Introduction

Abstract

This chapter motivates discussions about why we study Brazil–Japan cooperation from general points of view. We situate Brazil–Japan relations in international relations of Brazil and Japan respectively. We identify some areas in which Brazil–Japan cooperation has a strategic relevance to both countries. We explain how each chapter of this volume contributes to important issues in Brazil–Japan cooperation.

1 Why Is It Essential to Study Bilateral Cooperation in International Relations?

Cooperation helps countries build international institutions with others that hold similar preferences. Countries can realize mutual gains or prevent mutual losses from institutionalized cooperative relations. Growing bilateral cooperations constitute an evolving network of international relations. As Kinne (2013, p. 766) compellingly addresses, international cooperation is governed by an endogenous network of influences; that is, the probability of cooperation for any given pair of countries is endogenous to the third-party ties those countries have already established. Furthermore, when a pair of countries develop cooperation, countries in their third-party ties may subsequently alter their positions, changing the reward of the cooperation.

Given the complexity of bilateral cooperations construction, it is essential to address theoretical and empirical inquiries to understand why the intensity of cooperation and the areas in which they cooperate vary across countries. This book contributes to the literature on international cooperation by studying the relations between Brazil and Japan.

It can be said that Brazil and Japan are under the influence of the global hegemony of the United States and China, which is making inroads into international politics. They benefit from partnerships with the U.S. and China, but at the same time, they strive to maintain and expand political autonomy. They are economic powerhouses in the global economy and positioned as network hubs in economic and political ties at the regional level (South America for Brazil and Asia for Japan). Under such circumstances, Brazil and Japan have developed middle-power diplomacy in the last decades to widen their space for political autonomy through expanding strategic partnership networks. They avoid directly interfering with hegemons’ interests but also aim at consolidating influential positions in international politics. Studying Brazil–Japan relations, paying attention to which directions they are structuring their partnership, offers a practical test for an argument on the positive role of middle powers in building cooperation networks amid crucial challenges that the world commonly faces today.

2 Concepts of Cooperation in Critical Theories of International Relations

According to Nye and Welch (2017), there are four dominant paradigms in International Relations (IR) theory: realism, Marxism, liberalism, and constructivism. All paradigms understand that the international system is anarchic, that is, the world consists of sovereign nations without higher-level authority. They stand on different assumptions on the interaction process and produce distinct theories of cooperation. In turn, critical theory was born in the 1980s, when IR discipline opened up to new approaches and themes such as hegemony, emancipation and inequality, environment, culture, ethics and civil society. Critical theory thus emerged as the most important alternative theoretical contribution of IR, in a context of turmoil characteristic of a period of transition to an increasingly globalized world order.

Realists agree that states play power politics to claim territorial sovereignty and protect their national interests. The stability of the international system arises from the material balance of powers. Realists understand that the world is conflictual because countries play zero-sum games. However, Jervis (1999) argues that defensive realists, who would include maintaining international order among state goals, do not discard the possibility of cooperation among self-interested actors to correct the losses from not cooperating, typically in a prisoners’ dilemma case.

Marxism, in which we include the dependency theory, stylizes the international order by assuming an uneven distribution of powers among nations leading to the North–South international structure hierarchy, where the material and financial inequality is always present and self-reinforcing. This structural rigidity, in many cases, has a historical origin in colonialism. In this fixture, North–South cooperation only locks in the uneven structure. The South demands non-intervention and calls for South–South cooperation to do away with capitalist expansion (imperialist exploitation). Earlier discourses of the Third World were a manifestation of this type of thought.

Liberalists pay attention to not only military competition for power but also countries’ competition for wealth through trading. They argue that deepening interdependence through trade creates interests in cooperation (Keohane 1984, p. 8). Countries are willing to cooperate to build institutions for constructing positive-sum games as an international order in cases where countries can expect reciprocal gains and enhanced reputation among states of different international strategic settings (Keohane 1984, Chapter 3). While classical idealism trusted international organizations to provide a forum for nations to resolve disputes and set a body for global governance, liberalists view institutions more broadly as “recognized patterns of practice around which expectations converge” (Keohane 1984, p. 8). This view contrasts with the realists’ perspective that hegemonic countries provide institutions.

