9.1 Introduction of Integrated River Basin Governance (IRBG)

This section emphasizes the main challenges faced by implementation and functioning of water governance. It provides the scientific definitions of water governance as well as its principles.

9.1.1 Definition of Integrated River Basin Governance (IRBG)

As IRBM has been defined as IWRM taking basin as the management unit in a previous chapter, IRBG can be coarsely defined as integrated river basin water governance (IWRG) taking basin as the unit. So we firstly discuss the definition of water governance.

There is a clear opinion among many scholars that in order to improve water resources management, it is necessary, first of all, to create a solid water governance platform. It should define the rules of the game in water management and create an appropriate environment and prerequisites for it. In other words, water resources management will be ineffective in the absence or in case of inadequate water governance.

While looking for a definition of water governance, the literature mainly refers to the three sources listed below.

  • The OECD defines water governance as the “range of political, institutional and administrative rules, practices and processes (formal and informal) through which decisions are taken and implemented, stakeholders can articulate their interests and have their concerns considered, and decision makers are held accountable for water management” (OECD, 2015).

  • The term water governance encompasses “the political, economic and social processes and institutions by which governments, civil society, and the private sector make decisions about how best to use, develop and manage water resources”.

  • GWP defines water governance as “the set of political, social, economic and administrative systems in place to regulate the development and management of water resources and provide water services at different levels of society” (GWP, 2004)

Despite the slight difference in definitions, it is important to keep in mind that water governance must follow certain principles. The main principle is to achieve equal and sustainable water supply for the entire society, economy and nature, elimination of “water inequality, water shortage and water hunger” through water resources use. Thus, the target basis of water governance should be overcoming hydroegoism in all its manifestations (Dukhovny & Ziganshina, 2010).

Neither in science nor in practice is there a definite rigid approach to the framework of water governance. Each region, country, basin or sub-basin is unique. This means that approaches to water governance must be adapted to each of these levels.

Generalising the principles of water governance we can refer to the OECD methodology (OECD, 2015). The authors base their principles on three complementary aspects of water governance:

  1. (i)

    effectiveness—contribution of the governance to define the clear sustainable goals and objectives at all its levels, for implementation of these political goals and achievement of expected results.

  2. (ii)

    efficiency—governance’s contribution to maximising the benefits of sustainable water management and welfare at the lowest cost to society.

  3. (iii)

    trust and engagement—involves contribution of governance to building public confidence and ensuring stakeholders’ participation.

Effectiveness includes correctly chosen levels for the implementation of water governance principles, as well as policy coherence and capacity. Efficiency includes the collection, processing, sharing and distribution of data and information, as well as funding and regulatory frameworks. Finally, trust and engagement includes, but is not limited to, monitoring and evaluation, trade-offs and cooperation among users and economies, broad stakeholder engagement, and transparency to demonstrate performance.

Water governance can make a significant contribution to the design, implementation and following of appropriate policies for the economic, social and environmental benefits of water use. Establishing the responsibility of different levels of government, civil society, private sector and a wide range of stakeholders will increase their responsibility in the governance and management of water resources.

Integrated River Basin Governance focuses on the social, economic, organisational and institutional arrangements of river basin management (Hooper, 2005). As we understand it, Integrated River Basin Governance is the implementation of water governance within a basin, emphasising the integration of all aspects of water governance. Integrated River Basin Governance cooperation refers to the cross-border cooperation of various entities in the watershed for better water governance and obtaining more shareable benefits. It takes water as the centre, but sometimes it may go beyond the scope of water and only indicate the cooperation taking place within a river basin.

9.1.2 Integrated River Basin Governance by Basin Community

There has been a shift in policy rhetoric towards adopting polycentric bottom-up community-based approaches, in contrast to centralised top-down approaches (Tantoh et al., 2018). However, in this chapter community is not taken only as a root level organisation or crowd, but as the aggregation of all people and organisations within the basin who share the same basin and link their destiny together, including root villages. Integrated River Basin Governance by basin community means that all people and organisations should have the opportunity and methods to participate in water governance within the basin in which they are involved. It’s rational to see basin community as a complex system of formal and informal organisations or groups of people in different level, which can also be seen as sub-communities that constitute the whole basin community.

Basin (sub-)communities are created with different organisational structures, depending on tasks to be solved, legal and administrative systems, availability of human and financial resources. These are usually, but not always, formal legal structures. However, in some cases, less formalised structures also can work. Having any organisational structure, basin communities should remain public sector organisations, since water resources management is a public domain (GWP, 2009).

Often, the official basin communities are part of the public sector, but effective IRBG also requires broad participation of various stakeholders, which can be represented by community groups, economic sectors, nongovernmental organisations and private enterprises (Dukhovny & De Schutter, 2018).

In fact, basin communities are bodies combining a number of structures necessary for Integrated River Basin Governance. They are called upon to play a leading role in solving water governance problems at the basin level. This means maintaining full awareness and participation of decision makers and actors from all economic sectors and at all levels of both the public and private sectors.

Basin communities perform many tasks, but there is a tendency to group them into three key functions (Table 9.1). Depending on the purpose for which the basin community was created and its managerial structure, it can perform one, several or all of these functions.

Table 9.1 Key functions of basin communities
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9.1.3 The Outcomes of Integrated River Basin Governance Cooperation

In recent years, Basin countries have taken progressive steps towards a common future with an emphasis on water resources management and governance. Water security is the core of such cooperation and is designed to protect two important principles. First, water cooperation should not jeopardise a country’s sovereignty. Secondly, the economic and social development of any country should not be sacrificed for the use of water by another countries (Xing, 2017).

Regional and/or sub-regional cooperation has the potential to enhance the political, diplomatic, economic and cultural influence of riparian countries. Therefore, cooperation in developing national strengths and ensuring the safety of transboundary waters is in the interests of all Basin countries (Ponte, 2012).

An important goal of basin water governance cooperation is to resolve conflicts of national interests. Each country focuses on the use of river water in different ways: China and Laos focus on hydropower; Thailand and Vietnam highlight the importance of water use in agriculture; Cambodia focuses on the fishing industry. In addition, China, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand need water transport. Cooperation in the field of water governance includes all six countries and will align the interests of each country and resolve disputes on one platform (Van Thang et al., 2019).

The basin countries, through cooperation in the field of water management and water governance, have made tremendous efforts to combat river pollution. The overall water quality of the Mekong River is relatively satisfactory and meets the agreed minimum standards. Moreover, water quality indicators are fairly stable, with rare exceptions in the densely populated delta (MRC, 2020).

Also, due to close cooperation in water governance, it was possible to achieve an increase in releases from reservoirs during the dry season. On the one hand, this is not beneficial for upstream countries with hydroelectricity Plants (HEPs), but on the other hand, it is beneficial for downstream countries to combat drought. This balance is a mutual benefit of basin cooperation in the field of water governance.

An excellent example of water governance cooperation is the fact that agriculture and fisheries in Vietnam, Laos and Thailand were severely affected by the drought in 2015–2016. Moreover, there has been a significant intrusion of seawater into groundwater in Vietnam. An analysis report from Vietnam has got the conclusion that the main causes of the drought are the occurrence of El Nino in 2015 which caused severe climate draught in this basin and the water use in Thailand, Cambodia and Laos which contributed at least 49% of low season discharge decrease.Footnote 1 During this period, China released water to help its lower basin neighbours at their request (Gruenwald, 2020). China released an emergency water supply from its Jinghong Hydropower Station in the southwest Yunnan province to feed the downstream Mekong River between March 15 and April 10. These timely efforts have helped alleviate drought downstream and have demonstrated the positive impact of upstream dam construction. Vietnamese officials have officially acknowledged the role of the release of water from China's upstream reservoirs in alleviating the drought in Vietnam (Vietnam News Agency, 2016).

The commitment to continuous monitoring as part of water governance confirms the expected impacts of increased flow resulting from the construction of new reservoirs and HEPs in the Basin. This redistribution of seasonal flows from the wet season to the dry season by existing and planned HEPs could provide additional dry season flows to meet some of the planned water needs in downstream countries (Xing, 2017).

However, it is necessary to be extremely careful, in view of the fact that uncoordinated operation of reservoirs can cause negative consequences. This could be a delay in the onset of flooding due to dam filling and unexpected flow changes during the dry season, which would negatively affect the downstream countries and the delta.

Moreover, water governance in transboundary basins as a non-traditional security issue is closely intertwined with traditional security management. All Basin countries are developing economies. They are heavily dependent on the agricultural sector, where water demand is constantly growing. Consequently, inappropriate water governance and management of water resources can jeopardise national security (Goh, 2004). Under certain unfavourable circumstances, external migration, driven by a change in the volume of river water, can sharply increase. Declining quality and quantity of water resources, population growth and unequal access to them can negatively affect some population groups, exacerbating other problems: a lack of arable land, water, forests and fish (Goh, 2004). In turn, this reduces the economic activity of local population which leads to economic recession in countries and the entire region. The victims may migrate or be expelled to other areas and countries. External migration often provokes ethnic conflicts, riots and uprisings in rural areas. In developing countries, migration and declining productivity can ultimately undermine government control and enable elites to challenge central government (Xing, 2017). Thus, the proper water governance is intended to provide an ideal platform for the coordination of transboundary water resources, which can indirectly enhance comprehensive security in the region.

9.2 International Cooperation Mechanisms in the Lancang-Mekong River Basin [Shaofeng Jia, Hoaithuong Do, Boris Gojenko]

Because water cooperation is only one part within the whole system of international cooperation, and there are very little special agreement or mechanism for water cooperation, and water is always treated as one factor within bi/multi-lateral cooperation agreement or mechanism, it’s rational to put water cooperation under the umbrella of reginal cooperation, or understand water cooperation through the lens of regional cooperation.

9.2.1 Cooperation Mechanisms That Have Emerged

The cooperation mechanism means the matching and integration of institutions of two or more groups to achieve effective collaboration.

The vision of better management of the Mekong River brings certain cooperative advantages for the trade development of riparian countries (Zhu, 2010). A series of sub-regional cooperation mechanisms in the Mekong River has been established since the 1990s. At present, there are about 15 cooperative mechanisms in the Mekong Region divided into two groups: intra-regional mechanisms (cooperation among Mekong countries) and between Mekong countries with partners outside the basin (Le, 2018). This section introduces the 7 most important river basin cooperation institutions and their cooperation mechanisms in chronological order of their establishment (Table 9.2).

Table 9.2 The Mekong River riparian country cooperation mechanism
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– The Mekong River Commission: In 1957, the International Mekong River Committee was established by the United Nations with four countries Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and the Republic of Vietnam to jointly exploit the Mekong River (Backer Bruzelius, 2007). However, because of the war, the exploitation plan stalled. On 5/4/1995, the Mekong River Commission (Mekong River Commission) was established with 4 members, namely Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam, established with the signing of the “Agreement on cooperation for sustainable development of the Mekong River. The main objective of the Mekong River Commission is to promote cooperation among riparian countries in the sustainable use, development, and protection of water and related resources and for the mutual benefit of the countries (Backer Bruzelius, 2007). China and Myanmar joined as dialogue partners.

