Abstract
This chapter employs the discipline of the overlapping generations monetary framework originally developed by Marini and van der Ploeg (The Economic Journal, Vol. 98, September 1988, pp. 772–786) in order to study the dynamic consequences of fiscal policy regimes targeting real government liabilities relative to the size of the economy, via gradual adjustment rules, which interact with interest-rate policy regimes targeting inflation, via Taylor rules. The main result is that a fiscal easing enlarging the target stock of government liabilities causes inflation to increase both in the short run and in the long run, even under an aggressive interest-rate policy and an intertemporally balanced budgetary policy stance. Differently from the fiscal theory of the price level, fiscal regimes need not be “non-Ricardian”—i.e., disregarding the public solvency constraint—to reveal the debt–inflation relationship. The view that the rules-based approach to monetary policy is not sufficient to anchor inflation at the target rate without an appropriate commitment by the government over the long-run debt position and the pace of debt reduction—even under “Ricardian” fiscal regimes—has therefore additional analytical foundations. The chapter’s results suggest that inflation is neither only a monetary nor only a fiscal phenomenon. Rather, it appears to be a monetary–fiscal phenomenon.
[T]here is a chance that macroeconomic stimulus on a scale closer to World War II levels than normal recession levels will set off inflationary pressures of a kind we have not seen in a generation. [...] Stimulus measures of the magnitude contemplated are steps into the unknown.
Lawrence H. Summers (2021)
I am profoundly grateful to Giancarlo Marini, who was a major influence on my decision to pursue study and research in the field of fiscal and monetary policy. My deepest thanks to Giancarlo for the endless discussions and the invaluable encouragement.
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Notes
- 1.
Monetary models with overlapping generations of finite-horizon agents, along the line of research traced by Marini and van der Ploeg (1988), are increasingly adopted for both monetary and fiscal policy analysis, further in the context of discrete-time New Keynesian frameworks (Woodford 2003; Galí 2015, 2018). See, e.g., Petrucci 1999, 2003; Leith and Wren-Lewis 2000; Piergallini 2006; Annicchiarico et al. 2008, 2009; Leith and von Thadden 2008; Ascari and Rankin 2013; Brito et al. 2016; Nisticò 2012, 2016; Rigon and Zanetti 2018, and Galí (2021).
- 2.
The Fiscal Compact—formally “Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union,” reforming the Stability and Growth Pact—is in force since 2013, even though temporarily suspended from 2020 to 2023 because of the pandemic crisis, and features a firmly defined debt reduction benchmark rule. Specifically, the rule establishes that Member States whose debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds the 60% threshold are required to reduce their ratios to the reference value at an average rate of one-twentieth per year.
- 3.
This sign restriction comes from \(\Upsilon _{cc}-\Upsilon _{cm}\Upsilon _{c}/\Upsilon _{m}<0\) and \(\Upsilon _{mm}-\Upsilon _{cm}\Upsilon _{m}/\Upsilon _{c}<0\).
- 4.
See Appendix “Appendix A” for analytical details.
- 5.
This sign restriction reflects the fact that \(\Omega \left ( R(t)\right ) -R(t)\Omega ^{\prime }\left ( R(t)\right ) >0\), for the elasticity of substitution between real money balances and consumption, \(\Omega ^{\prime }\left ( R(t)\right ) R(t)/\Omega \left ( R(t)\right ) \), is lower than unity.
- 6.
See Appendix “Appendix B” for analytical details.
- 7.
It is worth noting that the stock of real government liabilities relative to output should be counted as a state variable of the system, since its value cannot jump independently of the inflation rate. To see this, let \(A\left ( 0\right ) \) and \(M\left ( 0\right ) \) denote the initial stocks of nominal government liabilities and nominal money, respectively, whose values are predetermined. It follows that the ratio \(A\left ( 0\right ) /M\left ( 0\right ) =a\left ( 0\right ) /m\left ( 0\right ) =a\left ( 0\right ) \Omega (\Psi (\pi (0))) \) cannot jump, since \(A\left ( 0\right ) /M\left ( 0\right ) \) is predetermined. Hence, only \(\pi (0)\) can jump freely in system (31), and the Blanchard–Kahn conditions ensure that a steady state is locally determined if one root of the Jacobian matrix is positive and one root is negative.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Using the definition of total consumption (5) and the optimal intratemporal condition (7), the instantaneous utility function can be expressed as
where \(q(t)\equiv \Upsilon \left ( \frac {\Omega (R(t))}{\Omega (R(t))+R(t)}, \frac {1}{\Omega (R(t))+R(t)}\right ) \) is identical across all generations and can be interpreted as the utility-based cost of living index of the basket of physical goods and real balances. Hence, the intertemporal optimization problem can be formulated in the following terms:
subject to
the no-Ponzi game condition (4), and given \(\overline {a}(s,0)\).
Optimality yields the Euler equation in terms of total consumption (8) and the transversality condition (9). Integrating forward (A.3) and using both the transversality condition (9) and the law of motion of total consumption (8), the optimal level of total consumption turns to be a linear function of total wealth, according to equation (10). From (7), one has
where \(\Lambda (R(t))\equiv 1+R(t)/\Omega \left ( R(t)\right ) \). Time differentiating (A.4) yields
Substituting (A.4) and (A.5) into (8), one obtains the law of motion for individual consumption (13).
Appendix B
Aggregate wealth in per capita terms is, by definition, given by
Differentiating with respect to time yields
Since \(\overline {a}(t,t)\) is equal to zero, by assumption, using (3) into (B.2) yields
From (12), the per capita aggregate consumption is given by
Differentiating with respect to time the definition of per capita aggregate consumption, one obtains
where \(\overline {c}(t,t)\) represents consumption of the newborn generation. Because \(\overline {a}(t,t)=0\) and \(\overline {h}(t,t)=\overline {h}(t)\), (12) implies
Substituting (13), (B.4), and (B.6) into (B.5), one obtains the time path of per capita aggregate consumption, expressed by (17).
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Piergallini, A. (2023). Public Debt, Taylor Rules, and Inflation Dynamics in an Overlapping Generations Model. In: Imbriani, C., Scaramozzino, P. (eds) Economic Policy Frameworks Revisited. Contributions to Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36518-8_5
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