{w\}) \setminus \{v\}\rangle & \text{if } v \notin A_{x}, v \in A_{y}. \end{array}\right.$$

We show: ψ is a total, injective and non-surjective function. Denote \(\langle B_{x^{\prime }}, B_{y^{\prime }}\rangle =\psi (\langle A_{x}, A_{y} \rangle )\).

Total function: Let 〈Ax,Ay〉∈ F(≼,w). Thus wAxAy and − (n + 1) ≤ x < yn + 1 (Lemma 2.1). By definition of ψ, (i) \(v \in B_{x^{\prime }} \setminus B_{y^{\prime }}\). To establish (ii) \(B_{x^{\prime }} \prec ^{*} B_{y^{\prime }}\), we show that the type shift\(\langle x,y\rangle \mapsto \langle x^{\prime }, y^{\prime }\rangle \) satisfies \(x^{\prime } \in \{x, -(n+2)\}, y^{\prime } \in \{y, n+2\}\), where \(x^{\prime } =-(n+2)\) iff x = −(n + 1) and Ax contains only w as n + 1-world, and \(y^{\prime } = n+2\) iff y = n + 1 and Ay misses only the n + 1-world w among the n + 1-worlds.

Case 1::

the identity involves no shift.

Case 2::

Note − (n + 1) < yn + 1. Removing the t-world v from Ay (t > n + 1), implies no shift. Adding the n + 1-world w changes the type, iff Ay is an n + 1-set which misses only the n + 1-world w, and in this case y = n + 1 goes to \(y^{\prime } =n+2\).

Case 3::

Note − (n + 1) ≤ x < n + 1. Adding the t-world v to Ax (t > n + 1) implies no shift. Removing the n + 1-world w changes the type iff Ax is a − (n + 1)-set which contains only w as n + 1-world, and in this case x = −(n + 1) goes to \(x^{\prime }=-(n+2)\).

Case 4::

nx < yn: Combine cases 2 and 3.

This, together with weak agreement up to n, establishes (ii) and thus the totality of ψ.

Injective: For reductio, assume (a) \(\langle B_{x^{\prime }}, B_{y^{\prime }}\rangle = \psi (\langle A_{x}, A_{y} \rangle )\) for some 〈Ax,Ay〉∈ F(≼,w) and (b) there is \((A^{*}_{x^{*}}, A^{*}_{y^{*}}) \in F(\preceq , w)\), such that (c) \((A^{*}_{x^{*}}, A^{*}_{y^{*}}) \neq \langle A_{x}, A_{y} \rangle \), but (d) \(\langle B_{x^{\prime }}, B_{y^{\prime }}\rangle = \psi ((A^{*}_{x^{*}}, A^{*}_{y^{*}}))\). Note: either \(x^{\prime } \geq - (n+1)\), in which case there is no type-shift (cf. cases 1-4), hence \(x=x^{\prime }=x^{*}\); or \(x^{\prime } = -(n+2)\), in which case (cf. cases 2-4) x = −(n + 1) = x. Similarly for y,y. Thus x = x and y = y. By (c) either (c1) \(A^{*}_{x} \neq A_{x}\) or (c2) \(A^{*}_{y} \neq A_{y}\).

(c1). Either (i) \(B_{x^{\prime }} = A_{x}\) (iff vAx) or (ii) \(B_{x^{\prime }}=(A_{x} \cup \{v\}) \setminus \{w\}\) (iff vAx). Similarly, either (i*) \(B_{x^{\prime }}= A^{*}_{x}\) (iff \(v \in A^{*}_{x}\)) or (ii*) \(B_{x^{\prime }} = (A^{*}_{x} \cup \{v\}) \setminus \{w\}\) (iff \(v \notin A^{*}_{x}\)) (equivalently \(A^{*}_{x} = (B_{x^{\prime }} \cup \{w\}) \setminus \{v\}\)). (i,i*) contradicts (c1). (i, ii*) implies \( A_{x} = (A^{*}_{x} \cup \{v\}) \setminus \{w\}\) and thus wAx, contradicting (a). (ii, i*) implies \( A^{*}_{x} = (A_{x} \cup \{v\}) \setminus \{w\}\) and thus \(w \notin A^{*}_{x}\), contradicting (b). (ii, ii*) implies \(A^{*}_{x} =(((A_{x} \cup \{v\}) \setminus \{w\}) \cup \{w\}) \setminus \{v\} = A_{x}\), contradicting (c1). Hence \(A^{*}_{x} = A_{x}\).