According to Dore (2003), Laos and Cambodia are the two countries with the highest proportion of territories linked to the Mekong River (97% and 86%, respectively). Therefore, the cooperation of the Mekong sub-region countries for these two countries is considered to have a direct and serious impact on the life and development of these countries compared to other members of the regime. Besides, Vietnam is a country located at the end of the Mekong River basin, the gateway to important traffic routes in the basin. For Vietnam the Mekong accounts for about 25% of the country's territorial area and 35% of the country's population, this region has strategic implications for the socio-economic development, environment, and national security of Vietnam. Participation in the Mekong River Commission is an important strategy to promote the development of this country in exchange and trade with countries in the region and around the world (Nguyen, 2015). On November 26, 2020, the International Mekong River Commission held the 27th session of the Council in conjunction with the 25th session with Development Partners, in Laos. At this meeting, the Council approved many important documents of the Commission such as a basin-wide environmental management strategy for important ecological environmental values; the Committee for the 2021–2030 River Basin Development Strategy, and the Commission's Strategic Plan for the period of 2021–2025; Working Program of the Commission for the year 2021–2022; Master Plan on Water Traffic. In addition, the meeting also discussed with the Dialogue Partners and Development Partners, the situation of cooperation and developments of water resources in the basin, the Common Environmental Monitoring Program for the above hydropower projects in mainstream Mekong River, and the response to extreme weather in 2020 and may continue to happen next year. The representatives of the donors, in addition to welcoming the Commission's cooperative achievements including the Commission's Joint Statement on Mekong mainstream hydropower projects, paid special attention to promote the establishment of monitoring systems for these projects and make them publicly available to support stakeholder consultation sessions.

After 25 years, the Mekong River Commission has achieved many positive results, contributing to promoting development in member countries, enhancing cooperation among member countries, and expanding cooperation with two upstream countries (Chinaand Myanmar) and many other international partners. In the Mekong basin cooperation frameworks, the Commission is the only organisation that has the function of developing legal frameworks, including binding regulations for member states to publicly and equally share water resources, jointly protect the river basin's ecological environment, as well as to promote joint development projects. The Commission's activities are not only important for economic and social development, and environmental protection but also contribute to strengthening friendly relations between countries in the region.

– Greater Mekong Subregion cooperation: The Greater Mekong Subregion was established in 1992 and includes five countries belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), namely Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, and two provinces of China (Yunnan, Guangxi). This is a region with great economic potential with rich natural resources, especially the resources in agriculture—forestry, fisheries, hydropower, and waterway transportation (Duong et al., 2020).

The Greater Mekong Subregion programme is considered to be the most complete and effective sub-regional cooperation mechanism, with priority given to infrastructure development, energy, telecommunications, tourism, trade investment, and resource development, human resources, and the environment. The Greater Mekong Subregion Program strategy adopts three pillars:

  1. 1.

    Enhancing connectivity through sustainable infrastructure development and converting transport corridors into transnational economic corridors;

  2. 2.

    Improving competitiveness through efficient support for cross-border passenger and cargo transportation, market integration, production processes, and value chains;

  3. 3.

    Raising public awareness through programmes and projects to address common social and environmental concerns (also known as 3C: Connectivity (infrastructure connectivity), Competitiveness (enhancing capacity), Community (community connection) (ADB, 2012).

Initiatives and activities in the Greater Mekong Sub-region programme focus on 9 main areas including transport, energy, environment, tourism, posts, and telecommunications, trade, investment, human resource development, agriculture, and rural development. 11 priority programmes have been identified in the sub-regional economic cooperation framework, including (i) Posts, telecommunications and information and communication technologies; (ii) North-South economic corridor; (iii) East-West economic corridor; (iv) Southern Economic Corridor; (v) Regional electricity and electricity trade links; (vi) Framework of environmental strategy; (vii) Facilitating cross-border trade and investment; (viii) Strengthening private sector participation and competitiveness; (ix) Developing human resources and skills; (x) Water resource management and flood prevention; (xii) Greater Mekong Subregion sub-region tourism development (ADB, 2012).

Greater Mekong Subregion cooperation is recognised by many experts as one of the fastest-growing regional cooperation channels in the world. During 1992–2006 all Greater Mekong Subregion countries experienced significant economic growth, among these the less developed countries generally experienced higher rates of growth than the more developed ones. Starting in 1992 with an average of US$664, the average GDP per capita (excluding China) increased to US$1,042 in 2006. From 1992 to 2006, Myanmar and Vietnam increased 171% and 129%, respectively, in GDP per capita. And thereafter to now, the economic growth rate of this region has maintained higher than the average of the world. In line with economic improvement, Greater Mekong Subregion countries achieved better quality of life for people in the subregion, heading towards high-quality development (Duong et al., 2020). This is one of the factors that together with abundant natural resources has become an attractive force for international investors. Therefore, Greater Mekong Subregion Greater Mekong Subregion cooperation is an important mean for all the regional countries, bringing common interests in many aspects such as security, politics, economy, culture—society, and improving the position of each country in the region and the international arena.

– Ayeyarwady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy: The Ayeyarwady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic cooperation strategy (ACMECS) is an economic cooperation framework consisting of five countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam) to strengthen mutual and economic cooperation, to exploit and promote comparative advantage among regions and member countries, to improve competitiveness and narrow the development gap (De et al., 2020). ACMECS was established in November 2003 at the Bagan Summit after a proposal by Thailand. So far, ACMECS has seven areas of cooperation including: (i) trade-investment; (ii) agriculture; (iii) industry—energy; (iv) traffic; (v) travel; and (vi) human resource development; (vii) health. ACMECS established seven Working Groups corresponding to 7 areas of cooperation. Each ACMECS country coordinates at least 1 field of cooperation: Thailand coordinates trade investment and health; Vietnam coordinates human resource development and industry-energy; Cambodia coordinates tourism cooperation; Laos coordinates traffic cooperation; and Myanmar coordinates agriculture (De et al., 2020). The ACMECS Summit is held every two years in each country in rotation, and a Ministerial Meeting takes place annually. The ACMECS is a more effective forum than others because of the opportunities for regular negotiation amongst high-ranking officers and governments.

Most recently, the 9th ACMECS Summit, took placeonline in December 2020, with the presence of senior leaders of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and the ASEAN Secretary-General. With the theme “Partnerships for Connectivity and Recovery”, ACMECS focused on reviewing the implementation of the Bangkok Declaration and the ACMECS Master Plan for the period 2019–2023 adopted by the leaders. In regard of future cooperation, leaders stated that the region and the world were facing unprecedented challenges due to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and non-traditional security issues such as climate change, environmental degradation, natural disaster, floods, etc. Leaders expressed concern about severe droughts, especially in 2019 and 2020, causing the water level of the Mekong River to drop. New record low and disrupted food supplies affected the subregion's ecosystem, agriculture, and aquaculture. On that basis, the leaders affirmed their determination to:

  1. 1.

    Promote cooperation in environmental protection, smart agricultural development and sustainable management of water resources in the Mekong River, disaster management and climate change;

  2. 2.

    Strengthen efforts to both prevent, combat and respond to the Covid-19 pandemic and economic reconstruction;

  3. 3.

    Restore supply chains by promoting trade, investment, industry, tourism, digital economy development, e-commerce, and human resource development among member countries of ACMECS;

  4. 4.

    Promote the participation and contribution of development partners, international organisations and the private sector in the implementation of the three pillars of cooperation of the ACMECS Master Plan and soon put the ACMECS Development Fund into operation to effectively implement priority projects;

  5. 5.

    Ensure the connectivity and resonance between ACMECS cooperation with ASEAN and related sub-regional cooperation mechanisms, at the same time consider improving the structure and operating modes of ACMECS cooperation towards enhancing efficiency and development maximise resources.

– Cooperation in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV): At the ASEAN-Japan Summit, in December 2003, Tokyo, Japan, senior leaders of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV) agreed to hold the first CLMV Summit on the occasion of the 10th ASEAN Summit, in November 2004 in Vientiane, Laos. The meeting adopted the “Vientiane Declaration” on “Strengthening economic cooperation and integration among CLMV countries” (Austria, 2004). The Vientiane Declaration affirmed the CLMV's determination to boost economic cooperation with each other and integrate into the Mekong, ASEAN, and regional cooperation frameworks. At the same time, it called on countries and international organisations to increase support for the four countries to narrow the development gap (Sotharith, 2008).

Areas of cooperation in the CLMV framework include trade, investment, agriculture, industry, transport, tourism, and human resource development. CLMV encourages participation from the private sector and businesses across countries. CLMV currently has 7 specialised working groups coordinated by member countries, specifically, Vietnam coordinates the working group on trade investment, information technology, and human resource development; Cambodia coordinates the tourism working group; Laos coordinates the transport working group; Myanmar coordinates the agriculture and industry-energy, working group (Sotharith, 2008). In recent years, the countries in CLMV have had strategies to promote diplomatic relations with countries inside and outside the region such as Thailand, China, Japan, and Korea. Among these countries, Thailand is one of the countries that takes the lead in promoting trade, building capacity, especially in enhancing productivity and encouraging private sector participation. Also, Thailand and the CLMV countries are members of ACMECS as well as the Greater Mekong Subregion, so there is always a close link in both economy and society between these countries. China, Japan, and Korea are the most important partners to help bring CLMV to the next level of development. The increasing volume of trade and investment from these countries will help strengthen CLMV’s economy through technology transfer, skill enhancement, job creation, capital mobilisation, and infrastructure improvement (Le, 2018). At the 10th CLMV conference, the leaders of the four-member countries approved three documents including the Joint Declaration of the Conference, the document “CLMV Development Framework” and the cooperation list of 16 priority projects. Which, “CLMV development framework” is a document that guides to building the CLMV region into an international business centre and towards the goal of becoming economies with a high average income in 2030. Leaders of the four countries also agreed to strengthen connectivity in many aspects for the sustainable and inclusive development of the CLMV region in terms of infrastructure, institutions, economics, and people.

– Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle cooperation: The Development Triangle Area (CLV) of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia was established in 2004 by three Prime Ministers. This organisation includes 10 provinces: Kon Tum, Gia Lai, Dak Lak, and Dac Nong (Vietnam); Sekong, Attapeu, Saravan (Laos); and Stung Treng, Rattanak Kiri, Mondul Kiri (Cambodia). In 2009, the three countries agreed to add Binh Phuoc province (Vietnam), Kratie province (Cambodia), and Champasak province (Laos) to the CLV (Chheang, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c).

The goal of the CLV is to strengthen the solidarity and cooperation of the three countries for socio-economic development, hunger eradication, and poverty reduction, contributing to maintaining the stability and security of the three countries. Cooperation focuses on transport, commerce, electricity, tourism, human resource training, and health. In addition to the High-Level Meetings, the three CLV countries agreed to establish a Joint Coordination Committee, consisting of four sub-committees: the economic sub-committee, the social and environmental sub-committee, the provincial coordination sub-committee, and the security and foreign affairs sub-committee (Chheang, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c). Each country appoints a minister to act as the co-chair of the Committee and a member of the Coordination Committee composed of representatives of the relevant ministries, branches, and provinces in the Triangle. The Joint Coordination Committee meets annually. In 2016, the leaders agreed to strengthen collaboration between CLV-DTA and other regional cooperation mechanisms in the Mekong region, particularly the Mekong-Japan Cooperation.