While all the above theories consider that a state is a homogeneous unit of decision and power uniquely identified by inherent national interests, the constructivism IR model see it as a social construction. This perception implies that the identities and interests of nations in international relations are socially constructed through interactions of heterogeneous ordinary people in a structural setting. Those identities and interests are not taken for granted, but they are changeable in response to a structural transformation. Constructivists echo the idealism and liberalism of the existence of plus-sum cooperation through which a country can gain without harming others. According to constructivism, international interactions construct common values even in an anarchic international system. In other words, an anarchic international system does not necessarily result in a zero-sum power struggle, but plus-sum cooperation is possible. In this line of arguments, constructivism influenced the recent debate on the Global South. More developing countries are being recognized as “makers” and “shapers” of global norms for being capable of charting their courses in international relations without placing too much weight on transforming the rigid North–South structure (Grant 2018).

Finally, for Critical Theory, with globalization, social ties that define national borders were weakened and led to the fragmentation of national cultures, which ended up being diluted in a cosmopolitan global culture. The international society imagined by critical theorists is a pluralistic society of states in which principles of coexistence function as the key to preserving freedom and equality among independent political communities, in which states agree on substantive moral principles.

3 International Relations of Brazil

According to Lessa (2010), Brazil maintains with the US a “fundamental partnership” on whose basis the intensity of ties with other countries may be measured. He also classifies the relations with the US as “a structuring relationship” to measure the intensity and organization of the entire system of Brazil’s international relations. Further, because of the dominant area and population size in South America and its geographical location of sharing borders with ten countries except Chile and Ecuador, Brazil seeks leadership in South America, projecting parallels to the US’ undisputed hegemony over North America. In this regard, Lessa (2010, p. 122) classifies the relationship with Argentina as another “structuring relationship,” which became a vector of South America’s stabilization. As Weyland (2016, p. 162) asserts, “while Brazil has pursued its self-interest even at the risk of displeasing the regional hegemon, it has always avoided confrontation.” Brazilian foreign policy takes a nuanced approach to balancing the alignment with the US and political autonomy as a regional power.

If the US imposes crucial constraints on autonomy, Brazil pursues hard-nosed realist goals to defend the national interest. According to Weyland (2016), the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), established in 1991 with Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, played a crucial role in sustaining Brazil’s defensive posture and passive resistance to the US’ push for the Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA) under Bill Clinton’s and George W. Bush’s presidency (p. 166). In his assessment, Brazil’s international behavior is not governed by liberalist values in economic collaboration. Unlike constructivism’s highlight, Brazil’s adherence to international principles (free trade, in this case) is notoriously selective (p. 146). The reaction to FTAA was not just occasional, but “national power and global clout are the priorities that have driven Brazilian foreign policy for more than a century” (p. 157).

Brazil has used tactics to distance itself from the US hegemony since the 1970s. It has expanded less explored partnerships to reinforce autonomous international actions. Lessa (2010, p. 118) characterizes them as “strategic partnerships.” Such partnerships are vital for technology transfers and international trade. Earlier examples of this category include the nuclear agreement with Germany (West Germany) and the the Japanese–Brazilian Cooperation Program for Cerrados Development (PRODECER) with Japan. Both were under Ernesto Geisel’s presidency (1974–1979) during the military regime. Moreover, under the Geisel administration, Brazil recognized the People’s Republic of China (Becard and Lessa 2021). Later, more progress was made with the earth image satellite project (CBERS) with China (since 1988) and EU–Mercosur free trade negotiation (1999–2019).

Under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s (2003–2010) and Dilma Rousseff’s (2011–2016) presidencies, the strategic partnerships have been instrumental in diversifying international relations and demonstrating Brazil’s ambition to play a global protagonist role as a responsible regional power and a strong emerging economy. Lula’s administration shifted Brazilian foreign policy toward the Global South engagement. The support to the World Social Forum, the establishment of the India, Brazil, South Africa Forum (IBSA), and inauguration of the BRICS summit in 2009, which also led to the establishment of the New Development Bank in 2014, were manifestations of this orientation.

The relationship with China was positioned as a strategic partnership in 1993 during Prime Minister Zhu Rongji’s visit to Brazil,¹ but it remained symbolic until the turn of the century. Brazil’s economic relations with China have evolved satisfactorily in the last two decades. China’s approximation to Latin America is motivated by the need to compensate for its critical natural resource deficit, feed the world’s largest domestic population, and fuel the soon-to-be largest economy in the world (Wise and Chonn Ching 2018). China is also investing in infrastructure for energy and transportation because production and trade would not work without adequate infrastructure. The accelerated depreciation of the Brazilian Real and the Brazilian government’s desperate search for investors amid the economic downturn favored Chinese expansion (Becard et al. 2020).