(c2) follows similarly, with the simultaneous replacements: y/x,w/v,v/w. Hence \(A^{*}_{y} =A_{y}\), proving injectivitiy.

Non-Surjective: {v}≺{w} (because ≼ extends ≤) and 〈{v},{w}〉∈ F(≼,v). However, that comparison is not reached by ψ. Else there would be 〈Ax,Ay〉 such that Ax = {w} and Ay = {v}, i.e. x = −(n + 1) and y = −t for t > n + 1. Yet 〈Ax,Ay〉∉F(≼,w), since we do not have {w}≺{v} (because ≼ also extends ≤). □

Lemma 6

Given the same assumptions as in Lemma 5:|L(≼,v)|≥|L(≼,w)|.Footnote 1

Proof

Let ≼,≼,≤,w,u,t as described. Define χ : L(≼,w) → L(≼,u) by

$$\chi(\langle A_{y},A_{x} \rangle ) = \left\{\begin{array}{ll} \langle A_{y}, A_{x}\rangle & \text{if } u \in A_{x}, u \notin A_{y},\\ \langle(A_{y} \cup \{w\} )\setminus \{u\}, A_{x}\rangle & \text{if } u \in A_{x}, u \in A_{y},\\ \langle A_{y}, (A_{x} \cup \{u\}) \setminus \{w\}\rangle & \text{if } u \notin A_{x}, u \notin A_{y}. \end{array}\right.$$

If 〈Ay,Ax〉∈ L(≼,w) we have \(A_{y} \subseteq A_{x}\). Thus uAx,uAy is impossible. We show that χ is a total, injective function. Denote \(\langle B_{y^{\prime }}, B_{x^{\prime }} \rangle =\chi (\langle A_{y}, A_{x}\rangle )\). We establish, by a similar reasoning as in Lemma 5: \(y^{\prime }=y\) and \(x^{\prime }=x\). From Lemma 3.2–3: either (a) z,y < xk < n + 1 and 0 < x or (b) − (n + 1) < −ky < x,z and y < 0.

Case 1::

Trivially \(y^{\prime } =y, x^{\prime }=x\).

Case 2::

Aygains a n + 1-world and looses a t-world (t > n + 1). The gain has an effect iff (i) y ≤−(n + 2) or (ii) y = n + 1. (a) excludes (ii), and (i) and Ax = AzAy would imply that Az ∩ [≤ x] = Ax ∩ [≤ x], i.e., zx, contrary to the assumption z < x in (a). (b) excludes (i) and (ii). The loss has an effect iff (i) y = −t or (ii) y = t + 1. (a) excludes (ii), and (i) would imply the same contradiction as above, since − t ≤−(n + 2). (b) excludes (i) and (ii). Thus there is no type shift.

Case 3::

Ax gains a t-world and looses a n + 1-world. The gain has an effect iff (i) x ≤−(t + 1) or (ii) x = t. (a) excludes (i) and (ii). (b) excludes (i); and (ii) and y < z imply that there is vAz with v ∈ [m] for m < −y and vAx (since x = t > n + 1 > m), contradicting Ay = AxAz. The loss has an effect only if (i) x = −(n + 1) or (ii) x = n + 2. (a) excludes (i) and (ii). (b) excludes (i) and (ii) would imply a similar contradiction as above. Thus there is no type shift.