At the CLV 11th Summit (December 2020), the prime ministers of the three countries affirmed their determination to build a peaceful, stable, sustainable and prosperous CLV development triangle by continuing to expand and enhance their effectiveness of cooperation, promoting integration, restructuring the economy, improving the business environment, and closely coordinating with other ASEAN member countries to realise the ASEAN Community Vision 2025. Three prime ministers approved the Joint Declaration on CLV Development Triangle Area Cooperation.

– The ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation (AMBDC): the AMBDC was established by the ASEAN Summit in 1995 to strengthen ASEAN's linkage to Greater Mekong Subregion cooperation. The main purpose of the cooperation is the development of infrastructure and human capital in the sub-region and the sharing of the resource base between ASEAN Member States and Mekong riparian countries, along with China, while promoting inclusive and equitable growth in the region (ASEAN, 2013). The main axis is a railway corridor from Singapore to Kunming, Yunnan crossing the Malaysian Peninsula, Thailand and Laos, branching to Cambodia and Myanmar (Le, 2018).

AMBDC’s main activities are aimed at: (i) economically sustainable development of the Lancang-Mekong River Basin, (ii) dialogue to ensure economic partnership for mutual benefit; and (iii) strengthening the cultural and economic relations between the ASEAN countries and the Basin countries.

The main principles of cooperation in frame of AMBDC are as follows:

  1. (1)

    supporting and aligning national and generalised development plans for the Basin countries;

  2. (2)

    achieving direct benefits for people living and operating in the basin, namely: providing new jobs, increased incomes, development of social programmes and hence the raising of living standards.

  3. (3)

    using the full potential of all resources to ensure stable and sustainable development to improve the management of natural resources and conservation and protection of environment;

  4. (4)

    complementing projects and cooperation initiatives currently being undertaken by MRC, ASEAN, donor countries, and international organisations and unions.

  5. (5)

    mobilising the private sector in the implementation of joint projects and activities.

  6. (6)

    opening participation to all interested countries, as well as regional agencies and international development agencies, to attract additional financial, institutional and technological assistance.

The AMBDC countries have also identified the main priority areas of activity:

  1. 1.

    development of transport infrastructure

  2. 2.

    development of telecommunications and information security

  3. 3.

    development of irrigation networks

  4. 4.

    energy development

  5. 5.

    development of trade and investment

  6. 6.

    development of agricultural sector to saturate domestic consumption, as well as the development of agricultural products export

  7. 7.

    development of forest and mineral resources sustainable use

  8. 8.

    industrial development

  9. 9.

    development of scientific and technical cooperation

  10. 10.

    development of human resources and their training.

The flagship project in the AMBDC—the Singapore-Kunming Rail Link (SKRL) is a pan-Asian high-speed railway network being developed to connect the countries of Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, China, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The 6,617.5 km-long railway network is being developed with an estimated investment of $15 bln, under the AMBDC which was formed to encourage economic integration among the ASEAN countries. The project will link the cities in ASEAN countries with Kunming, the capital city of China’s Yunnan Province.

Proposed under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the railway network aims to connect countries to encourage cross-border passenger/cargo transportation and tourism between the countries (ASEAN, 2013).

– Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC): Thailand first proposed the Mekong- Lancang cooperation in 2012 with the participation of six riparian countries: Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and China. In March 2016, the LMC was formally established at the First LMC Leaders’ Meeting in Sanya, China. The LMC mechanism not only supports economic development but also strengthens security cooperation (Biba, 2018). China has pledged $300 million to the LMC Special Fund to support the 1st five-year plan. The LMC has proven its dynamic development by forming a working mechanism from senior to specialised working groups and implementing projects in the field in member countries. The LMC has maintained the mechanism of two-yearly high-level meetings, annual ministerial meetings, SOM meetings, and working groups. The six-member countries agreed to establish five cooperation centres, including the Water Resources Cooperation Center, the Environment Cooperation Center, the Agricultural Cooperation Center, the Center for Exchange Cooperation, and the Career Training Center.

Countries promote academic exchanges through the establishment of the Center for Global Studies on the Mekong. At the 2nd Lancang–Mekong Summit in 2018, countries agreed to approve the Action Plan 2018–2022 with specific cooperation contents on each pillar. So far, LMC has deployed more than 400 projects using the LMC Special Fund. The working mechanisms of LMC have gradually come into operation, initially formulating and implementing action plans (Le, 2018). As a more recent mechanism, the LMC has appropriately pursued a concerted effort with other mechanisms. In December 2019, the Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Center signed a Cooperation Agreement with the MRC Secretariat. This is the first cooperation agreement between the LMC and another cooperation mechanism. The agreement set out some key areas of cooperation such as data and information exchange, basin-wide monitoring, and joint assessment of water and related resources. At the 5th LMC Ministerial Meeting in Vientiane (Laos) in February 2020, the Ministers proposed the upcoming LMC priorities including (i) Accelerating the development and implementation of action plans on regional connectivity, production capacity, water resources, commerce, agriculture; strengthen cooperation in response to natural disasters, epidemics and cross-border crimes; (ii) Promoting exchanges and dialogues between local authorities and border gate authorities; and (iii) Improving the operational efficiency of the LMC Special Fund. The LMC will also strengthen the cohesion and complementarity of the LMC with relevant regional cooperation mechanisms.

It can be said that China has seized the initiative from international donors and has invited all the countries of the Mekong Basin to participate in the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism (LMC), which is part of the One Belt One Road Initiative, and is designed to support regional integration. Water resources management, although it was the initial unifying theme, has faded into the background, giving way to the issues of establishing development funds, creating infrastructure, facilitating cross-border trade, etc. China has promised $10 billion in loans to partner countries for joint MSLM projects (Simonov, 2018).

As an integral part of the twenty-first century Maritime Silk Road, the LMC performs important functions and tasks for the construction of the China-Indochina economic corridor. China boasts rich experience and remarkable achievements in the construction of hydropower infrastructure. With the development of the BRI, the interconnection between China and the Mekong countries can be significantly improved through the construction of unobstructed land–water transport channels, cross-border power supply networks and power transmission routes. In this way, the management of the Lankang-Mekong water resources can further strengthen the security ties between China and the Mekong countries, which in turn will contribute to the implementation of the Belt Road Initiative.

Common security has become a key element of water resources management through LMC. The Mekong countries are less developed economically than China. However, all six coastal countries share common interests in disaster management and thus must work together to address the security dilemma. As long as the countries concerned follow the path of building mutual trust and cooperation, upstream dams can help regulate the flow of water downstream. By looking for common interests, the LMC attempts to define the roles of all riparian countries. As a result, agreement is possible through mutual understanding (Paramonov, 2018).

Additionally, sustainable security is the ultimate goal of LMC. It is noteworthy that all riparian countries have established principles of ecological and biological protection in their laws and regulations concerning water resources. China, in particular, prioritizes green development in its nationwide planning, and has applied this idea to the management of the Lancang-Mekong water resources to make a new contribution to global environmental security.

In short, the LMC is designed to promote sustainable water security for all riparian countries and promote water cooperation in an environmentally friendly and open way (Xing, 2017).

China, together with the Mekong countries, has established a water security cooperation centre where all riparian countries can share relevant technology and information, and jointly build disaster management capacities.

Finally, the Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Center (LMWRCC) was established in Beijing in 2017. It serves as a platform for LMC countries to strengthen comprehensive cooperation in technical exchanges, capacity building, drought and flood management, data and information sharing, conducting joint research and analysis related to water resources. LMWRCC has been supporting the joint working group on various activities such as technical exchanges, capacity building and cooperative projects (LMC, 2018).

The Mekong Delta has great potential for rapid development, but the region also needs to cope with significant security and development challenges, especially environmental degradation, water resources and climate change. In such an environment, cooperation in the Basin can play an important role in enhancing sustainable development in the Mekong subregion, strengthening good-neighbourliness between all the states, assisting countries to implement the 2030 Agenda and further deepening the ASEAN-China strategic partnership (Hong, 2018).

At the first summit of LMC, which took place in March 2016, participants agreed on major areas of this active cooperation. Since then positive results have been obtained. Countries have established mechanisms for dialogue from summit to ministerial meeting and meeting of senior officials. In addition to the centres for cooperation in the use of water resources and cooperation for environmental protection in the Basin, a global centre for the study of the Mekong River was established. Projects are also being implemented: the Forum for Women's Cooperation, the Forum for Cooperation of Tourist Cities in the Basin, and the Lancang-Mekong Special Cooperation Fund.

In order to develop all the available potential, it is necessary to develop a more effective approach for LMC, to identify the exact directions that will bring real benefits and at the same time harmoniously promote other existing mechanisms and frameworks of cooperation. It should also attach great importance to the scientific and sustainable management and use of the water resources of the Mekong River, enhance economic integration in the region, cooperate in the sustainable development of agricultural production, and create favorable conditions for the development of cross-border trade, investment and tourism (Hong, 2018).

The main goal pursued by China in implementing the LMC is to promote more efficient management of the transboundary river basin, as well as to use the geographical proximity, cultural proximity and economic complementarity of all six countries of the Basin.

9.2.2 The Role of Basin Cooperation Mechanism

The cooperation mechanisms serve as platforms for conducting water diplomacy, as they fulfil the roles of policy dialogue facilitator and coordinator, norm builder, and information hub for transboundary water resources management (Phoumin, 2020). From MRC through Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), the Mekong–Japan Cooperation and Mekong–Republic of Korea Cooperation, to LMC, all these mechanisms consider water security as a significant focus. Their joint statements, issued at high-level conferences, often demonstrate the significance of water cooperation. In 2018, at the 11th LMI Ministerial Meeting, member countries approved restructuring the mechanism into two mainstays of cooperation. Cooperation on water, energy, food, and the environment is of a priority.

Moreover, the 1st LMI Policy Dialogue and the Friends of the Lower Mekong have served as a consultative platform about transboundary water management, in which participants focus on the exchange of water data and ways of employing big data technology to predict droughts and floods in the subregion (MFA, 2019). In the LMC framework, in response to requests from other partners for strengthening subregional cooperation in data sharing, China has proposed projects including the Lancang–Mekong River Space Information Cooperation Center and the Building of a Comprehensive Information Platform for the Lancang–Mekong Water Resources Cooperation (Phoumin, 2020). This has also drawn attention from external partners. Also, according to Phoumin (2020), the US, within the framework of the LMI, established the Mekong Water Data Initiative, a programme of the Sustainable Infrastructure Partnership, and put into operation ‘Mekong Water’ to support the MRC and promote data sharing for disaster forecasting and policy making. On this basis, downstream countries can publish a new data-sharing platform and a new impact assessment programme in the Lower Mekong. Moreover, the US intends to cooperate with the Republic of Korea to implement a project on using satellite images to assess floods and drought in the Mekong River; and collaborate with experts from the World Bank, Australia, France, and Japan to conduct dam safety assessments on 55 dams in the Lao PDR (Thu & Tu, 2019).

9.3 Perspectives of Riparian Countries on Basin Cooperation and Impact of Countries Outside the River Basin [Hoaithuong Do]

9.3.1 Perspectives of Riparian Countries on Basin Cooperation

Each member country has its opinion of the basin governance cooperation mechanism.

