Abstract
In the Nun’s Priest Tale, Chaucer defers to “the hooly doctour Augustyn, / Or Boece, or the Bisshop Bradwardyn” (VII.3232–3) for a detailed discussion on the topic of God’s foreknowledge. After this apparent dismissal of material that he cannot sift to the husks (NPT, VII.3238), the poet nonetheless finds it here necessary to pause for a moment to distinguish between “symple necessitee,” “free choys,” and “necessitee condicioneel.” Interestingly, Chaucer recasts the “greet disputisoun” as it relates to modal logic (NPT, VII.3238). In the poet’s own version of simple necessity, he isolates the modal adverb “Nedely,” which qualifies the copula “to doon” in the kind of modal construction “A is necessarily B” (as opposed to non-modal propositions that exclude such words as “necessarily” and “possibly”). Moreover, the far more complicated conditional necessity reads, “if A, then necessarily B.” Boethius employs conditional necessity for the argument that God’s knowledge of future events does not bridle man’s free choice.1 In this chapter, I will examine these and other such modal statements in another poem, the Parliament of Fowls. In fact, conditional “if… then…” statements and imaginative conjectures embedded in the oft-repeated word “wolde” permeate the poem’s dialogue and draw attention to the poetic potential for actualizing the possible within the reality of the inner dream.
Wheither that Goddes worthy forwityng
Streyneth me nedely for to doon a thyng—
“Nedely” clepe I symple necessitee—Or elles, if free choys be graunted me
To do that same thyng, or do it noght,
Though God forwoot it er that I was wroght;
Or if his wityng streyneth never a deel
But by necessitee condicioneel.
(Nun’s Priest Tale, VII.3243–50)
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Notes
J. A. W. Bennett, The Parlement of Foules: An Interpretation, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965).
A.J. Minnis, “The Parliament of Fowls,” in Oxford Guides to Chaucer: The Shorter Poems, ed. A.J. Minnis, V.J. Scattergood, and J. J. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 252–322.
See also Thomas L. Reed, Middle English Debate Poetry and the Aesthetics of Irresolution (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1990), 355.
see Derek S. Brewer, “The Genre of the Parlement of Foules,” Modern Language Review 53 (1958): 321–6.
Zeeman, “Philosophy in Parts: Jean de Meun, Chaucer, and Lydgate,” in Uncertain Knowledge: Scepticism, Relativism, and Doubt in the Middle Ages, ed. Dallas G. Denery II, Kantik Ghosh, and Nicolette Zeeman (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014), 234.
See Hester Goodenough Gelber’s 2004 book entitled It Could Have Been Otherwise: Contingency and Necessity in Dominican Theology at Oxford, 1300–1350 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2004).
see also John Marenbon, Medieval Philosophy: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), 321–2.
Jennifer E. Ashworth, “Logic,” in The Cambridge History of Science, Volume 2: Medieval Science, ed. David C. Lindberg and Michael Shank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 541.
See also Rodney Delasanta, “Chaucer and Strode,” CR 26 (1991): 205–18.
Howard H. Schless, Chaucer and Dante: A Revaluation (Norman, OK: Pilgrim, 1984), 94.
Kathryn L. Lynch, Chaucer’s Philosophical Visions, Chaucer Studies 27 (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2000), 99.
Simo Knuuttila, “Modal Logic,” in The Cambridge History of hater Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 354.
Calvin Normore, “Divine Omniscience, Omnipotence and Future Contingents: An Overview,” in Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy, ed. Tamar Rudavsky (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985), 3–22.
See also Oscar Becker, Untersuchungen über den Modalkalkül (Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain, 1952).
Kathleen Hewitt, “‘Ther It Was First’: Dream Poetics in the Parliament of Fowls,” CR 24 (1989): 21.
Derek S. Brewer, “The Parliament of Fowls: Community and Conflict,” in A New Introduction to Chaucer (London: Longman, 1998), 137.
Piero Boitani, “Old Books Brought to Life in Dreams,” in The Cambridge Companion to Chaucer, ed. Piero Boitani and Jill Mann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 69.
Robert R. Edwards, The Dream of Chaucer: Representation and Reflection in the Early Narratives (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), 140.
Wolfgang Clemen, Chaucer’s Early Poetry, trans. C. A. M. Sym (London: Shenval Press, 1963), 139.
Alexander Broadie, Introduction to Medieval Logic, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 61.
Paul Vincent Spade also cites Albert of Saxony and Walter Burley: “Insolubilia,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 249n31.
Catarina Dutilh Novaes, “Medieval Obligationes as Logical Games of Consistency Maintenance,” Synthese 145 (2005): 371.
Sara Uckelman, “Interactive Logic in the Middle Ages,” Logic and Logical Philosophy 21 (2012): 444.
Paul Vincent Spade, “Three Theories of Obligationes: Burley, Kilvington and Swyneshed on Counterfactual Reasoning,” History and Philosophy of Logic 3 (1982): 1–32.
Catarina Novaes, “Roger Swyneshed’s Obligationes: A Logical Game of Inference Recognition?” Synthese 151 (2006): 125–53.
Henrik Lagerlund and Erik Olsson, “Disputation and Change of Belief: Burley’s Theory of obligationes as a Theory of Belief Revision,” in Medieval Formal Logic: Obligations, Insolubles, and Consequences, ed. M. Yrjönsuuri (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001), 35–62.
Christopher J. Martin, “Obligations and Liars,” in Sophisms in Medieval Logic and Grammar: Acts of the Ninth European Symposium or Medieval Logic and Semantics, held at St Andrews, June 1990, ed. Stephen Read (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001), 357–81.
Mikko Yrjönsuuri, “Obligations as Thought Experiments,” in Studies on the History of Logic, ed. I. Angelelli and M. Cerezo (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1996), 79–96.
See Eleonore Stump, “Obligations: From the Beginning to the Early Fourteenth Century,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 318.
David Lawton, Chaucer’s Narrators (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 42.
Deanne Williams, “The Dream Visions,” in The Yale Companion to Chaucer, ed. Seith Lerer (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 172.
See also Paul Vincent Spade, “The Logic of Disputation in Walter Burley’s Treatise on Obligations,” Synthese 63 (1985): 355–74.
Ian Robinson, Chaucer and the English Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 61.
Russell A. Peck, “Chaucer and the Nominalist Questions,” Speculum 53 (1978): 758.
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© 2015 Alexander N. Gabrovsky
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Gabrovsky, A.N. (2015). Counterfactual Conditionals in the Avian Debate: Ars Obligatoria and Possible Worlds Semantics in the Parliament of Fowls. In: Chaucer the Alchemist. The New Middle Ages. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137523914_5
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