We can therefore write 〈By,Bx〉 = ψ(〈Ay,Ax〉). For ∪-flaws, define \(B_{z^{\prime }}\) as: Case 1: \(B_{z^{\prime }} = A_{z}\). Case 2: \(B_{z^{\prime }}= A_{z} \cup \{u\}\). Case 3: \(B_{z^{\prime }} = (A_{z} \cup \{u\} )\setminus \{w\}\). One shows \(z^{\prime }=z\) (cf. case 2 above, exchanging t and n + 1). For ∩-flaws define \(B_{z^{\prime }}\) as : Case 1: \(B_{z^{\prime }} = A_{z}\). Case 2: \(B_{z^{\prime }}= (A_{z} \cup \{w\}) \setminus \{u\}\). Case 3: \(B_{z^{\prime }} = A_{z} \setminus \{u\}\). One shows \(z^{\prime }=z\) (cf. case 2 above). Thus in general \(z^{\prime } = z\).

Total function: If 〈Ay,Ax〉∈ L(≼,w) has witnesses Az,v, then 〈By,Bx〉∈ L(≼,u) has witnesses Bz,v. I.e., we show: (0) ByBx, (1) BzBx, (2) uBxBy, (3) Bx = ByBz and (4) vBx. (0) and (1) hold since z,y < x for 0 < x < n + 1 (weak agreement up to n). (2) holds by definition of χ. (3) Case 1 is clear. Case 2: (Az ∪{u}) ∪ ((Ay ∪{w}) ∖{u}) = Ax since wAx (by assumption) and the removal of u from Ay was compensated with the addition of u to Az. Case 3: Ay ∪ ((Az ∪{u}) ∖{w}) = (Ax ∪{u}) ∖{w}, since the addition of u and removal of w from Ax was reproduced for Az. (4) u ∈ [t] for t > n + 1 is distinct from v ∈ [k], since k < n + 1 < t and thus vBx.

By a dual reasoning: If 〈Ay,Ax〉∈ L(≼,w) has witnesses Az,v, then 〈By,Bx〉∈ L(≼,u) has witnesses Bz,v.

Injective: For reductio, assume (a) 〈By,Bx〉 = ψ(〈Ay,Ax〉) for 〈Ay,Ax〉∈ L(≼,w) (i.e. wAxAy) and (b) there is \(\langle A^{*}_{y^{*}}, A^{*}_{x^{*}} \rangle \in L(\preceq , w)\) (i.e. \(w \in A^{*}_{x^{*}} \setminus A^{*}_{y^{*}}\)), such that (c) \(\langle A^{*}_{y^{*}}, A^{*}_{x^{*}} \rangle \neq \langle A_{y}, A_{x}\rangle \) but (d) \(\langle B_{y}, B_{x}\rangle = \psi (\langle A^{*}_{y^{*}}, A^{*}_{x^{*}} \rangle )\). We have x = x and y = y (c.f. above). By (c) either (c1) \(A^{*}_{x} \neq A_{x}\) or (c2) \(A^{*}_{y} \neq A_{y}\).

(c1): Either (i) Bx = Ax (iff uAx) or (ii) Bx = (Ax ∪{u}) ∖{w} (iff uAx). Similarly, either (i*) \(B_{x}= A^{*}_{x}\) (iff \(u \in A^{*}_{x}\)) or (ii*) \(B_{x} = (A^{*}_{x} \cup \{u\}) \setminus \{w\}\) (iff \(u \notin A^{*}_{x}\)) (equivalently \(A^{*}_{x} = (B_{x^{\prime }} \cup \{w\}) \setminus \{u\}\)). (i,i*) contradicts (c1). (i,ii*), implies \( A_{x} =(A^{*}_{x} \cup \{u\} )\setminus \{w\}\) and thus wAx, contradicting (a). (ii, i*) implies \( A^{*}_{x} = (A_{x} \cup \{u\}) \setminus \{w\}\) and thus \(w \notin A^{*}_{x}\), contradicting (b). (ii,ii*) implies \(A^{*}_{x} = (((A_{x} \cup \{u\}) \setminus \{w\}) \cup \{w\}) \setminus \{u\} = A_{x}\), contradicting (c1). Thus we have a contradiction in each case. Hence \(A^{*}_{x} = A_{x}\).