Cambodia is the only basin country with a large portion of the territory within the regime. Therefore, the development direction of the Mekong basin is considered to have a more direct and severe impact on the well-being of the country compared to other countries. This makes Cambodia more eager to join regional cooperation mechanisms such as the MRC, Greater Mekong Subregion (Greater Mekong Subregion), and LMC (Lancang-Mekong Cooperation). From very early on, Cambodia engaged in MRC cooperation and viewed the mechanism stricter than other members. However, past incidents (such as the Yali incident) have disappointed Cambodia with what the MRC has achieved for it. This was improved after a new CEO of MRC took office, but Cambodia's participation in the mechanism was still limited (Backer Bruzelius, 2007).

The Cambodian Government has signed several international environmental conventions related to watershed management, including the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Convention on Climate Change, and the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance. To meet the requirements of these conventions, the Government of Cambodia has assigned some key ministries for the translation of these conventions into national policies (Bunnara et al., 2004). In the newly emerging institutional landscape, several institutions were competing for significant roles in managing natural resources and related issues (Sato et al., 2011). To make institutions more effective regarding basin and watershed management, Cambodia improved its governance and reduced corruption and vested interests in all sectors and at all levels of government to allow more effective law enforcement and allocation of resources; generated a better understanding among government officials and the general public concerning natural resource management and watershed management (Kishor & Damania, 2007). Cambodia established the Cambodia Resident Mission (1996) as the primary operational link between the Asian Development Bank and the government, the private sector, civil society organisations, and development partners. The Government of Cambodia recognises Bank's country partnership strategy for 2014–2018 for Cambodia in line with its significant growth and development plans. It seeks to strengthen the rural–urban linkage towards the goals of human and social development. With the help of Greater Mekong Subregion, the Cambodian government has made significant achievements in areas such as energy, human resources development, telecommunications, tourism, and investigation (GMS, 2018b). As for the LMC, Cambodia contends that it has a political influence on the river basin countries and has the presence of leadership with a clear vision and strong political support from all countries. At the same time, the Cambodian government also believes that the LMC is compatible and complementary to existing regional mechanisms. Cambodia has shown a strong interest in strengthening synergies between the LMC and other regional initiatives such as the Greater Mekong Subregion, MRC, the ASEAN Connectivity Master Plan (MPAC), and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Chheang, 2018c).

China, as an upstream country, plays an essential role in the development of the Mekong subregion cooperation. Since the MRC mechanism and subsequently the GMS were established, China has maintained a positive attitude in coordinating cooperation with riparian countries in the basin (Backer Bruzelius, 2007; Zhu, 2010). China participates in multilateral river management institutions, playing a more significant role in its general water governance issues (Biba, 2014). However, cooperation in water resource management for China today is not an easy task. Water issues continue to be tied to national security considerations, and national law restricts the sharing of relevant data. Specifically, sustainable water resource management is considered one of LMC's official documents; they also believe that the LMC will be a key mechanism for economic development through connecting and enhancing the production capacity and managing water resources efficiently (Biba, 2018).

China's main goals when participating in Greater Mekong Subregion cooperation are to (Zhu, 2010):

  • connect by road between southwestern China and the Indochinese peninsula,

  • connect markets between southwestern China and Southeast Asia,

  • establish mutually beneficial economic relations, strengthen mutual exchanges and economic ties, promote multifaceted economic and technological cooperation,

  • realise sustainable development in the sub-region, create job opportunities, increase income, eradicate poverty, promote social progress, and improve people's lives,

  • deepen subregional cooperation through dialogue and implementation of joint projects, and build an appropriate international trade and investment climate, promoting peace and development in the sub-region.

Specifically, China paid special attention to developing the North–South Corridor, which includes Yunnan and Guangxi provinces and stretches south in two different areas (Bangkok and Hanoi) (Lee, 2015). Special attention has been given to building roads to improve transport infrastructure for regional trade (Lim, 2008). China has promoted the development of a regional market in the Mekong River basin in recent years.

In 2016, to promote cooperation in the rational use of water resources between riparian countries, a new mechanism-LMC led by China, was established (LMC, 2016). According to Middleton and Allouche (2016), the LMC objective is to foster synergy with the Belt and Road Initiative and utilize the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank's funding, promoting China's diplomacy through joint development and strengthening regional integration focusing on China. Based on the report of De et al. (2020), China has become a significant trade partner of the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) and contributed significantly to the development of these countries.

Lao PDR has 97% of territory within the Mekong River Basin with an abundance of unexploited water resources (Dore, 2003). This brings a potential in the future use of the water in the Mekong River Basin and makes this country dependent on the Mekong River regime (Backer Bruzelius, 2007). Previous research has shown that there are signs that the Lao government wants the freedom to develop the Mekong tributaries according to its preferences without having to follow the recommendations of the MRC regime. The weak economy with limited human resources and bureaucracy hampered the efforts of Laotians in this regime. Lao PDR is believed to be in a neutral position towards the regime and has acted accordingly (Backer Bruzelius, 2007). However, in recent years, Lao PDR has gradually integrated regional and international economies due to the favourable foreign policy and diversified the country's market (Leebouapao, 2008). Also, Laos has acceded to the international conventions on biodiversity, desertification, climate change, and CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora) and Agenda 21 for sustainable development and environmental protection. Through the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the Lao PDR's Government was committed to a programme of integrated area-based development centred on watersheds and river basins. Many laws, strategies, and decrees supporting integrated watershed management, especially at the national level, have been enunciated (Bunnara et al., 2004). Through the 10-year development strategy to 2025, with a vision to 2030 of Laos, it can be seen that international cooperation through Greater Mekong Sub-region, ASEAN, or LMC mechanisms is highly focused (Nishimura et al., 2016). Laos is actively engaged in water conservancy construction, such as Sayaburi Hydropower Station.

Myanmar is considered an upstream country, contributing only 2% of the total flow to the Mekong River (Dore, 2003). Myanmar has great potential for a large market, abundant natural resources, and a young workforce (Zaw, 2008). Since 1988, the Myanmar government has taken a step towards its outward development strategy, actively cooperating with Asian and international economies (Sotharith, 2008). Joining the MRC mechanism as a dialogue partner, Myanmar is only active to a limited extent in all forms of regional cooperation, but Myanmar's representatives attend the annual dialogue meetings, with the Mekong River Commission. As such, Myanmar seems to play only a minor role in managing the Mekong basin (Backer Bruzelius, 2007). Besides, according to Zaw (2008), Myanmar's participation in ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), Greater Mekong Subregion, and several other regional cooperations is expected to lead Myanmar's development based on its comparative advantage in abundant natural resources and cheap labour. Most of the inflow of foreign investments to Myanmar came from Asian countries (especial ASEAN+3), followed by European countries and the United States (Zaw, 2008). Myanmar leaders are focusing on developing hydroelectricity due to the high energy demand in the region and increasing pressure on Myanmar's water resources (Kattelus et al., 2014; Van Dorp et al., 2018). Although Myanmar has abundant water resources, its spatial and temporal distribution is very uneven, leading to water scarcity and desertification in the arid regions of the central region, problems of flooding and salinity in the Ayeyarwady Plain and flash floods in the north and west of Myanmar. Deforestation caused by illegal logging causes erosion and sedimentation in rivers and reservoirs, a cause of navigation problems (Van Dorp et al., 2018). Inconsistent water management overlaps responsibilities in some sectors, seriously affecting water resources. Water resources are managed in an ad hoc fashion, with no long-term planning leading to little or no policy integration or cooperation. In 2014, the government called for an Integrated Water Resources Management approach to deal with current and future problems that will arise as a direct result of the country's development (NWRC, 2014). In 2019, Myanmar signed a cooperation agreement with the Lancang-Mekong Water Resource Cooperation Center of China on water management. Myanmar expressed confidence when participating in the programme, emphasising that the problem of Mekong River resources cannot be solved by one country alone. In addition, Myanmar also attaches great importance to the LMC's “special fund projects”, for the development of the six LMC member states, for example, the Bagan Stupa emergency repairs of Myanmar.

Thailand is a country with one-third (36%) of the territory located in the Mekong River (Dore, 2003), occupying an important position in the management of the Mekong River Basin. Thailand has signed the international conventions on Biodiversity, Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Marine Life Conservation, Ozone Layer Protection, and Wetlands. Policy regulations relating to watershed management can be traced back to the 1950s. Legal consideration of watershed management in Thailand was adopted in 1975 when the Urban Plan Act 2518 B.E. (1975) was approved by the Thai Parliament (Bunnara et al., 2004). Land-use planning approaches in terms of land development have been promulgated since 1960 to improve and restore agricultural land and environmental conditions (Gyawali et al., 2013). Also, the Cabinet has approved many resolutions aimed at solving complexities related to social, economic, and environmental issues, particularly in upland and highland watersheds. However, according to Backer Bruzelius (2007), Thailand prefers a loosely defined cooperation framework. The country has been accused of unnecessarily delaying the establishment of flow regime regulations. Since Thailand is a fairly advanced country and has a developed economy, it does not need the development resources that the MRC can provide. Thailand also has a more explicit stance on issues such as environmental impact assessment (EIA) regulations, is less concerned with adapting existing procedures to those proposed by the MRC, and does not require their capacity as much as some of the other members. Thailand thinks that some of MRC's policy recommendations and requests from downstream riparians are too strict (Backer Bruzelius, 2007). However, Thailand's remarkable development has made it an important partner as well as an investor with other riparian countries (De et al., 2020). Also, grasping its essential position between India and China, Thailand has taken a wise step in cooperating with these two countries through mechanisms such as the LMC or MGC to promote the economy (Banomyong et al., 2011).

As a downstream country, Vietnam is facing the risk of suffering enormous, unforeseen impacts from upstream mainstream development programmes and projects while also holding the gateway to trade of the Mekong countries and the world (Nguyen, 2015). Therefore, Vietnam always pays attention to development cooperation in the Mekong River region. From early on, Vietnam has actively participated in the development of mechanisms, procedures, and programmes of the Mekong River Commission, which is an essential legal basis for water resources and related resources in the river, to protect Vietnam's interests in the Mekong Delta (Nguyen, 2015). Besides, within the framework of the MLC, Vietnam has also promoted cooperation in the management and sustainable use of water resources to achieve a balance of interests and responsibilities among the Mekong riparian states. It can be said that Vietnam is one of the most active and proactive countries in preparing, drafting documents, and discussing at LMC conferences (Le, 2018). Furthermore, under the Greater Mekong Subregion mechanism, Vietnam has been effectively involved in trade and investment facilitation activities, including simplifying customs procedures, facilitating goods, and granting travel rights to vehicles and territories of Greater Mekong Subregion countries (Le, 2018). Vietnam is also an active member of regional organisations such as ACMECS, CLMV (Cambodian, Laos, Myanmar, Viet Nan) and CLV (Cambodian, Laos, Viet Nan) (Chheang, 2018a).