The rapid approximation induced the creation of mechanisms of coordination. The most notable was the establishment of China–Brazil Commission of High Level of Agreement and Cooperation (COSBAN) in 2004² with twelve sub-commissions: (1) political; (2) economy/trade; (3) economy/finance; (4) phytosanitary and quarantine inspection; (5) agriculture; (6) science, technology, and innovation; (7) industry and information technology; (8) spatial cooperation; (9) energy and mining; (10) education; (11) culture; and (12) health. The Brazil–China relations were elevated to a Global Strategic Partnership in 2012, and the Global Strategic Dialogue and the Ten–Years Plan of Cooperation were launched in the same year. Brazilian Ministry of Planning, Budget, and Management and Sino–Latin American Production Capacity Cooperation Investment Fund (Claifund) jointly founded the Brazil–China Fund for Production Capacity Expansion (Brazil–China Fund) in 2017. The initial contribution to the fund was US$20 billion with US$15 billion from the Claifund and US$5 billion from the Brazilian Development Bank and Caixa Econômica Federal. The fund focuses on infrastructure development.

The rise of Chinese presence triggered a pros-and-cons debate.³ Arguments of “China dependence” come mainly from dependency theory, as Stallings (2020) raises the concern that the predominance of China would lead to the dependency structure that disables Latin America’s autonomous development. From the realist’s paradigm, Busilli and Jaime (2021) wrote, “priority sectors such as power generation and distribution represent sensitive areas for the host country’s security. In this vein, the logics of economic statecraft are strengthened because these same incentives can eventually become ‘sticks’ since Chinese companies can use them to control, limit, interrupt or impose conditions on the provision of critical infrastructure goods and services for Brazil.” Liberalists may reply that the intensification of economic relations induced the institutionalization, which avoided “relative-gain concerns” and allowed to maintain the target of long-term mutual benefits (Zhang and Chen 2021). Constructivist insights show the growing diversified presence of the Chinese is the product of the “Going Out” policy to motivate Chinese firms facing the maturing internal demand to capture demand abroad and win the competition in Brazil, which is obsessed to fulfill the need for investment (Becard and Lessa 2021; Becard et al. 2020). This unsettled debate awaits further scholarly research.

4 International Relations of Japan

The Japanese economy significantly benefits from globalization, but the country faces complex threats and challenges in international relations. North Korean missile development and China’s alarming strengthening of military forces and attempts to unilaterally change the status quo are imminent in the regional realm. The Japanese government is also concerned about the necessity of adequate international institutions for international trade and supply chain management, climate change and natural disasters relief, and health promotion to address the resiliency of globalization.

Against this background, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan advances diplomacy under the “Proactive Contribution to Peace” guideline. It sets Seven Priority Areas of Japan’s Foreign Policy: (1) strengthening the Japan–US alliance; (2) promoting the vision of the Free and Open Indo–Pacific (FOIP); (3) building stable relations with neighboring China, South Korea, and Russia; (4) concerns regarding North Korea; (5) coping with the situation in the Middle East (concerning energy security); (6) leading international efforts to create new rules (trade and data flow, among other things): (7) contributing to global challenges under the concept of human security (e.g., peace building, terrorism, disarmament and non-proliferation, the rule of law, human rights, women’s empowerment and gender equality, disaster risk reduction, global health, and the environment and climate change) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2021).

Priorities from (1) to (5) are linked to national security. In this regard, no other bilateral relationship is more important than with the US based on the US military presence under the Security Treaty. The US also places importance on the US–Japan alliance as the cornerstone of the security interests in Asia and is fundamental to regional stability and prosperity.⁴ Recently, Japan made a “proactive contribution to peace” national policy and emerged as a strategic actor in regional and international politics. Koga (2018) notes that after the September 11, 2001 attacks, Japan responded to reduce security dependence on the US and hedge against the risk of US commitment reduction in East Asia. Japan and the US strengthened their security partnership through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) with Australia and India.⁵

Another diplomatic maneuver of Japan is the creation of ASEAN+3 as an ASEAN-centric institution in East Asian cooperation. Japan engages in "value-based diplomacy" as a responsible stakeholder aligned with the US to embed open regionalism and the principles of democracy, the rule of law, good governance, and human rights (Koga 2018, p. 654). The recent agreement of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which states that it aims to broaden and deepen ASEAN’s engagement with Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand, ratifies the ASEAN centrality and Asia–Pacific multilateralism. A recent study by Singh (2022) points out that Japan pursues a combination of hard and soft balancing strategies to address threats.

Foreign policy priorities (6) and (7) are linked to contributions to international rule-making and the development of forums of discussion on critical global challenges. A remarkable success in the economic realm is the launch of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), also known as TPP-11. It includes provisions for the high-standard liberalization of goods and service trade. It also defined dispute settlement rules for investments, introduced a new intellectual property standard, and established the transparency of state-owned enterprises. Economic Partnership Agreements with the European Union and the United Kingdom (UK) set equally high-standard rules for trade and investment.