(c2) similarly leads to a contradiction, applying the simultaneous replacements: y/x,w/u,u/w. □

1.2 A.2 Main Theorem

Definition 10

Let ≼ be a relation over \(\mathcal {A}\) and ≼ the canonical extension of ≤ (see Definition 8). a(≼) agrees totally with a(≼) up to n iff for all w ∈ [≤ n]:

$$F(\preceq^{*}, w)= F(\preceq, w)~~~, ~~~ L(\preceq^{*}, w)= L(\preceq, w)~~~, ~~~R(\preceq^{*}, w)= R(\preceq, w)$$

a(≼) agrees partially with a(≼) up to n iff a(≼) agrees with a(≼) up to n − 1 and for all w ∈ [n]:

$$F(\preceq^{*}, w)= F(\preceq, w)~~~, ~~~ L(\preceq^{*}, w)= L(\preceq, w)~~~, ~~~|R(\preceq^{*}, w)| \geq |R(\preceq, w)|$$

Clearly, total agreement implies partial agreement.

Definition 11

Let ≼ be a weak order over \(\mathcal {A}\) and a(≼) = 〈〈f1,r1〉,…,〈fk,rk〉〉 an accuracy profile for ≼. For f ∈{f1,…fk}, the f -block of a(≼) is the restriction of a(≼) to 〈fi,ri〉, where fi = f.

Note that Definition 6 can now be understood as saying that a(≼) ≥ a(≼) iff (1) for all f the f -block in a(≼) and in a(≼) are equal (if it exists), or (2) there is a first f such that the f -block in a(≼) is unequal to that of a(≼), being either (a) longer or (b) better, i.e., equally long, but for a first i in the block, \(r^{*}_{i} > r_{i}\).

Theorem 13

Letbea basic order over W (finite) andits canonical extension. Then foratransitive total extension of,a(≼) ≥ a(≼) impliesthatis.Footnote 2

Proof

Assume (I) ≼ is a transitive, total extension of ≤ to \(\mathcal {A}\) and (II) a(≼) ≥ a(≼). Thus \(a(\preceq ^{*}) = \langle \langle f^{*}_{1},r^{*}_{1}\rangle , \ldots , \langle f^{*}_{k}, r^{*}_{k}\rangle \rangle \) and a(≼) = 〈〈f1,r1〉,…,〈fk,rk〉〉 satisfy Definition 6. We recursively show profile- and order-agreement up to n, for all n, and thus ≼ is ≼ (cf. Definitions 10 and 9).

Base case: Note that for all v∉[0]: |F(≼,v)| > 0 (≤-compatibility). Thus we must have |F(≼,w)| = 0 and |L(≼,w)| = 0 for all w ∈ [0], else (II) would be violated, i.e., the 0-block would be longer for ≼ (Lemma 2, 3) which contradicts clauses (i)–(iii) of Definition 6. Since the 0-block for ≼ cannot be longer than [0], (II) also implies |R(≼,w)|≥|R(≼,w)| (by (i) and (iii) of Definition 6). Thus a(≼) agreespartially with a(≼) up to 0.

  • We show that |F(≼,w)| = 0 for w ∈ [0] implies that for all n,m > 0 all n-sets An, all − m-sets Am and all 0-sets A0, \(A^{\prime }_{0}\) (which exist only if |[0]| > 1):

    $$A_{-m} \preceq^{*} A_{0} \sim^{*} A^{\prime}_{0} \preceq^{*} A_{n}$$
    1. (1)

      \(A_{0} \sim ^{*} A^{\prime }_{0}\): Let A be a 0-set, (i.e., |[0]| > 1). Then there is a witness vA ∈ [0] ∖ A and wA ∩ [0], so that minimising F yields {vA}≼A in w and A{vA} in vA, i.e., \(\{v_{A}\} \sim ^{*} A\). Therefore \(A_{0} \sim ^{*} \{v_{A_{0}}\} \sim ^{*} \{v_{A^{\prime }_{0}}\} \sim ^{*} A^{\prime }_{0}\) (≤-compatibility).