9.3.2 Impact of Countries Outside of the Basin

For a long time, developing countries have sought to reach outside powers to maintain regional order by pursuing security cooperation and deepening economic relations. Regulating the domination of any significant power at the same time creates economic interdependence and benefits from cooperation. However, it seems the countries of Southeast Asia are proactively pursuing the more extensive powers for aid and grace. The effectiveness of this twin strategy depends mainly on the powers allowing what happens. Its success is mainly because these developing states are not seen as a threat to great powers. However, under certain conditions, this one-way property needs to be reconsidered. For now, it seems that regional powers are leading the way. The USA, Japan, South Korea, India and other influential countries are becoming more proactive and expanding their presence and importance in the region. Besides China, four great powers USA, Japan, South Korea and India, took the lead in the new engagement. Although the level of regional involvement differs from country to country, this new round was primarily triggered by China's attempt to establish new institutional rules through the LMC and, more broadly, the BRI. The strategic outcomes of these three countries’ diversified moves appear harmonious even though each has its separate policy and mechanism goals. Notably, President Trump's Indo-Pacific policy has added impetus to the re-engagement of powers outside the region into the Mekong sub-region. The USA’s presence is an essential factor in the policy setting of significant powers. The USA possesses many advantages not only from military power but also economic and soft power. The USA has extensive security arrangements with most Southeast Asian countries.

– Mekong–US Cooperation: The USA, as a superpower after World War II, is an early and significant actor in the Indo-China peninsula. The USA entered the region in 1950s and was the main initiator of the construction of MRC in 1957. In recent years, the USA has become more active in the region.

The LMI mechanism was formed in 2009 under the initiative of the USA. So far, the LMI has been implementing some of the subsequent initiatives and cooperation activities, including the “Mekong Forecast, the Delta Research and Global Observation Network programme, and environmental cooperation to build automatic monitoring stations to control and evaluate climate change effects in the Subregion area (Duong et al., 2020). Also, in 2009, the USA funded some projects in the fields of environment, health care, and education. For example, in the Lower Mekong sub-region, USA provided US$7 million for environmental projects (LE, 2016). In 2010, a Partnership between the Mekong River Commission and the Mississippi River Commission was established to enhance the exchange of experiences and cooperation between the two sides.

In the past, the USA foreign policy in Southeast Asia had a certain contradiction, especially when it came to the Mekong sub-region. However, since introducing the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy (FOIP) in 2018, the region has seen a significant change in the USA’s engagement (Parameswaran, 2018). In the FOIP strategy, the LMI has been reinstated as a tool for the USA to reinforce cooperation with the sub-region. At the 10th LMI Ministerial Conference in 2017, then US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson proposed the “Mekong Water Data Initiative” to promote sharing and using the Mekong River system data of the MRC (Thuy, 2020).

In September 2020, the first Mekong-US Ministerial Meeting took place online. The conference was co-chaired by Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh of Vietnam and Permanent Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United States, Myanmar, Thailand, and the Secretary-General of ASEAN. The conference officially announced the upgrade of bilateral cooperation to the Mekong-US Partnership (MUSP) based on the successes of the LMI mechanism established in 2009. Regarding the direction of the next phase of cooperation, the ministers stated that, given the challenges and opportunities facing the Mekong sub-region, the US-Mekong Partnership should aim to promote peace, stability, and prosperity in the region, supporting the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals to 2030 and the ASEAN Community Vision 2025. The two sides exchanged principles of cooperation and agreed to focus on four areas: economic connectivity; sustainable management of water resources, natural resources, and environmental protection; non-traditional security; and human resource development. The USA announced that it would spend nearly $153.6 million on cooperation projects in the Mekong region for increasing the sharing of water resources data for policymaking and disaster management (VNA, 2020) (Table 9.3).

Table 9.3 Overview of US-Mekong Cooperation
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– Mekong–Japan Cooperation: Japan has played an essential role in the Mekong sub-region, which has undertaken three major initiatives for CLMV since the 1990s. These initiatives were the Forum for Comprehensive Development of Indochina (FCDI) in 1995, the AEM-METI Economic and Industrial Cooperation Committee (AMEICC) established in 1998, and the New Concept of Mekong Region Development announced at the Japan-ASEAN Special Summit in December 2003 (Kraisoraphong, 2017; Pan, 2014; Uchida & Kudo, 2008). The New Concept of Mekong Region Development is a new attempt based on regionwide development. It was included in Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter revised in 2003 (Pan, 2014).

The Mekong-Japan Regional Partnership Program since 2007 has formalised Japan's involvement in the entire sub-region and institutionalised annual high-level meetings. At ASEAN Summit 12 (Philippines, January 2007), Japan launched the Japan-Mekong Partnership Program for Shared Prosperity. Subsequently, the first Mekong-Japan Summit was held in November 2009 in Tokyo, adopting the Tokyo Declaration “A New Partnership for a Commonly Prosperous Future” as the foundation for cooperation in 2009–2012 (Kagami, 2009). The cooperation is implemented in many fields such as socio-economic development, infrastructure construction, implementation of the Millennium Development Goals, environmental protection, and water security in the Mekong River. At the fourth high-level conference (April 2012), leaders of countries approved the Tokyo Strategy as the foundation for cooperation in the period 2013–2015, including three main cooperation pillars: (i) Strengthening connectivity within the Mekong sub-region and between the Mekong sub-region with regions and the world; (ii) Cooperation for mutual development between the Mekong countries and Japan; (iii) Environmental protection and human security. Also, the Mekong-Japan cooperation has been implemented within the Mekong-Japan Economic and Industrial Cooperation Initiative framework, the “Green Mekong decade” Initiative, and cultural exchange, people exchange programmes (Kraisoraphong, 2017).

The 10th Mekong–Japan Summit Meeting in October 2018 adopted the Tokyo Strategy, expressing the determination to cooperate in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the Mekong region to fully implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Duong et al., 2020). Also, in 2018, Japan aligned its policy with the US Indo-Pacific strategy (Basu, 2018; Matsumura, 2019). Japan argues that “the Mekong subregion has a geographic interest that can benefit significantly from the realisation of a free and open Indo-Pacific”. At a meeting in November 2018, Japanese Prime Minister Abe and the US Vice President agreed to spend $70 billion on infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific region, especially for power project quality in Southeast Asia. Japan expanded its presence with the USA and supported the ASEAN in the Vision on the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). FOIP demonstrated ASEAN's efforts to foster cooperation among regional partners by advocating inclusiveness, transparency, and law-based regional architecture. Through its support for FOIP, Japan strengthened regional, peaceful and stable connectivity in the Mekong. Tokyo's commitment to the Mekong sub-region was also reflected in Japan's support for existing sub-regional mechanisms such as ACEMCS (Matsumura, 2019).

– Mekong–Korea Cooperation: Korea is also becoming more and more active in the Mekong sub-region under President Moon Jae-in's New South Policy (NSP). Mekong-Korea cooperation was implemented with the first Mekong-Korea Ministerial Meeting held from October 27–28, 2011. The meeting adopted the “Declaration of Han River” on the establishment of a “comprehensive partnership between the Mekong countries and Korea for shared prosperity”, which defines the goals, principles, and orientations for cooperation in the future between the Mekong countries and South Korea (LE, 2016). In 2012, all parties developed an action plan for this new cooperation mechanism. The priority areas of cooperation were ASEAN connectivity, sustainable development, and human resource development. The NSP represents a strong economic connection between Korea and the sub-region. ASEAN has become Korea's second-largest trading partner, Korea's investment in ASEAN has increased 20 times over two decades, especially for CLMV countries (Kang, 2020). The ASEAN-Korea Summit held in November 2019 in Korea showed a solid commitment to ASEAN and emphasised that the Mekong-Korea Cooperation was the foundation for deepening its commitment. The Mekong-Korea Summit was also held on the sidelines for the first time (since 2011, the mechanism is only at the Ministerial and SOM level), outlining potential areas where Korea could support the areas, including water resources and infrastructure development. At the same time, considering the CLMV's diplomatic relations with North Korea, South Korea also hoped the sub-region can support the peace process on the Korean peninsula (YNA, 2019).

South Korea also expressed its support for the USA’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, which Seoul sees as bringing many economic benefits to the country and is consistent with the NSP in the subregion. Korea also supports ACMECS with the criterion that better coordination between the sub-region and external donors in planning will lead to mutual benefits (Kang, 2020).

– Mekong–Ganga Cooperation (MGC): MGC cooperation was established at the initiative of India and Thailand, approved at the meeting between the Foreign Ministers of 6 countries Cambodia, India, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam, held on the occasion of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Bangkok July 28, 2000. MGC's goal is to strengthen the friendship and solidarity between the countries of the Mekong and Ganges (Mazumdar, 2009).

Since its establishment, India's trade with these countries in the Mekong sub-region has increased significantly, from $1.36 billion in 2000 to $27.59 billion in 2018, a 25-fold increase over two decades (De et al., 2020). To date, areas of cooperation have been expanded to include traditional medicine and modern medicine, agriculture and related industries, irrigation, micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, technology, skills development, and capacity building. Thailand, Vietnam, and Myanmar are the top three trading partners of India in MGC. In recent years, India’s exports to Viet Nam has witnessed a phenomenal rise by over five times between 2008 and 2018. With an export of US$6.51 billion in 2018, Viet Nam has become India’s largest export partner in MGC, followed by Thailand at about US$4.44 billion in 2018 (De et al., 2020). This trend indicated a high potential of value chains between India and ACMECS countries or in MGC. In August 2019, the 10th Mekong-Ganga Cooperation Foreign Affairs Ministerial Meeting (MGC) took place in Thailand. The ministers discussed the recent cooperation situation. They agreed to approve the Action Plan of the Conference from 2019 to 2022, to better meet development needs and respond to common challenges as well as further promote the potential for cooperation between the Mekong countries and India. This action plan added three new areas of cooperation, namely water resource management, science and technology, capacity building and skills development; continue to strengthen cooperation in agriculture, fisheries, health, commerce, culture, and tourism. The meeting also welcomed India becoming a development partner of the ACMECS. Also, at this meeting, the Deputy Prime Minister of Vietnam proposed some priorities for subsequent cooperation, including:

  • strengthening cooperation and connection, developing a multimodal transport network connecting the Mekong region and India; especially the expansion of the East–West Economic Corridor, the southern economic corridor to India by land and sea, as well as expanding the India-Myanmar-Thailand expressway to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam,

  • actively researching development assistance projects,

  • developing trade and investment facilitation through the elimination of trade barriers, trade promotion, cooperation on customs clearance, quarantine, and regional supply chain development;

  • promotig sustainable water management, in particular the implementation of projects on water resource data collection and monitoring, groundwater management, climate change adaptation and mitigation, flood control and drought (MEA, 2019).

Continental Southeast Asia, particularly the Mekong sub-region, has become the site of new commitments by external powers. The USA is at the forefront of this strategic competition, especially in the Indo-Pacific strategic framework. The LMI reboot has become a unique policy tool for the subregion. The USA’s action has encouraged and enabled major external partners such as Japan and South Korea to strengthen and deepen relations with the Mekong countries through existing cooperation. They promote the integration of regional mechanisms in opposition to the LMC, which focuses more on engaging China with the Mekong countries (Williams, 2020). New commitments from external powers to benefit the Mekong countries should create more options for economic development. Regional countries need to grapple with excellent power dynamics and send a clear message that enhanced cooperation with external powers cannot be equated with taking sides on other issues.

