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To work or not? Wages or subsidies?: Copula-based evidence of subsidized refugees’ negative selection into employment

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Abstract

Despite increasing interest in topics related to refugees, economic literature has remained mostly silent on how refugees make labor supply decisions in their initial resettlement period, during which their host government provides various care and financial assistance. This paper fills that void by applying the copula-based selection model, which is free from the restrictive joint normality assumption, to a unique, high-dimensional data set of refugees who resettled in the US. Its selection parameter estimates suggest that subsidized refugees negatively select themselves into employment in terms of unobserved wage potential, which, according to the theoretical model, should be attributed primarily to the fact that (i) their reservation wages are rigid due to host-provided, non-labor income and (ii) host country employers discount refugees’ unobserved human capital components substantially. As a result, employed refugees’ wages, all observable factors held constant, are lower than the counterfactual wages of non-employed refugees, which contradicts what is usual in conventional labor markets. This devaluation-based skill paradox is more pronounced in regions unfriendly to refugees, and the negative pattern temporarily reversed immediately after the 9/11 attacks, which represented a huge adverse shock to non-natives in the US labor market, suggesting that subsidized refugees’ labor supply decisions are influenced greatly by their expectations regarding future labor market outcomes. Possible explanations are discussed based on a simple theoretical model in the context of the US refugee resettlement system.

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Notes

  1. Parsons and Vézina (2018) highlight that refugee integration increases subsequent exports to their country of origin.

  2. Throughout this paper, selection, as an economic term, refers to selection on unobservables unless otherwise specified. Likewise, if not otherwise mentioned, it is assumed that observable factors are held constant. More details are discussed in Sect. 2.

  3. The question of how migrants, who should be distinguished from refugees for reasons addressed below, select themselves into migration (and return migration) has been investigated in many studies, such as Borjas (1987), Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), Rooth and Saarela (2007), Moraga (2011), Wahba (2015), and Borjas et al. (2019). A brief explanation of these studies is given in Online supplement B.2.

  4. Some qualified host populations receive unemployment benefits. However, the duration of such benefits is 26 weeks across most of the US (though 28 weeks in Montana and 30 weeks in Massachusetts), which is much shorter than the average duration of the refugee subsidy program.

  5. Heckman (1974) introduces the asking wage, which is a function that determines the value a person places on his or her time. Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) call the reservation wage the non-market wage.

  6. The expression not fully explained by \(\mathbf {h}\) is used intentionally because we cannot rule out the possibility that \(\text {Cov}(\mathbf {h},v)\ne 0\) (e.g., observable schooling and unobservable abilities).

  7. To the extent that \(v_{\text {m}_{i}}\) is unmeasured, its influences on \(\log w_{i}^{\mathrm{m}}\) are recognized as an increase (or decrease) in a refugee’s wage, conditional on his or her observed (productivity and demographic) characteristics \(\mathbf {z}\).

  8. Many empirical studies corroborate the importance of capabilities and skills that are commonly unobserved but substantially affect wages, such as Murnane et al. (1995), Neal and Johnson (1996), Kuhn and Weinberger (2005), Heckman et al. (2006), and Fortin (2008). Some investigations, such as Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), use test scores or IQ data as proxies for unobserved abilities.

  9. Other papers, such as Taber (2001), also use the same distributional assumption \(s\sim N(\mu _{s},\sigma _{\varepsilon _{s}}^{2})\).

  10. Borjas et al. (2019) simply call it ‘(unobserved) skill component.’

  11. \(\varepsilon _{q}\) for \(q\in \{\text {r},\text {m}\}\) is conceptually important when expecting an exclusion restriction to exist.

  12. Controlling for a broad set of observables might also control for some unobservables to the degree that they correlate.

  13. The richness of and in the current study is detailed in Sect. 3.

  14. Gronau (1974), Heckman (1979), and Keane et al. (1988) are among extant studies that use this bivariate normality assumption. For further details on this assumption, see Moffitt (1999).

  15. The bivariate normality of enables to be normally distributed with its constant variance . Thus, the probit link function can be used.

  16. Similarly, Lang (2005) attributes low \(\gamma _{\text {m}}\) to ‘zero-return’ on non-native workers’ imported labor market experience.