    2. (2)

      AiAn, i ≤ 0: \([0] \subseteq A_{n}\), but \([0] \nsubseteq A_{i}\). Hence there is a 0-world vAnAi and minimising F yields AiAn.

    3. (3)

      AmAj, j ≥ 0: Am ∩ [0] = but Aj ∩ [0]≠. Minimising F yields AmAj.

  • |L(≼,w)| = 0 for w ∈ [0] implies no new constraints.

  • |R(≼,w)|≥|R(≼,w)| implies R(≼,w) = R(≼,w). \(R(\preceq ^{*}, w) \subseteq PR(w)\) (by definition). Additionally, if (Ax,Ay) ∈ R(≼,w), then AxAy and hence not x = y = 0 (due to (1) above and because if |[0]| = 1 there are no 0-sets). Therefore \(R(\preceq ^{*}, w) \subseteq R(\preceq , w)\) (Lemma 4). Thus |R(≼,w)| = |R(≼,w)|, and in fact R(≼,w) = R(≼,w). This shows total profile agreement up to 0. Therefore all F-undecided ≼ (not turned into \(\sim ^{*}\)) are turned into ≺ (Lemma 4), i.e.:

    $$A_{-m} \prec^{*} A_{0} \sim^{*} A^{\prime}_{0} \prec^{*} A_{n}$$

By transitivity, ≼agrees strongly with ≼ up to 0 if |[0]| > 1 and weakly if |[0]| = 1.

Induction step: Suppose a(≼) agrees with a(≼) totally up to n (IH1) and ≼ agrees with ≼ up to n (IH2) (i.e., strongly if |[n]| > 1, and weakly if |[n]| = 1). We lift this to n + 1, by first using in addition to (IH1) only weak order agreement, denoted (IH2*).

By (IH1), X(≼,w) = X(≼,w) for w ∈ [≤ n] and X = F,L,R. We first show that for w ∈ [n + 1] and v ∈ [> n + 1]:

  1. (1)

    |F(≼,w)|≤|F(≼,w)|,

  2. (2)

    |L(≼,w)|≤|L(≼,w)|,

  3. (3)

    |F(≼,w)| < |F(≼,v)|,

  4. (4)

    |L(≼,w)|≤|L(≼,v)|.

(1): It suffices to show \(F(\preceq , w) \subseteq F(\preceq ^{*}, w)\): Let (Ax,Ay) ∈ F(≼,w) for w ∈ [n + 1]. Then (Ax,Ay) ∈ PF(w) and − (n + 1) ≤ x < yn + 1 (Lemma 2). Thus AxAy (IH2*), i.e., (Ax,Ay) ∈ F(≼,w). (2): It suffices to show \(L_{\cup }(\preceq , w) \subseteq L_{\cup }(\preceq ^{*}, w)\), \(L_{\cap }(\preceq , w) \subseteq L_{\cap }(\preceq ^{*}, w)\): Let (Ay,Ax) ∈ L(≼,w) for w ∈ [n + 1]. Then (Ay,Ax) ∈ R(≼, [m]), where 0 ≤ m < xk < n and y < x (Lemma 3). IH2* implies AyAx. Thus (Ay,Ax) ∈ L(≼,w) (using the same witnesses). An analogous reasoning applies to for L. (3) follows from Lemma 5, IH2* and ≤-compatibility. (4) follows from Lemma 6 and IH2*.

Thus for w ∈ [n + 1] and v ∈ [> n + 1]:

  • |F(≼,w)| + |L(≼,w)|≥|F(≼,w)| + |L(≼,w)|,

  • |F(≼,v)| + |L(≼,v)| > |F(≼,w)| + |L(≼,w)|.