9.4 The Role of Social Participation in Basin Governance

9.4.1 Defining and Conceptualising Social Participation

River basin governance is not only a technical issue, but also inherently a political and social one; because water inevitably flows across administrative boundaries and involves multifarious stakeholders who pursue diverse interests (Liu et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2017a, 2017b). As a result, river basin governance is a pluri-centric process that entails a series of accommodation, negotiation, conflicts, and cooperation, on which both state and non-state actors (e.g., non-governmental organisations, enterprises, and community members) have an impact.

The shifting nature of transboundary governance of an international river, such as the Lancang-Mekong, in particular, demonstrates increasing interconnectedness between state and non-state actors in the context of deepened globalisation and rapid development of modern information technologies (Dalby, 2010). This increasing interconnectedness substantially reshapes the structure of international river basin governance, the physical water that has traditionally been dominated and exploited by human beings, has been integrated with new features of power relations, social networks, cultural values, and individual subjectivities (Budds, 2009; Linton & Budds, 2014). The governance of international river basins is, therefore, not about governing water per se, but also about reshuffling a complex social-natural entity that is no longer exclusive to sovereign states or technical elites (Boström & Hallström, 2010).

As international river basin governance becomes an open platform to diverse non-state actors, the water sector has been experiencing a paradigm shift from state-led and technocratic management towards an increase of participatory based water governance, which has become particularly popular with international organisations, donors and NGOs (Sultana, 2015). For instance, in 1992, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development stated that “Environmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level” (United Nations, 1992). The EU Water Framework Directive is one of the most widely known examples which highly emphasises social participation in water governance (European Parliament & the Council, 2000).

Unlike the unanimous support of social participation globally, the defining characteristics and scope of social participation are relatively less clear among different actors. A World Bank publication defined participation as “a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them” (Bhatnagar et al., 1996). Berry and Mollard (2009) characterised social participation in water governance by “the direct involvement of an array of people in decision-making and implementation of water policy or management”, emphasising the opportunity that individuals and/or collectives have to “express their voices and articulate their arguments in public forums”. In general, social participation refers to a process of involvement, but who should be involved, in what issues, to what degree, and how the involvement process should be organised? Answers to these questions remain subject to debate. Therefore, some scholars have suggested that social participation should be understood as a principle rather than a rigorously defined subject (Webler et al., 2001).

Arnstein (2019)’s ladder of citizen participation and the EU Water Framework Directive are two widely cited conceptual frameworks for understanding social participation (Fig. 9.1).

Fig. 9.1
A diagram where Arnstein’s Ladder of Participation is depicted as a right arrow and the European Union Water Framework Directive is placed above it. From left to right, the directive is grouped into information supply, manipulation, and active involvement. Each of these 3 have additional divisions.

Conceptual frameworks for understanding social participation. Sources Adapted from Arnstein (2019) and the European Parliament and the Council (2000)

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9.4.2 Rationalities of Social Participation

Although social participation has gained popularity in the international community, its multifarious features have resulted in divergent understanding in terms of the scope, format, and degree of participation, thus raising challenges for consensus building and meaningful deliberation. Therefore, it is important to explore the reasons why social participation should be included in river basin governance. The clarification on rationalities of social participation could shed light into how to unify divergent expectations from different stakeholders and enhance river basin governance through effective social participation (Carr, 2015).

One of the most salient rationalities for social participation is that it is expected to improve the performance of river basin governance, which may be achieved through three major mechanisms underpinned by social participation. First, social participation is expected to provide space for deliberation and social learning, thus lead to high-quality decisions (Hedelin, 2007). As a “wicked” problem (Freeman, 2000), many believe river basin governance does not have a clear-cut solution prescribed for various complicated problems that emerge in the process of decision-making and policy implementation; rather, is an argumentative process, which brings together different stakeholders who can interact and communicate, is expected to gradually generate a common understanding, shared vision, and aligned knowledge, even the argumentative process starts from everyone’s own interests and opinions (Ison et al., 2007; Pahl-Wostl & Hare, 2004; Reed et al., 2010). Second, social participation is expected to develop social networks and trust between participants (Lubell, 2007), which funnels existing values, beliefs, and rules towards river basin governance issues. As a result, social participation is expected to mobilise human and social capital to enable collaboration and coordination in redistributing responsibilities, sharing benefits, raising societal commitment, achieving common objectives, and facilitating policy implementation (Auer et al., 2020; Chai & Zeng, 2018; Putnam, 2000), all of which may provide creative, efficient and effective strategies for river basin governance. Third, social participation is expected to legitimise the decisions made through transparent and inclusive processes that allow participants to feel that they have influenced the decision based on a fair procedure (Carr et al., 2012). These perceived legitimate decisions are thus more likely to be accepted by the general public and easier to implement (Halvorsen, 2006).

Another rationality of social participation moves beyond the instrumental view that considers participation as a tool for performance enhancement. Instead, as Bourblanc (2010) put it, “participation is frequently perceived as an end in itself rather than as a means to an end” because participation has been increasingly connected with social-political struggles such as inequalities and asymmetric power (Berry & Mollard, 2009). In this sense, the rationale for social participation could lie in itself—for it signals deliberative democracy and an approach to empowering the vulnerable and minority groups. For instance, Clark (2013) proposes litigation as a form of social participation through an illustrative case of South Africa and argues that the right to water is an indigenous human right built upon participation. In Colombia’s Pacific coastal region, participation has also evolved into water activism and social mobilisation, which are linked with broader struggles for development among black peasants (Perera, 2013).

9.4.3 Means of Social Participation

Empirical practices of social participation in the Lancang-Mekong River are much more diverse and complicated than its theoretical conceptualisation and rationalities. A variety of stakeholders, ranging from global network initiatives to local NGOs, from business enterprises to communities, have been actively engaging in the governance of the Lancang-Mekong River Basin. They have adopted different strategies (e.g., scientific research, capability building, policy advocacy, and citizen engagement) to exert influence on various issues such as climate change, biodiversity, hydropower development, and sustainable livelihood, revealing overlapping and interacting mechanisms of participation.

9.4.3.1 Global Network Initiatives

The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the Global Water Partnership (GWP) are two major global network initiatives that play a critical role in facilitating climate change adaptation and transboundary water cooperation in the Lancang-Mekong region.

IUCN is the world’s largest membership union that brings together over 200 governmental agencies and 1,200 civil society organisations in a combined effort to conserve nature. Since 2016, IUCN have served as the secretariat for the Indo-Burma Ramsar Regional Initiative (IBRRI) to support the transboundary conservation and sustainable use of wetlands between Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, Vietnam, and Myanmar (International Union for Conservation of Nature, 2019a). To support the implementation of the Ramsar Convention and the IBRRI, IUCN launched a specific project to build resilience of wetlands in the Lower Mekong region in 2017. This project aims to improve regional collaboration on transboundary wetlands management through capacity building and trainings activities including (1) ten climate change vulnerability assessments with local and national stakeholders at selected Ramsar sites in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Vietnam, which will be further developed into local adaptation plans; (2) a training programme developed to increase local wetland management capacity co-organised with Mekong Wetlands University Network; and (3) a citizen journalism programme initiated with the support of Thai PBS to raise the awareness of local communities about the impact of climate change on wetlands (International Union for Conservation of Nature, 2019b).

Another influential network is GWP. GWP was established by the Swedish International Development Agency, the United Nations Development Program and the World Bank in 1996 in response to international concern about deteriorating freshwater resources. The GWP’s multi-stakeholder partnership mainly aims to support countries and communities in the sustainable management of water resources based on the principles of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). To accelerate transboundary water cooperation among countries in the Lancang-Mekong River Basin, the GWP China and Southeast Asia Regions have set up a partnership with the Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Center (LMWRCC) in 2017 (GWP, 2017a). The GWP has secured the LMWRCC’s funding for capacity building activities and projects by supporting the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation mechanism through its neutral multi-stakeholder platform on which consultative meetings at the national, regional and inter-regional level can be organised (GWP, 2017b). For instance, the GWP has facilitated six member countries in identifying the national water development priority in the Five-Year Plan of Action on the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (2018–2022) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation, 2018). This strategic plan, drafted by the LMWRCC and reviewed by the national focal points through the network of GWP, was officially released in 2018.

9.4.3.2 International NGOs

The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and The Nature Conservancy (TNC) are two influential international NGOs working in the Lancang-Mekong region to improve the capability of science-based water management techniques and biodiversity protection.

The main measures that the WWF uses to advance river basin governance are the production and dissemination of knowledge regarding responsible water use and infrastructure. For example, it has launched the Basin Report Card Initiative to help stakeholders create science-based report cards in their own basins using indicators of shared values (World Wide Fund for Nature, 2016). In 2014, the Luc Hoffmann Institute (LHI), established by the WWF and MAVA Foundation, kick-started the Linked Indicators for Vital Ecosystem Services (LIVES) project, which serves as a benchmark for identifying linked indicators for joint governance, planning, and management of the food-energy-water nexus. It is expected to formulate a knowledge basis of describing the complex relationships between the goals stakeholders have for their basins, and the levers that can be used to achieve those goals (Watkins et al., 2016). Moreover, WWF has led a series of stakeholder workshops and used the LIVES methods to discuss integrated planning and trade-offs in basin planning and management processes, which could amplify the impacts of the generated knowledge in community empowerment and civil society collaboration (Luc Hoffmann Institute, 2017).

TNC is a worldwide-reaching environmental nonprofit aiming to conserve the lands and waters. Dating back to the mid-1990s, TNC initially carried out a pioneer project on the Great River Basin National Park in northwestern China, and formally signed a memorandum of cooperation with the Yunnan Provincial Government to engage in biodiversity protection in the upstream of four Asian rivers, namely, the Jinsha-Yangtze River, the Lancang-Mekong River, the Nu-Salween River, and the Dulong-Ayeyarwady River (China Development Brief, 2017). In 2017, TNC also signed a five-year strategic cooperation agreement with the Lancang-Mekong Environmental Cooperation Center (LMECC). This agreement enabled the cooperation between TNC and the Chinese government on ecological and environmental protection, capacity building, policy dialogue, regional exchanges and cooperation in the Lancang-Mekong region. Similar to WWF, the work of TNC also focuses on knowledge generation and promotion, which allows TNC to give full play to its advantages and work with the LMECC to jointly promote scientific watershed planning and management, and to improve the capability of transboundary biodiversity protection.

9.4.3.3 Local NGOs

Local NGOs act actively as environmental stewards in the Lancang-Mekong region, mainly focusing on the issue of green infrastructure and sustainable overseas investment through the means of policy advocacy.

The past few years have seen local environmental NGOs continuously advocate against the development of hydropower infrastructure. For example, in 2011, local NGOs submitted a joint letter to the prime ministers of Laos and Thailand to advocate against the construction of the Xayaburi hydropower plant. In Thailand, Living River Siam mobilised communities along the river to raise awareness of its impact and organised community leaders to conduct an opening field investigation in the river basin (Herbertson, 2012). Two NGO coalitions, Vietnam Rivers Network and Rivers Coalition in Cambodia, also adopted advocating strategies at the national and regional levels to lobby against the Xayaburi dam (Yasuda, 2015). In 2017, the Network of Thai People in Eight Mekong Provinces filed charges against related government agencies in Laos and Thailand on the grounds that the public had insufficient means to participate in the planning stage of the Pak Beng hydropower dam. The charges led to a second round of a technical consultation meeting in November 2018, which brought together government agencies, China Datang Overseas Investment Ltd., local NGOs, and experts to further discuss potential environmental and social impacts on upstream and downstream countries (The Mekong Butterfly, 2018). More extreme measures have been taken by some regional NGOs networks (e.g., Save the Mekong and International Rivers), which took a stronger opposition stand against the Pak Lay hydropower plant in August 2018 (Focus on the Global South, 2018).