  17. This section partly draws from Shin (2021), which is based on the same data set.

  18. This data set is initially used in Beaman (2012), in which some network-related variables are newly collected.

  19. This context is similar to Damm (2009), Damm (2014), and Dustman et al. (2019), who exploit a dispersal policy that assigns refugees to municipalities quasi-randomly.

  20. For all sampled refugees, their claims were decided before arrival in the US. They thus had permission to work immediately after arrival in resettlement cities.

  21. For more details, see Brell et al. (2020).

  22. For an overview of issues related to the economics of immigration, see Borjas (1994).

  23. For further discussions on selectivity, see Online supplement B.4.

  24. This contrasts with the case of reunification refugees who have personal sponsorship (Tran and Lara-García 2020).

  25. Potocky-Tripodi (2004) avoids this bias by using several variables such as (i) the number of relatives living in the same city or county, (ii) the number of relatives living in the US but not in the same city or county, and (iii) how much help a refugee received from relatives after arrival in the US.

  26. The more observables we can control, the more likely (6) holds.

  27. Another disadvantage of this data set is that it comprises only male refugees. For more discussion, see Online supplement B.5.

  28. Admitted refugees begin receiving such services immediately after arrival, even before social security numbers are issued.

  29. Thus, all multivariate distributions have a copula representation.

  30. ML is an abbreviation for maximum likelihood.

  31. Specifying two marginal distributions separately is much less restrictive than specifying their joint distribution.

  32. Although the probit and logit models are largely undifferentiated, the tail feature of each can differ substantially, and the latter is known to be more robust due to its thicker tails.

  33. In economics literature, ML-based selection models are often referred to as models of selection on unobservables, with selection on observables implicit (Cameron and Trivedi 2005).

  34. Considering the former is simpler—including regressors and estimating their coefficients (or marginal effects). In many labor supply contexts, however, errors can still correlate, even when observable regressors are controlled for, leading to the latter (Cameron and Trivedi 2005).

  35. Discussed in Sect. 1, this study assesses whether unobservable human capital factors that raise the wage a refugee receives during employment increase (or decrease) the probability that he or she enters employment, which has not been investigated. Thus, selection on unobservables is of more interest in the current paper.

  36. This is intuitive because \(F_{\text {C.D.F.}}^{\prime }(\cdot )>0\) holds for both the probit and logit models.

  37. Vocational school graduates associate with (statistically nonsignificant but) substantially higher employment probabilities, which is understandable because training and knowledge obtained in vocational schools in home countries might transfer (relatively) easily to the US labor market.

  38. Note the positive roles of higher education on wage levels, which accords with our intuition.

  39. Lang (2005) expresses this as ‘zero-return on imported experience.’

  40. According to Albiom et al. (2005) in Canada, the financial value of foreign work experience is about 30 percent of that of Canadian work experience, and foreign education is valued at about 70 percent of Canadian education.

  41. The most important component of the program is its employment services, which comprise English-language training, ongoing networking, pre-employment training, job readiness workshops, employer-specific training, short-term vocational training, employer-employee matching, certification or re-certification for professional or paraprofessional refugees, and post-placement support. For details, see Shin (2022).

  42. Social security numbers are used to report a person’s wage to the government and to determine a person’s eligibility for social security benefits.

  43. The negative relationship between non-labor income and labor supply is already well established. See Heineke and Block (1973).

  44. In the context of migrants, Borjas et al. (2019) underscore the importance of unobserved abilities as drivers of selection.

  45. For the underlying framework and notations, see (30) in Sect. 4.

  46. This corresponds to Column 2 in Table 2.

  47. Mathematically, the third panel distribution is centered at the weighted average \(\Pr (D=1)\cdot \mathbb {E}(y_{w}\mid \mathbf {x}_{w},D=1)+\Pr (D=0)\cdot \mathbb {E}(y_{w}\mid \mathbf {x}_{w},D=0),\) the sample estimate of which is simply \(N^{-1}(\sum _{i\in \{i\mid D_{i}=1\}}{\widehat{y}}_{w_{i}}+\sum _{i\in \{i\mid D_{i}=0\}}{\widehat{y}}_{w_{i}}).\)

  48. Statistical significance at the 10 percent level is expectable due to the smaller number of observations.

  49. See Table 6 in Online supplement B.6 .

  50. Bushway et al. (2007) and Wooldridge (2010) explain that ML-based selection models often encounter a convergence problem.