Hence: we must have |F(≼,w)| + |L(≼,w)| = |F(≼,w)| + |L(≼,w)|, else the (|F(≼,w)| + |L(≼,w)|)-block would be longer for ≼ than for ≼, contradicting Assumption (II) by Definition 6. (1) and (2) above then imply |F(≼,w)| = |F(≼,w)|, |L(≼,w)| = |L(≼,w)| and in fact F(≼,w) = F(≼,w), L(≼,w) = L(≼,w) and thus |R(≼,w)|≥|R(≼,w)|. This shows partial profile agreement up to n + 1 (using IH1).

By IH2* and transitivity, Eq. A.1 extends from n to n + 1 (set t = n + 1 in Eq. A.1). It thus suffices to establish Eqs. A.2A.3 for n + 1 and, if |[n + 1]| > 1 (14) for n + 1.

  • We show that F(≼,w) = F(≼,w) implies:

    $$ A_{-k} \preceq^{*} A^{\prime}_{-(n+1)} \sim^{*} A_{-(n+1)} \preceq^{*} \dot{A}_{-(n+1)} ~~~,~~~ \dot{A}_{n+1} \preceq^{*} A_{n+1} \sim^{*} A^{\prime}_{n+1} \preceq^{*} A_{k}, $$
    (A.5)

    where k > n + 1, \(A^{\prime }_{-(n+1)}, A_{-(n+1)}\) are non-full, \(\dot {A}_{-(n+1)}\) is full, \(\dot {A}_{n+1}\) is void, and in the case |[n + 1]| > 1 the sets \(A^{\prime }_{-(n+1)}, A_{-(n+1)}\) are non-full and \(A^{\prime }_{n+1}, A_{n+1}\) are non-void, whereas in the case |[n + 1]| = 1, Ax and \(A^{\prime }_{x}\) for x ∈{−(n + 1),n + 1} with the previously required specifications don’t exist and can be discarded. The reasoning for the claimed non-existence is as follows: Assume |[n + 1]| = 1 and consider the case x = −(n + 1). An − (n + 1)-set, contains as smallest world an n + 1 world (by definition). But since there is only one such world (by assumption), such a set must be full. Thus it can only be of the type \(\dot {A}_{-(n+1)}\). Hence only \(A_{-k} \preceq \dot {A}_{-(n+1)}\) needs to be established (for k > n + 1). The reasoning is similar for x = n + 1.

    Additionally, we also show:

    $$ A_{-n} \preceq^{*} A^{*}_{-n} \sim^{*} A^{\prime}_{-n} \preceq^{*} \dot{A}_{-n} ~~~, ~~~ A_{n} \preceq^{*} A^{*}_{n} \sim^{*} A^{\prime}_{n} \preceq^{*} \dot{A}_{n}, $$
    (A.6)

    where now An,An are (n + 1)-empty, \(A^{*}_{-n}, A^{*}_{n}, A^{\prime }_{-n}, A^{\prime }_{n}\) are not (n + 1)-empty and not (n + 1)-full and \(\dot {A}_{-n}, \dot {A}_{n}\) are n + 1-full. Here a set A is (n + 1)-empty iff A ∩ [n + 1] = and (n + 1)-full iff \([n+1] \subseteq A\).

    The following establishes Eq. A.5: \(A_{n+1} \sim ^{*} A^{\prime }_{n+1}\) is shown as (1) in the base case (replace n + 1/0). An+ 1Ak, AkA−(n+ 1) is shown as (2) and (3) in the base case (replace n + 1/i, k/n,k/m). \(\dot {A}_{n+1} \preceq ^{*} A_{n+1}\) is proved as (3) in the base case. \(A_{-(n+1)} \preceq ^{*} \dot {A}_{-(n+1)}\) is proved as (2) in the base case. If |[n + 1]| = 1: \(A_{-k} \preceq ^{*} \dot {A}_{-(n+1)}, \dot {A}_{n+1} \preceq ^{*} A_{k}\) are also obtained as in the base case (2) and (3).