In addition to advocacy, local NGOs also conduct research, foster dialogues on sustainable overseas investment, and engage in knowledge production. The Global Environmental Institute (GEI), a Chinese non-profit organisation, has brought talent and expertise to improve the policies and on-the-ground reality of overseas investment. GEI has been conducting a research project on China's Investment in the Greater Mekong Subregion-Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Myanmar since 2013. It has published a series of reports to demonstrate the history, legal background, environmental and social risks faced by Chinese companies investing in these countries (Global Environmental Institute, 2016). Another Chinese environmental Think-Do organisation is Greenovation-Hub, which has also been working on green finance and investment and promoting cutting-edge environmental policy-making. In 2019, it coordinated and co-conducted the Handbook on Environmental Risk Management in China’s Overseas Investment with an aim to provide better understanding of the destination countries’ social and environmental regulations and cultures (Greenovation:HUB, 2019).

9.4.3.4 Business Enterprises

In addition to non-profit organisations, business enterprises also shoulder corporate social responsibilities and have taken a proactive part in river basin governance and hydropower development.

Coca-Cola launched a transformational partnership with the WWF in 2007 to conserve the world’s freshwater resources in eleven key regions, including the Lancang-Mekong. Along the Chi River in Thailand, the partnership worked with farmers on agricultural improvements and reforestation activities that would support the freshwater ecosystem. In Vietnam’s Tram Chim National Park, the partnership initiated a three-year project targeting the recovery of natural wetlands of the Plain of Reeds in 2008. With the project’s support, the Tram Chim National Park has secured US$200,000 from the provincial government for infrastructure development, including building spillways to improve the water flow regime. In addition, the Coca-Cola and the WWF partnership were involved in legal proceedings by working with park officials and local governments, and eventually passed a new statute that allows for more appropriate management of a wetland ecosystem while helping local communities sustainably harvest park resources. During 2012, the partnership work spanned Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, focusing on advancing the conservation of the endangered Irrawaddy dolphin. They helped establish the Kratie Declaration on the Conservation of the Mekong River Irrawaddy Dolphin, an agreement that calls for increased monitoring and enforcement to reduce the use of improper fishing nets (World Wide Fund for Nature, 2012).

Huaneng Group Lancang River Hydropower Co., Ltd. (Huaneng) is China’s second largest river basin hydropower company that is mainly engaged in the development and operation of hydropower in the Lancang-Mekong region. Over the years, it has paid careful attention to environmental impacts that hydropower stations would bring about and taken protective measures adapted to local conditions during the planning and construction processes. To preserve the ecological environment of the Baima Snow Mountain National Nature Reserve and the World Natural Heritage Site along the Three Parallel Rivers-the Yangtze River, the Yellow River, and the Lancang-Mekong River, Huaneng cancelled the Guonian hydropower station and lowered the normal storage level of the Wulonglong hydropower station. It further took effective actions to avoid soil erosion caused by engineering construction along the upper and lower reaches of the Lancang-Mekong River. In 2008, Huaneng originally established an animal rescue station within the Nuozhadu hydropower station to provide necessary care for the surrounding endangered wild animals. Rare plant and fish habitat protection areas have also been successively established to protect the indigenous wildlife resources in the tributaries (Wang, 2019). To promote the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, the company continues to leverage its core advantages in hydropower, actively participating in the exchange and cooperation with downstream countries and enterprises to develop green hydropower in the Lancang-Mekong region.

9.4.3.5 Local Communities

Local community members are the key stakeholders engaging in projects on sustainable livelihoods organised by international or local NGOs. They are not only vital components of river basin governance in the Lancang-Mekong region, but also actors that could initiate participatory actions.

In the previously mentioned Tram Chim National Park project launched by Coca-Cola and WWF, local communities secured one of the Plain of Reeds’ last strongholds in southern Vietnam. Nestled in the Mekong Delta close to the Cambodian border, Tram Chim is of great significance for local residents as the basis of their families’ livelihoods. Therefore, the rapidly growing population has been turning it into one rice paddy after another, so that much of the historic wetland has disappeared. People have always fished in the park’s pristine wetlands, even before some gained the legal right to do so. It was not until recently, however, that 200 households set up user groups to coordinate and cooperate on water governance affairs. The poorest and most vulnerable households have been part of this unique management approach that allows them to fish inside Tram Chim. In close collaboration with management staff, some fishermen have also become the park’s ambassadors who contribute to preserving the park. They have learned the importance of the park’s biodiversity and abandoned harmful fishing methods such as deadly chemicals and electrofishing. To date, there are over 50,000 people who live closest to Tram Chim working with rangers to protect wetlands (World Wide Fund for Nature, 2015).

Villagers, living in the upstream areas of the Three Parallel Rivers located in China, are also developing sustainable livelihoods with technical and financial support from domestic NGOs such as GEI and Shan Shui Conservation Center. Ecological compensation programmes have been set up and local villagers could receive cash payments by providing ecological services such as participating in water quality monitoring and species observation. In 2016, more than 2,000 herdsmen received training and conducted monitoring activities in six tributaries of the Three Parallel Rivers. To achieve a win–win situation of ecological protection and community development, several communities have established economic cooperatives to improve sustainable livelihoods working on ecological farming and herding, traditional handicrafts, Tibetan tea production, and eco-tourism (Wang, 2016).

9.4.4 Outcomes of Social Participation

9.4.4.1 Positive Outcomes

Although mixed with challenges and complexities, social participatory engagement in the governance of the Lancang-Mekong have generated some promising outcomes.

First, information and data collected and disseminated by NGOs and civil society groups have facilitated informed and transparent decision-making on investment projects. For example, before the construction of the Xayaburi dam, the Laos government strictly conducted the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), the Social Impact Assessment (SIA), the Environmental Management Plan (EMP), and the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) as a response to active appeals of local NGOs. The construction of Pak Beng hydropower plant has also gone through the second round of technical consultations with affected people and all stakeholders. Furthermore, multi-stakeholder platforms with both public and private sectors involved have facilitated transboundary water collaboration among the riverine countries. For example, the collaboration between the LMWCCC and GWP since 2017 has allowed non-government stakeholders to be an integrated part of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation.

Second, some business enterprises have complied with their corporate social responsibilities and leveraged capital-rich investment in sustainable economic, social, and ecological development. For example, the global freshwater conservation campaign launched by Coca-Cola and WWF in 2007 has leveraged a total funding of $20 million in eleven regions. In particular, the Tram Chim National Park project based in the Mekong River Basin has secured an annual expenditure of $250,000 for the recovery of natural wetlands of the Plain of Reeds in southern Vietnam (World Wide Fund for Nature, 2012). Hydropower private investors, such as Xayaburi Power Co., Ltd. and Huaneng, have committed to developing green hydropower using the best available technologies to prevent and minimise all environmental and social risks, including fishery resource conservation, sediment routing, navigation, and riverbank erosion.

Last but not least, local people have been increasingly aware of social-ecological issues through participatory approaches structured on community mobilisation and village engagement. For example, through the Basin Report Card initiated by WWF, a professional class of facilitators within international NGOs have become brokers to stimulate local interests in water governance. The villager-led Thai Baan Research, an emancipatory means of knowledge production developed in the late 1990s and expanded to other areas, has also empowered the grassroots to voice their concerns on long-term potential threats that development plans will bring about. This approach has not only included indigenous groups such as the Chiang Khong Conservation Group and regional NGOs such as the South East Asia Rivers Network, but also gained the support of government officials and other organisations such as IUCN and Oxfam. It has rapidly gained credibility and become complementary to decentralisation initiatives, bringing in local farmers’ and fishers’ knowledge that has been vividly communicated to others through photos, videos, and booklets (Lebel et al., 2007; Sretthachau, 2007).

9.4.4.2 Negative Outcomes

Despite the positive achievements, social participation in the Lancang-Mekong River, in some respects, have demonstrated signals that it can be transformed into political instruments for external interventions in state and regional governance, casting shadows over future collaborative governance. These external interventions are not ideologically neutral, nor are they fully motivated by the interests of local stakeholders; rather, they are intrinsically political and filled with geopolitical contestations. Historically, the Lancang-Mekong region has been rife with diverse geographical imaginaries, which include not only the Cold War “front line” that divided communism and capitalism, but also the “corridor of commence” that signified the prevalence of neoliberalism promoted by international donors and funders (Bakker, 1999). More recently, the growing influence of China has received many critics from the West, which depicts China as the “upstream dragon” (Magee, 2011) and “water power” (Lee, 2014) which holds great economic, political, and hydrological strengths to “control” downstream countries (Biba, 2012; Yeophantong, 2014). These geopolitical contestations, reflected in social participation of river basin governance, generate two main negative outcomes.

One prominent outcome is prevalent social conflicts associated with development projects at the sub-national level (Dugan et al., 2010; Galipeau et al., 2013). As mentioned earlier, the rationale for social participation is to create space for deliberation, build trust, legitimise decisions, and thus improve the performance of water governance. In this sense, it is important to bear in mind that the objective of social participation is to facilitate cooperation rather than to create social conflicts. For instance, NGOs are not affiliated to government agencies; their objectives are not necessarily in contradiction with the government either. Although civil society groups and international organisations have contributed significantly in mitigating environmental and social impacts of development projects (e.g., hydropower dams) on vulnerable groups, one should also remember that the failure of development is by no means conducive to local livelihoods either. In practice, the essence of social participation can be lost, sometimes even manipulated, as development projects proposed by national governments are translated into “battle fields” where different stakeholders pursue their own interests in the process of participation. For instance, Thai NGO collectives, such as Save the Mekong and People’s Network of Isaan Mekong Basin, chose to boycott the prior consultation phase for dam projects which was an official communication platform built by the MRC (Jirenuwat & Roney, 2020); and further, they refused to reach a consensus through constructive conversations and discussions with government agencies. Likewise, the USA-backed institutions, Eyes on Earth and Stimson Center, deliberately used flawed data and models to hype up the 2019 lower Mekong drought, exacerbating transboundary tensions between the MRC member states and China (Kallio & Fallon, 2020). The behavior of such NGOs in using flawed data and hyping up implied their objective is making conflicts rather than promoting cooperation. Against this backdrop, it is worth noting that many non-state actors are value-driven entities with specific goals, which similar to those of the states or private companies, may also include seeking independence, influence, and profits (Chen et al., 2013; Knutsen, 2013). As a result, the boundary between non-state and state actors is more blurred than many would expect. The lack of social participation could be manufactured as an excuse by some participants, which creates barriers instead of facilitating cooperation in river governance.