  51. Addison et al. (2009) also argue that higher unemployment benefits lead to higher reservation wages, based on cross-country data.

  52. Recent studies suggest that the number of family members can also affect efforts at marketplace work, and thus productivity and wages (Dolado et al. 2020).

  53. For an example, see D’Haultfoeuille et al. (2018).

  54. \(\tau \) from the copula-based selection model and \(\rho \) from the Heckman two-step estimator cannot be compared directly regarding magnitude because each is based on different metrics (Gilpin 1993; Nelsen 1999). Nevertheless, their empirical meanings are the same, and their signs can be compared directly, which is of primary interest for a robustness check (Xu et al. 2013).

  55. Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) demonstrate this in the context of females’ labor force participation.

  56. Brown and Taylor (2013) theorizes that expectations play a role in adjusting reservation wages.

  57. It is expected that negative selection gradually vanishes as host-provided assistance tapers. Therefore, refugees’ selection into work is expected to shift from (initially) negative to (ultimately) positive.

  58. The 9/11 attacks, the deadliest terrorist attacks in America, were a series of airline hijackings and suicide attacks perpetrated by 19 militants who associated with Al-Qaeda against targets in the US.

  59. These results accord with findings from Dolado et al. (2020), in which it is shown that massive job destruction that derives from a negative shift in labor demand (e.g., economic recessions) can cause the pattern of selection into employment to become more positive (i.e., equivalently, less negative). The 9/11 attacks represent another typical example of a huge demand-side negative shock, and I likewise observe an upward change in Fig. 2. Dolado et al. (2020) show that shock-driven changes in selection return to their pre-shock patterns during the subsequent recovery phase, which also accords with Fig. 2.

  60. This paper uses non-employed instead of unemployed because the definition of the former includes potential workers who choose not to (immediately) enter employment (Murphy and Topel 1997).

  61. Based on whether a refugee works, we can only infer the sign of \(y_{d_{i}}^{*}\). Its magnitude is not inferable.

  62. Some methods exist for testing normality assumptions, such as Gourieroux et al. (1987) and van der Klaauw and Koning (2003).

  63. The Heckman two-step estimator estimates the single coefficient of \(\lambda (\mathbf {x}_{d_{i}}^{\prime }\widehat{\varvec{\beta }}_{d})\). Structural parameters \(\sigma _{\varepsilon _{w}}\) and \(\rho (\varepsilon _{d},\varepsilon _{w})\) are deduced by the method of moments (Greene 2002).

  64. An exclusion restriction is not necessarily indispensable to ML-based selection methods, such as the copula-based selection model, as evidenced by a simulation from Marra and Wyszynski (2016).

  65. In contrast, if the first stage probit model can discriminate employed and non-employed people sufficiently, an exclusion restriction is not required. For details, see Nawata and Nagase (1996) and Leung and Yu (1996).

  66. According to Vella (1998), many theoretical models impose that no such exclusion restriction variable exists.

  67. If \(\varphi \left( 0\right) =\infty \), \(\varphi \) is called a strict generator, and \(\varphi ^{-1}\) exists.

  68. Arellano and Bonhomme (2017) also uses the Frank copula.

  69. This is based on a suggestion from Joe (1997).

  70. For other copulas, the range of \(\theta \) is limited, and thus the interval of \(\tau \) is narrower.

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Acknowledgements

I thank the editor, associate editor, and two anonymous referees for their careful reading and helpful suggestions, despite the lasting pandemic. I am grateful to Jin-Young Choi (Xiamen University) for constructive comments. Earlier versions of this article benefited from comments from numerous conference participants at Econometric Society meetings and the Society of Labor Economists (SOLE) meeting. All potential errors are mine.