    The following establishes Eq. A.6: Let |[n]| = 1 (else there is nothing to prove by strong agreement IH2). \(A^{*}_{-n} \sim ^{*} A^{\prime }_{-n}, A^{*}_{n} \sim ^{*} A^{\prime }_{n}\) follows as (1) in the base case. \(A^{\prime }_{-n} \preceq ^{*} \dot {A}_{-n}, A^{\prime }_{n} \preceq ^{*} \dot {A}_{n}\) follow as (2) in the base case. \(A_{-n} \preceq ^{*} A^{*}_{-n}, A_{n} \preceq ^{*} A^{*}_{n}\) follow as (3) in the base case.

  • We show that L(≼,w) = L(≼,w) for all w ∈ [n + 1] implies: for all − n sets (full or not) and all n-sets (void or not):

    $$ A_{-n} \sim^{*} A^{\prime}_{-n} ~~~~ , ~~~~ A^{\prime}_{n} \sim^{*} A_{n}. $$
    (A.7)

    And if |[n + 1]| > 1 then for all − (n + 1) sets (full or not) and all n + 1-sets (void or not):

    $$ A_{-(n+1)} \sim^{*} A^{\prime}_{-(n+1)} ~~~~ , ~~~~ A^{\prime}_{n+1} \sim^{*} A_{n+1}. $$
    (A.8)

    Let us establish Eq. A.7: Consider |[n]| = 1 (else Eq. A.7 holds by strong agreement IH2). Assume n > 0 (else there is nothing to prove).

    1. (1)

      \(A_{-n} \sim ^{*} A^{\prime }_{-n}\): We first show that \(A_{-n} \sim ^{*} \dot {A}_{-n}\) in case An is n + 1-empty and \(\dot {A}_{-n}\) is n + 1-full.

      Let \(\dot {A}\) be a − n-set which is n + 1-full. Define \(A:= \dot {A} \setminus [n+1]\) and \(A^{\prime }:= [n+1]\). Thus A is a − n-set which is n + 1-empty and \(A^{\prime }\) is a − (n + 1)-set. Then \(A \prec ^{*} \dot {A}\) would be a ∪-flaw in any w ∈ [n + 1]. Indeed: (1) \(A^{\prime } \prec ^{*} \dot {A}\) by IH2*, (2) \(w \in \dot {A} \setminus A\) and (3) \(\dot {A} = A \cup A^{\prime }\) and for v ∈ [n − 1] (non-empty, since n > 0), we have (4) \(v \notin \dot {A}\). But \((A, \dot {A}) \notin L(\preceq , w)\), hence \((A, \dot {A}) \notin L(\preceq ^{*}, w)\). Thus \(\dot {A} \preceq ^{*} A\). Since \(A \preceq ^{*} \dot {A}\), we obtain \(A \sim ^{*} \dot {A}\).

      Let now \(A^{\prime }, \dot {A}\) be two − n sets, such that \(\dot {A}\) is n + 1-full and \(A^{\prime }\) is not n + 1-empty and not n + 1 full. Then we can find an n + 1-empty witness A (cf. above) such that \(A \sim ^{*} \dot {A}\). But \(A \preceq ^{*} A^{\prime } \preceq ^{*} \dot {A}\) (by F-minimisation). Thus \( A \preceq ^{*} A^{\prime } \preceq ^{*} \dot {A} \sim ^{*} A\). Squeezing yields \(A^{\prime } \sim ^{*} \dot {A}\).

      Similarly, let \(A, A^{\prime }\) be two − n-sets, such that A is n + 1-empty and \(A^{\prime }\) is not n + 1-empty and not n + 1-full. Again, we can find a witness \(\dot {A}\)n-set that is n + 1-full, (\(\dot {A} = A \cup [n+1]\)), such that ∪-flaw-avoidance yields \(A \sim ^{*} \dot {A}\) (choose witness \(A^{\prime } = [n+1]\)). Hence \(A \sim ^{*} \dot {A} \sim ^{*} A^{\prime }\), i.e., \(A \sim ^{*} A^{\prime }\) (transitivity). Thus equivalence extends to all − n-sets.

