Abstract
We come finally to contemporary efforts to bring back the classical practice of international punishment in its nearly complete form; as we will see, the only significant way in which what is advocated today differs from the old practice is in the lack of reliance on Natural Law metaphysics. Contemporary discussion of the criminalization of state behavior and the punishment of states for the commission of international crimes effectively brings us full circle to Grotius and Locke.
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Notes
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© 2010 Harry D. Gould
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Gould, H.D. (2010). The Problematic Discourse of State Crime. In: The Legacy of Punishment in International Law. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230113077_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230113077_6
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