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Appendix

Appendix

1.1 Mathematical derivation

The derivation of (16), discussed in Section 2.1, is shown below:

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \rho _{v_{\text {m}},(v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}})/\kappa }&=\frac{\text {Cov}(v_{\text {m}},(v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}})/\kappa )}{\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}}\sigma _{(v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}})/\kappa }}\\&=\frac{1}{\kappa }\frac{\text {Cov}(v_{\text {m}},(v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}}))}{\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}}\sigma _{(v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}})/\kappa }}\\&=\frac{\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}}^{2}-\text {Cov}(v_{\text {r}},v_{\text {m}})}{\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}}}\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}}\sigma _{(v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}})/\kappa }}\;\;\because \,\;\kappa =\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}}}\\&=\frac{\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}}^{2}-\text {Cov}(\gamma _{\text {r}}\cdot \varepsilon _{s}+\varepsilon _{\text {r}},\gamma _{\text {m}}\cdot \varepsilon _{s}+\varepsilon _{\text {m}})}{\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}}}\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}}\sigma _{(v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}})/\kappa }}\\&=\frac{\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}}^{2}-\{\gamma _{\text {r}}\gamma _{\text {m}}\sigma _{\varepsilon _{s}}^{2}+\text {Cov}(\varepsilon _{\text {r}},\varepsilon _{\text {m}})\}}{\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}}}\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}}\sigma _{(v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}})/\kappa }}\;\;\because \,\;\text {Cov}(\varepsilon _{s},\varepsilon _{\text {r}})=\text {Cov}(\varepsilon _{s},\varepsilon _{\text {m}})=0\\&=\frac{\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}}^{2}-\{\gamma _{\text {r}}\gamma _{\text {m}}\sigma _{\varepsilon _{s}}^{2}+\rho _{\varepsilon _{\text {r}},\varepsilon _{\text {m}}}\sigma _{\varepsilon _{\text {r}}}\sigma _{{\varepsilon _{\text {m}}}}\}}{\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}}}\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}}\sigma _{(v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}})/\kappa }}\\&=\frac{1}{\sigma _{(v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}})/\kappa }}\frac{\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}}^{2}-\{\gamma _{\text {r}}\gamma _{\text {m}}\sigma _{\varepsilon _{s}}^{2}+\rho _{\varepsilon _{\text {r}},\varepsilon _{\text {m}}}\sigma _{\varepsilon _{\text {r}}}\sigma _{{\varepsilon _{\text {m}}}}\}}{\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}}}\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}}}\\&=\frac{\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}}}{\sigma _{(v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}})/\kappa }\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}}}}\frac{\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}}^{2}-\{\gamma _{\text {r}}\gamma _{\text {m}}\sigma _{\varepsilon _{s}}^{2}+\rho _{\varepsilon _{\text {r}},\varepsilon _{\text {m}}}\sigma _{\varepsilon _{\text {r}}}\sigma _{{\varepsilon _{\text {m}}}}\}}{\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}}^{2}}\\&=\frac{\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}}}{\sigma _{(v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}})/\kappa }\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}}}}\left( 1-\frac{\gamma _{\text {r}}\gamma _{\text {m}}\sigma _{\varepsilon _{s}}^{2}}{\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}}^{2}}-\frac{\rho _{\varepsilon _{\text {r}},\varepsilon _{\text {m}}}\sigma _{\varepsilon _{\text {r}}}\sigma _{{\varepsilon _{\text {m}}}}}{\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}}^{2}}\right) \\&=\frac{\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}}}{\sigma _{(v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}})/\kappa }\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}}}}\left[ \frac{\gamma _{\text {m}}^{2}\sigma _{\varepsilon _{s}}^{2}}{\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}}^{2}}\underbrace{(1-\frac{\gamma _{\text {r}}}{\gamma _{\text {m}}})}_{\text {A}}+\frac{\sigma _{{\varepsilon _{\text {m}}}}^{2}}{\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}}^{2}}\underbrace{(1-\frac{\rho _{\varepsilon _{\text {r}},\varepsilon _{\text {m}}}\sigma _{\varepsilon _{\text {r}}}}{\sigma _{{\varepsilon _{\text {m}}}}})}_{\text {B}}\right] \\&=\frac{\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}}}{\sigma _{(v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}})/\kappa }\sigma _{v_{\text {m}}-v_{\text {r}}}}\Psi . \end{aligned} \end{aligned}$$