    2. (2)

      \(A_{n} \sim ^{*} A^{\prime }_{n}\) follows for all n-sets by a similar reasoning, using ∩-flaw avoidance.

    We have thus extended Eq. A.3 from n to n + 1 (whether |[n]| = 1 or > 1).

    Let us now establish Eq. A.8, provided |[n + 1]| > 1:

    1. (1)

      \(A_{n+1} \sim A^{\prime }_{n+1}\): Let \(\dot {A}\) be a void n + 1-set and let C1,C2 partition [n + 1] (assuming |[n + 1]| > 1). Then \(A = \dot {A} \cup C_{1}\) as \(A^{\prime }= \dot {A} \cup C_{2}\) are non-void n + 1-sets. Let wC1. Then \(\dot {A} \prec ^{*} A\) would be a ∩-flaw in w, for witnesses \(A^{\prime }\) and v ∈ [n] (using \(A \sim ^{*} A^{\prime }\) by Eq. A.5). But \((\dot {A}, A) \notin L(\preceq , w)\). Thus \(A \preceq ^{*} \dot {A}\). Since \(\dot {A} \preceq ^{*} A\), we obtain \(A \sim ^{*} \dot {A}\). By the same reasoning \(B \sim ^{*} \dot {B}\) where \(\dot {B}\) is another void n + 1-set. But \(B \sim ^{*} A\), and hence equivalence extends to all n + 1-sets.

    2. (2)

      \(A_{-(n+1)} \sim ^{*} A_{-(n+1)}\) follows by the same reasoning, using ∪-flaws.

    Thus we have also obtained Eq. A.4 for n + 1 (provided |[n + 1]| > 1).

  • We show R(≼,w) = R(≼,w). We already have |R(≼,w)|≥|R(≼,w)|. We show \(R(\preceq ^{*}, w) \subseteq R(\preceq , w)\). Let (Ay,Ax) ∈ R(≼,w), then (Ay,Ax) ∈ PR(w) and AyAx. Hence not x = y for − nx,yn (by Eq. A.3). We also obtain not x = y for x ∈{−(n + 1),n + 1}, by (14) established above if |[n + 1]| > 1; and if |[n + 1]| = 1 the sets Ay,Ax are both void or both full and AyAx cannot be a right comparison. Thus: not x = y for − (n + 1) ≤ x,yn + 1. Similarly not − (n + 1) ≤ x < y ≤ (n + 1) (by IH2, i.e., Eqs. A.1 and A.2 for n). But this implies (Ay,Ax) ∈ R(≼,w) (Lemma 4). Hence |R(≼,w)| = |R(≼,w)| and thus R(≼,w) = R(≼,w). This proves total profile agreement up to n + 1.

    R(≼,w) = R(≼,w) then implies that all ≼ obtained by F-minimisation in [n + 1] and left undecided (not turned into \(\sim ^{*}\)) are now turned into ≺. In particular

    $$A_{-t} \prec^{*} A_{-(n+1)} ~~~~ A_{n+1} \prec^{*} A_{t}~~~~ \text{for } t>n+1$$

    This is Eq. A.2 for n + 1. Therefore ≼agrees with ≼ up to n + 1, where agreement is strong if |[n + 1]| > 1 and weak if |[n + 1]| = 1.

The recursively constructed ≼ over \(\mathcal {A} \setminus \{\emptyset , W\}\) satisfies

$$A_{x} \prec^{*} A_{y} \text{ iff } x<y$$

In the last step n (for n maximal), we also obtain by R-maximisation An and AnW, since these cannot be flaws. The transitive closure of ≼ over \(\mathcal {A}\) is thus the canonical ≼. □

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Raidl, E., Spohn, W. An Accuracy Argument in Favor of Ranking Theory. J Philos Logic 49, 283–313 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-019-09518-8

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-019-09518-8

Keywords

Navigation