The other negative outcome is discursive polarisation. The confrontational approaches taken in the process of participation are not only a manifestation of power struggles, but also breed opposite framings of the Lancang-Mekong among different stakeholders. For instance, a polarising discourse is situated between hydropower development and ecological conservation. The development discourse overwhelmingly emphasises the importance of energy generation, irrigation, and flood control for local livelihoods (Ho, 2014; Middleton & Allouche, 2016) and argues that hydroelectricity is the most appropriate option for development in the lower Mekong countries where alternative energy sources are not available (Zhang, 2017). On the other hand, the conservation discourse chooses to see the other side of hydropower—displacement of local residents, habitat loss, and socioeconomic inequalities (Biba, 2012, 2014; Magee, 2011; Yeophantong, 2014). As a result, the polarising discourse could deepen societal division rather than build consensus, rendering a contested public space where collaboration becomes impossible. Another polarising discourse concerns the relationship between China and the downstream countries. Since the Lancang-Mekong has been filled with strategic competition between superpowers, social participation is often entangled with shifting geopolitical contestations (Hirsch, 2016). As Chinese investments continuously grew after the 1997 financial crisis (Middleton et al., 2012), the discourse used in environmental advocacy by civil society groups seems to have placed China at the opposite side of the environment, despite Western dominated donors and banks (e.g., World Bank) having long championed hydropower development in the Mekong (Yong & Grundy-Warr, 2012). As a result, polarised discourse in social participation could become a part of a bigger political agenda that attempts to contain Chinese influence in the Mekong rather than to explore an acceptable path toward sustainable development. This is an often-neglected fact at the transnational level where power asymmetries easily shadow the truths and realities—it is easier to simply label the powerful as the “evil developers” and the weak as the “innocent protectors” than to dig into socioeconomic complexities and explore hidden sources of conflicts.

9.4.5 Overcoming the Challenges and Complexities of Social Participation

As participatory approaches to governing river basins are experimented with and tested around the world, we have increasingly seen practices of social participation in the Lancang-Mekong River Basin. However, the goal of participatory water governance, which is to create arenas for discussion, dialogues, capacity building, and empowerment, is far from being achieved (Berry & Mollard, 2009, p. 315). Social participatory engagement in the Lancang-Mekong region also faces challenges and complexities, concerning the issues of legitimacy, information and knowledge, inclusiveness, and capability.

First, as the defining features and degree of social participation vary across different institutional frameworks at both regional and national levels, the legitimacy of participatory decision making, accordingly, is subject to debate and elucidation. In other words, government agencies, experts, international organisations, local NGOs, and community members may all have a different understanding of “representativeness” and “fairness” in the decision-making process, making participation itself a contested notion. Yet regardless of the way participation is organised, a critical component for legitimacy is that the decision-making process is clearly structured and displayed in an institutionalised way (Chilvers, 2009; Rowe & Frewer, 2000), which remains elusive in the Lancang-Mekong River Basin. The Five-Year Plan of Action on Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (2018–2022) has established a leader-led, government-guided working structure to maintain high-level dialogues and exchanges. However, institutionalised social participation remains inadequate. At the national level, the scope of institutionalised social participation, such as EIA is still relatively narrow and encounters practical difficulties when sensitive issues (e.g., large-scale hydropower projects) are involved (Bian, 2017).

Second, the general public still has limited access to sufficient information and limited input into knowledge production in the Basin governance. On the one hand, the inadequacy of institutionalised participation opportunities in major government decisions, to a large extent, prevents the general public from being fully informed in a timely, true, and comprehensive manner. For a legitimate decision to be made, greater disclosure of key information is essential, particularly before a hydraulic project moves to the next stage (Middleton, 2018). On the other hand, gaps between expert knowledge and lay knowledge remain salient and lay knowledge has rarely been acknowledged despite the limitation of technical and managerial expertise (Lopez Cerezo & Gonzalez Garcia, 1996). Scientific and technical expertise are usually deployed to justify policy and development plans, whilst limited opportunity is offered for inhabitants who have a living understanding of the water environment (Käkönen & Hirsch, 2009). Although there have been villager-oriented attempts, in several countries, to conduct studies on rivers and formulate endogenous findings, it seems particularly difficult for local people to convince the governments and get their input comfortably accepted in the decision-making process (Herbertson, 2012). In order to address sustainability challenges, knowledge generation needs to move rapidly from a disciplinary linear ‘tree’ model to an interdisciplinary ‘web’ model by involving different stakeholders. Liu et al. explains how such a shift is useful by looking at case studies in the context of water management.

Lastly, building consensus and increasing inclusiveness of social participation remains a predicament. On the one hand, complex conflicts of interest exist among actors involving the states, government agencies, private investors, and water user groups, such as farmers and fishers in the Lancang-Mekong Region. These actors compete on spatial scales of administration, hydrology, ecosystems, and economy, and also on different territories at local, provincial, national, or regional levels (Dore & Lebel, 2010), which inevitably create challenges to consensus building, in spite of dialogues and other forms of deliberation engagement. On the other hand, there exists technical, financial, and social gaps among civil society groups, which prevents inclusive public deliberation from being an institutional protection for the disadvantaged. The empirical evidence has indicated that international NGOs, such as WWF and TNC, play much bigger roles in the Lancang-Mekong region than small grassroots NGOs (Fabres, 2011). With sufficient human capital and funding, international organisations are able to dominate the discourse and practices, whereas the impacts and autonomy of indigenous groups are largely confined (Fabres, 2011). Likewise, few Chinese NGOs are able to participate owing to limited capacity. Only a few sporadic actions have been taken in the upstream Chinese territories. This intra-society gap also occurs among different social groups. Low-income ethnic women have experienced exclusion from community water decision-making (Nguyen et al., 2019) and project-led community participation is mainly dominated by local elites. Whereas those whose livelihoods and everyday practices are greatly impacted are mostly marginalised in the participatory process.

In light of these challenges that may prevent social participation from fully realising its expectations, some strategies should be explored to address the challenges and improve future collaborative engagement in the Lancang-Mekong River Basin governance.

First, a paradigm shift from elite-led participation to inclusive participation is needed. Particularly, marginalised and less represented groups should be empowered and play a bigger role in knowledge production. For one thing, current practices indicate that the scope and actors that are effectively involved in social participation are not only limited, but also easily politicised. To this end, it is of vital importance to empower excluded social groups and grassroots actors, rather than international organisations or transnational enterprises, to facilitate inclusive representativeness and to create a space of fair exchange. For another, knowledge is critically shaped by cognitive, cultural, political, and institutional factors, and thus knowledge that better fits Western knowledge systems normally receives more recognition than indigenous knowledge (Briggs & Sharp, 2004; Lemos, 2015). Therefore, the co-production of knowledge is important because it incorporates multiple forms of knowledge and ensures broad representation instead of elite domination. Situational knowledge of riverside communities and various civil society research initiatives, such as Thai Baan research in Thailand and Sala Phoum in Cambodia should be acknowledged in the participatory decision-making process (Middleton, 2018).

Second, it is important to establish institutionalised social participation through regulations, policies, and laws (Berry & Mollard, 2009, p. 316). Formal deliberation procedure is a salient example that could enable power to be distributed more fairly, thus being conducive to overcoming power imbalances in practice. Simply putting people with different priorities together is not enough to foster social participation, but an institutionalised deliberative engagement makes participation meaningful; because it allows active and reflexive management of the negotiation among diverse participants who have a variety of opinions, positions, interests, and values. A formal deliberative procedure allows multiple stakeholders, including minorities, women, migrants, and diverse groups of the poor, to engage in conversations and dialogues where everyone is given a relatively fair opportunity to articulate their reasoning and claims (Dore & Lebel, 2010). In this sense, the deliberation procedure itself has served the purpose of participation and enabled decisions to be viewed as legitimate by participants, regardless of the outcomes (e.g., consensus is reached or not) of the deliberation.

Third, the use of modern technologies may play a bigger role in empowering the general public. In China, the rapid development of internet infrastructure (e.g., advanced sensors, smart data processing and sharing, web-based geographical information system, and cloud calculation) and the increasing ability of the general public to use smartphones and apps have allowed them to supervise the performance of water governance easily (Jia & Li, forthcoming), thus opening the channel for social participation. For example, water agencies in several provinces have developed a variety of “river chief” smartphone applications, which allow the general public to upload photos and report water-related problems they see and experience in everyday life (Huang & Xu, 2019).

Last but not least, state-led participation should act more proactively. For instance, China has established an expert argumentation system, which mandates that any newly built, reconstructed, and expanded hydraulic project must be reviewed, debated, and approved by a panel of experts before construction (Jia & Li, 2021). This institutionalised procedure actively brings in expert opinions, which could reduce potential conflicts and legitimise decisions on hydraulic infrastructure. Likewise, information disclosure is central for social participation, both in terms of the quantity and quality of information. Rather than react passively, government agencies could voluntarily share hydraulic data and make the information not only accessible to the scientific experts but also to the general public. The Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Information Sharing Platform launched by the Chinese government in 2020 has started to play a critical role in data sharing with other riparian partner countries. Proactive information sharing not only improves transparency, but more importantly, increases the legitimacy of decisions, which greatly facilitates cooperation in river basin governance.

9.5 Outlook for Future Development of Basin Governance Cooperation

Basin-based integrated water governance continues to develop and strengthen as showed by the phenomena that China's top leader Xi Jinping personally advocated and promoted the great protection plan of the Yangtze River, the ecological protection and high-quality development plan of the Yellow River Basin.

Integrated River Basin Governance in the Lancang-Mekong River Basin will certainly broaden and deepen along with the strengthening desire of people of riparian countries for better water management, more powerful will for basin community cooperation, and capacity building including more advanced knowledge and technology. Closer basin cooperation is a consensus among riparian countries. The LMC mechanism has been deepening. On June 8, 2021, the sixth LMC foreign ministers’ meeting was held in Chongqing, China, issued a joint statement on strengthening Lancang Mekong countries’ sustainable development cooperation, and put forward proposals on deepening local cooperation between Lancang Mekong countries.

Cooperation between different mechanisms is also being strengthened, especially the cooperation between the two main basin cooperation mechanisms—LMC mechanism and MRC—is deepening. The new CEO of the MRC Secretariat, Dr. Anoulak Kittikhoun, stated that beyond a desire to deepen regional and international partnership, a crucial priority is to expand efforts to monitor and measure how economic development, water-infrastructure projects and climate change—including more floods and drought—affect the many millions who dwell in the Lower Mekong River Basin (MRC, 2022).

One of the main directions of all programmes and formats of cooperation is cooperation in the field of science, education and technology. International scientific research and educational centres and institutes have been created and continue to be created. Subsequently, this will only lead to an improvement in the quality of all actions and decisions taken.

There may be also some interferent to the cooperation. One interruption factor is big power competition between USA and China. While China put forward “One Belt One Road Initiative”, USA put forward “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”. Recently, President Biden further put forward “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework” to construct a regional economic partner organization but plan to exclude China. This operation may make troubles for the basin countries to cooperate with China. At the same time, disputes between riparian countries, such as the sovereignty dispute between China and Vietnam over islands in the South China Sea, may also interrupt the basin cooperation.

The basin countries must sustain economic growth and work together to follow the Agenda for achieving the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. After all, any mutually beneficial cooperation has a high chance of achieving the main goal—the well-being of the population in all countries of the region.