1.2 Selection framework

This section provides an overview of the selection-into-employment framework and the most common estimation methods. Consensus in labor economics literature suggests that the average wage of working people (i.e., observed wages of  \(\{i\mid D_{i}=1\}\)) might not measure accurately the wages of all people (i.e., potential wages of \(\{i\}\)) because working people might not represent a random sample of the entire population. This aspect also applies to refugees. The objective of the current study is investigating refugees’ non-random, systematic self-selection into employment, which requires use of a sample selection framework. Economists have long considered selection-related issues, with selection methods dating to Tobin (1958), Gronau (1974), and Heckman (1974). Diverse sample selection models exist, since many ways exist to generate a ‘selected or truncated’ sample, which refers to a sample based in part, intentionally or unintentionally, on values taken by a dependent variable (i.e., the response from a selection equation) (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). Wage observations in this study’s data represent an archetypal case of such a selected sample in the sense that only employed refugees’ wage levels are observed. Counterfactual wages of non-employed refugees cannot be observed due to their decision to not work.Footnote 60

Conventional selection models consist of two sequential equations—one for employment (e.g., selection or participation) and another for outcomes (e.g., wage levels). An employment equation with binary observable outcomes \(D_{i}\in \{0,1\}\) can be expressed as:

$$\begin{aligned} D_{i}={\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \ 1 &{} \text {if}\quad {y_{d_{i}}^{*}>0}\\ \ 0 &{} \text {if}\quad {y_{d_{i}}^{*}\le 0} \end{array}\right. }, \end{aligned}$$
(38)

where \(y_{d_{i}}^{*}\) is a latent variable that determines whether to work. From a labor supply viewpoint, \(y_{d_{i}}^{*}\) can be construed as the difference between a refugee’s market wage and his or her reservation wage, discussed in Sect. 2.1. If \(y_{d_{i}}^{*}>0\), a refugee decides to work, and it can be inferred that the market wage exceeds the reservation wage for that refugee.Footnote 61 On the other hand, a resultant wage equation with continuous outcomes can be expressed as:

$$\begin{aligned} y_{w_{i}}={\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \ y_{w_{i}}^{*} &{} \text {if}\quad {y_{d_{i}}^{*}>0}\\ \ \text {{Unobserved}} &{} \text {if}\quad {y_{d_{i}}^{*}\le 0} \end{array}\right. }. \end{aligned}$$
(39)

Wage equation (39) suggests that a refugee’s wage outcome is observed if and only if a refugee is employed with \(y_{d_{i}}^{*}>0\) in (38). The canonical approach specifies linear models with additive error terms, say \(\varepsilon _{d}\) and \(\varepsilon _{w}\), in the following manner (Cameron and Trivedi 2005).

$$\begin{aligned} {\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} y_{d_{i}}^{*}=\mathbf {x}_{d_{i}}^{\prime }\varvec{\beta }_{d}+\varepsilon _{d_{i}} &{} \text {for employment (i.e., selection)}\\ y_{w_{i}}=\mathbf {x}_{w_{i}}^{\prime }\varvec{\beta }_{w}+\varepsilon _{w_{i}} &{} \text {for wage levels} \end{array}\right. } \end{aligned}$$
(40)

The correlation between \(\varepsilon _{d}\) and \(\varepsilon _{w}\) in (40) is the key part of sample selection models, which, if overlooked, can cause bias when estimating \(\varvec{\beta }_{w}\). In the case of the bivariate ML selection model, also called the Tobin (1958) Type-II estimator, estimation by maximum likelihood (ML) is straightforward, given distributional assumption:

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{bmatrix}\varepsilon _{d}\\ \varepsilon _{w} \end{bmatrix}\sim N\left[ \begin{bmatrix}0\\ 0 \end{bmatrix},\begin{bmatrix}\text {Var}(\varepsilon _{d})=\sigma _{\varepsilon _{d}}^{2} &{} \text {Cov}(\varepsilon _{d},\varepsilon _{w})\\ \text {Cov}(\varepsilon _{d},\varepsilon _{w}) &{} \text {Var}(\varepsilon _{w})=\sigma _{\varepsilon _{w}}^{2} \end{bmatrix}\right] , \end{aligned}$$
(41)

which means that correlated errors are joint normally distributed with homoskedasticity. The normalization of \(\text {Var}(\varepsilon _{d})=1\) is used because only the sign of \(y_{d_{i}}^{*}\) can be observed. Based on assumption (41), the bivariate ML selection model maximizes likelihood function:

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{aligned}L=\prod \limits _{i=1}^{N}\{\Pr [y_{d_{i}}^{*}\le 0]\}^{1-D_{i}}\{\Pr [y_{d_{i}}^{*}>0]\times f(y_{w_{i}}\mid y_{d_{i}}^{*}>0)\}^{D_{i}}\end{aligned} , \end{aligned}$$
(42)

and using probit as a link function leads to:

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{aligned}L=&\prod \limits _{i=1}^{N}\{\Phi (-\mathbf {x}_{d_{i}}^{\prime }\varvec{\beta }_{d})\}^{1-D_{i}}\times \\&\left[ \sigma _{\varepsilon _{w}}\phi \left( \frac{y_{w_{i}}-\mathbf {x}_{w_{i}}^{\prime }\varvec{\beta }_{w}}{\sigma _{\varepsilon _{w}}}\right) \Phi \left\{ \frac{\mathbf {x}_{d_{i}}^{\prime }\varvec{\beta }_{d}+(y_{w_{i}}-\mathbf {x}_{w_{i}}^{\prime }\varvec{\beta }_{w})\rho /\sigma _{\varepsilon _{w}}}{\sqrt{1-\rho ^{2}}}\right\} \right] ^{D_{i}}, \end{aligned} \end{aligned}$$
(43)

where \(\rho \) refers to:

$$\begin{aligned} \rho (\varepsilon _{d},\varepsilon _{w})=\frac{\text {Cov}(\varepsilon _{d},\varepsilon _{w})}{\sigma _{\varepsilon _{d}}\sigma _{\varepsilon _{w}}}=\text {Corr}(\varepsilon _{d},\varepsilon _{w}), \end{aligned}$$
(44)

the correlation coefficient between \(\varepsilon _{d}\) and \(\varepsilon _{w}\). As is customary, \(\Phi \) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, and \(\phi \) is the standard normal probability density function. The log of (43) is the objective function of the bivariate ML selection model.

When using the bivariate ML selection model, it is important to note that assumption (41) is restrictive and difficult to test (Puhani 2000; Bushway et al. 2007).Footnote 62 Since the bivariate ML selection model relies heavily on (41), its estimates are inconsistent if normality fails (Vella 1998). Thus, economists commonly prefer to use the two-step estimator from Heckman (1976; 1979), which is based on weaker assumption:

$$\begin{aligned} \varepsilon _{w_{i}}=\delta \varepsilon _{d_{i}}+\eta _{i}, \end{aligned}$$
(45)

where \(\eta _{i}\) is independent of \(\varepsilon _{d_{i}}\). This less restrictive assumption suggests that error term \(\varepsilon _{w_{i}}\) in the wage equation is a multiple of error term \(\varepsilon _{d_{i}}\) in the employment equation, with additive noise \(\eta _{i}\). In addition to (45), when \(\varepsilon _{d}\sim N(0,\sigma _{\varepsilon _{d}}^{2}=1)\) is assumed for using probit as a link function, the Heckman two-step estimator can be defined in the form of an augmented ordinary least squares regression:

$$\begin{aligned} y_{w_{i}}=\mathbf {x}_{w_{i}}^{\prime }\varvec{\beta }_{w}+\rho (\varepsilon _{d},\varepsilon _{w})\cdot \sigma _{\varepsilon _{w}}\cdot \lambda (\mathbf {x}_{d_{i}}^{\prime }\widehat{\varvec{\beta }}_{d})+v_{i}, \end{aligned}$$
(46)

where \(\lambda (\mathbf {x}_{d_{i}}^{\prime }\widehat{\varvec{\beta }}_{d})\) is the (estimated) inverse Mills ratio \(\phi (\mathbf {x}_{d_{i}}^{\prime }\widehat{\varvec{\beta }}_{d})/\Phi (\mathbf {x}_{d_{i}}^{\prime }\widehat{\varvec{\beta }}_{d})\). In this context, \(\lambda (\mathbf {x}_{d_{i}}^{\prime }\widehat{\varvec{\beta }}_{d})\) proxies for a refugee’s participation in employment, the addition of which measures the sample selection effect (Dolton and Makepeace 1986).

Despite less-restrictive assumption (45), this study does not use the Heckman two-step estimator as its primary econometric method for several reasons. First, ML-based selection methods (e.g., copula selection model) are more efficient than the Heckman two-step estimator, and the loss of efficiency caused by using the Heckman two-step estimator is often large (Leung and Yu 1996; Stolzenberg and Relles 1997; Moffitt 1999; Puhani 2000; Bushway et al. 2007). Second, the objective of this study is investigating selection patterns of refugees into employment, which makes \(\rho \) in (43) the main parameter of interest. Using the Heckman two-step estimator, it is impossible to estimate \(\rho \) directly in (46) because it is not \(\rho \) but \(\rho (\varepsilon _{d},\varepsilon _{w})\cdot \sigma _{\varepsilon _{w}}\) that is estimated as the coefficient of selection correction term \(\lambda (\mathbf {x}_{d_{i}}^{\prime }\widehat{\varvec{\beta }}_{d})\). The Heckman version correlation coefficient, \(\rho ^{\text {Heckman}}\), can be estimated only indirectly using additional stages.Footnote 63 Third, the asymptotic properties of the standard error of \(\rho ^{\text {Heckman}}\) have not been investigated extensively, making it challenging to test statistical significance. Fourth, using the Heckman two-step estimator, an exclusion restriction is practically necessary, though theoretically unnecessary, which refers to the requirement that at least one regressor, say z, in the employment equation should be excluded from the wage equation so that \(\mathbf {x}_{d}=(\mathbf {x}_{w}^{\prime },z)^{\prime }\) holds.Footnote 64 Its importance amplifies when \(\mathbf {x}_{d_{i}}^{\prime }\widehat{\varvec{\beta }}_{d}\) in (46) has little variation. In that case, \(\varvec{\beta }_{w}\) in (46) is identified only weakly because the Heckman two-step estimator was designed to exploit the non-linearity of \(\lambda (\mathbf {x}_{d_{i}}^{\prime }\widehat{\varvec{\beta }}_{d})\). If it is approximately linear over a range of its argument, this intended mechanism does not operate properly.Footnote 65 Since it is difficult to find a defensible exclusion restriction, this aspect should be regarded as a substantial limitation of the Heckman two-step estimator (Puhani 2000).Footnote 66 For more on limitations of the Heckman (1976; 1979) two-step estimator, see Stolzenberg and Relles (1997) and Bushway et al. (2007). Despite such shortcomings, this paper uses the Heckman two-step estimator for a robustness check in Sect. 6 due to its less-restrictive assumption, at the expense of less efficiency. It is also used when a log-likelihood function does not converge due to a limited number of observations and a large number of parameters estimated. Bushway et al. (2007) and Wooldridge (2010) discuss that it is often difficult for ML-based selection methods to converge.

1.3 Econometric details

In this paper, several copulas are used, and Archimedean copulas are especially practical, with mathematical properties that are easy to deal with (Smith 2003). The mathematical properties of Archimedean copulas are captured by an additive generator function, \(\varphi :\mathbf {I}=[0,1]\rightarrow [0,+\infty )\), which is continuous, convex, and strictly decreasing (i.e., \(\varphi ^{\mathrm {\prime }}(t)<0\) and \(\varphi ^{\prime \prime }(t)>0\) for \(0<t<1\)), with terminal \(\varphi (1)=0\) (Smith 2003).Footnote 67 Generator function \(\varphi \) maps the interval [0, 1] onto the non-negative real line. According to Smith (2003), in a bivariate case with two continuous random variables \(\varepsilon _{w}\) and \(\varepsilon _{d}\) and their marginal CDFs \(F_{1}(\varepsilon _{w})=u_{w}\) and \(F_{2}(\varepsilon _{d})=u_{w}\), the means by which \(\varphi \) generates the copula are based on:

$$\begin{aligned} \varphi \left( C\{u_{w},u_{d};\theta \}\right) =\varphi \left( u_{w}\right) +\varphi \left( u_{d}\right) . \end{aligned}$$
(47)

For all Archimedean copulas, \(C\{u_{w},u_{d};\theta \}\) is recovered by:

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{aligned}C\{u_{w},u_{d};\theta \}&=\varphi ^{-1}\left\{ \varphi \left( u_{w}\right) +\varphi \left( u_{d}\right) \right\} \\&=\varphi ^{-1}\left\{ \varphi \left( C\{u_{w},u_{d};\theta \}\right) \right\} . \end{aligned} \end{aligned}$$
(48)

Differentiating (48) with respect to \(u_{w}\) yields:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial }{\partial u_{w}}C\{u_{w},u_{d};\theta \}=\frac{\varphi ^{\mathrm {\prime }}(u_{w})}{\varphi ^{\mathrm {\prime }}(C\{u_{w},u_{d};\theta \})}, \end{aligned}$$
(49)

where \(\varphi ^{\mathrm {\prime }}(\cdot )\) refers to the derivative of \(\varphi (t)\). Substituting (49) into (36) leads to:

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{aligned}L&=\prod \limits _{i=1}^{N}\{\Pr [y_{d_{i}}^{*}\le 0]\}^{1-D_{i}}\left\{ f_{1}(\varepsilon _{w})\times \left( 1-\frac{\varphi ^{\mathrm {\prime }}(u_{w})}{\varphi ^{\mathrm {\prime }}(C\{u_{w},u_{d};\theta \})}\right) \right\} ^{D_{i}},\end{aligned} \end{aligned}$$
(50)

which is the likelihood function with an Archimedean copula. Estimating using ML is straightforward.

Among various Archimedean copulas, this study uses the Frank (1979) copula, due primarily to the fact that only the Frank copula is comprehensive in terms of dependence coverage (i.e., \(-\infty<\theta <\infty \)).Footnote 68 In addition, it has weaker tail dependence. In the current investigation, it is also preferred because of its lowest information criterion values, as measured by both the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC).Footnote 69 In this study, with two marginal distributions, the Frank copula, the generator function of which is:

$$\begin{aligned} \varphi (t)=-\log \left( \frac{e^{-\theta t}-1}{e^{-\theta }-1}\right) , \end{aligned}$$
(51)

can be expressed as:

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{aligned}C_{{-\infty<\theta <+\infty }}^{\text {Frank}}\{u_{w},u_{d};\theta \}&=-\theta ^{-1}\log \left\{ 1+\frac{(e^{-\theta u_{w}}-1)(e^{-\theta u_{d}}-1)}{(e^{-\theta }-1)}\right\} .\end{aligned} \end{aligned}$$
(52)

When using (52), one complication arises; the parameter space of \(\theta \) ranges from \(-\infty \) to \(+\infty \), which makes \(\theta \) less informative than \(\rho \) in the bivariate ML selection model, bounded in the interval \([-1,1]\). Thus, Kendall’s \(\tau \) is often used because it is also bounded in the interval \([-1,1]\) (Smith 2003). For an Archimedean copula with its generator function \(\varphi \), Kendall’s \(\tau \) can be calculated by:

$$\begin{aligned} \tau =1+4{\displaystyle \int _{0}^{1}}\frac{\varphi (t)}{\varphi ^{\mathrm {\prime }}(t)}\mathrm{d}t. \end{aligned}$$
(53)

Kendall’s \(\tau \) for the Frank copula can be calculated by:

$$\begin{aligned} \tau ^{\text {Frank}}=1-\frac{4}{\theta }\left\{ 1-\frac{1}{\theta }{\displaystyle \int _{0}^{\theta }}\frac{t}{e^{t}-1}\mathrm{d}t\right\} . \end{aligned}$$
(54)

By this calculation, \(\theta \) is converted to \(\tau ^{\text {Frank}}\), bounded in the interval \([-1,1]\) and facilitating its interpretation.Footnote 70 The closer \(\tau \) is to \(-1\) \((+1)\), the stronger the negative (positive) dependence between \(\varepsilon _{w}\) and \(\varepsilon _{d}\). \(\tau =0\) indicates no dependency. For details on Archimedean copulas, see Nelsen (1999). The unique aspect of the current study is that the selection parameters are of primary interest, unlike other studies, in which selection parameters function only as selection-correction terms.

1.4 Additional table

See Table 4.

Table 4 Summary statistics (key variables only)

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Shin, S. To work or not? Wages or subsidies?: Copula-based evidence of subsidized refugees’ negative selection into employment. Empir Econ 63, 2209–2252 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-022-02202-y

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