Japan also took the initiative to lead global efforts on data governance at the G20 Osaka Summit in 2019 to inaugurate the process of establishing the international rule of e-commerce with the concept of “the Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT).” According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,⁶ 86 countries have confirmed participation in the negotiation, including China and the US.

Regarding climate change, Japan ratified the Paris Agreement and vowed to become carbon neutral by 2050. Kameyama (2021) points out that Japan had been inactive in global climate issues because the decision mechanism was dominated by the “iron triangle” of traditional business leaders from energy-intensive industries, bureaucrats, and conservative politicians. The recent position change was brought about by pressures from new business leaders and subnational governments influenced by the unfolding at the international level.

Japan has provided international cooperation in disaster risk reduction with its knowledge and expertise acquired through experiences of various natural disasters. It played a central role in the UN World Conference on Disaster Reduction in defining the Hyogo Framework of Action 2005–2015 (2005) and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (2015). The empirical study by Taghizadeh-Hesary et al. (2021) found that quality infrastructure, which is more durable, environmentally friendly, and disaster-resilient than standard infrastructure, significantly reduces natural disaster damage in the long term. Japan’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure for infrastructure development investment with the Asian Development Bank is Japan’s reply to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

In the health area, according to Nomura et al. (2022), Japan has disbursed a total of 2.3 billion dollars toward addressing the health-related effects of COVID-19 in low- and middle-income countries, which is the largest among all donor countries and international development agencies. Development assistance for health (DAH) from Japan is increasing, which is channeled through international organizations and multilateral development banks. The Basic Design for Peace and Health (BDPH), which was formulated in 2015, outlines three basic DAH policies: establishing resilient global health governance that can respond to public health emergencies and disasters; promoting seamless utilization of essential health and medical services and universal health coverage (UHC) throughout the lifecycle; and leveraging Japanese expertise, experience, and medical products and technology.

5 Japan Viewed from Brazil

Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducts the Poll on Japan annually in the US and selected countries. The 2017 and 2020 surveys include Latin America, including Brazil. Figure 1.1 is created from the answers to which countries are important partners to their country currently and in the future in Brazil.

Fig. 1.1

(Source Authors’ creation based on Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Opinion Poll on Japan https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/culture/pr/index.html)

Current and future important partner countries for Brazil

The US appears as the most important country in both years, and its share grew remarkably. The rise of the US⁷ reflects the political change during this period. President Jair Bolsonaro came into power in 2019. He showed personal admiration to former US President Donald Trump and vowed alignment to the US foreign policy. He also raised the tone of antagonism against China, to which Brazil engaged in approximation during the preceding presidency of the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores). However, the survey also shows that the US’ importance will decline in the future. Argentina is the second most important partner in the Americas, and its significance is also predicted to decrease.

In both years, China and Japan have been considered more important than even the traditional trans-Atlantic allies such as the UK, France, Germany, and Italy. The growth of Chinese share is more remarkable than that of Japan between the two years. China surpassed the US in total export and import value with Brazil in 2010, and the gap has widened further since 2018. China also invested considerably in Brazil, mainly in key sectors such as energy and infrastructure (Becard and Lessa 2021). However, the 2020 survey result predicts that China’s importance will decline. This result may be influenced by the current political debate in Brazil over the China-dependence risks and President Bolsonaro’s Chinophobic discourses (Becard and Lessa 2021).

Brazilians view Japan as an important partner because of three factors. First, Brazil and Japan have enjoyed a long-term friendship (Chap. 2) through migration (Chap. 6), investment in resource development (Chap. 4), and manufacturing technology transfer (Chap. 7). Brazil is home to 1.9 million⁸ Japanese descendants (nikkei), the largest Japanese-origin population outside Japan. Their cultural and economic success created a positive image of Japan among Brazilians. Second, Brazil and Japan are major global economic powers and highly regarded as soft-power countries. The two countries join forces in a strategic partnership and exert influence to lead global challenges (Chaps. 3, 4, and 5). Third, Brazil and Japan do not directly interfere with each other’s security and geopolitical autonomy interests. However, the partnership can be instrumental in handling the balance of powers involved, such as their relations with the US and China. This aspect should be critical as the struggle between the two countries intensifies.

Interestingly, Figure 1.1 shows Japan’s importance for Brazil to rise in the future. This result can be interpreted that Brazilians view Japanese engagement with Brazil as less than what it should be; it needs to increase in the future.

6 Brazil–Japan Relation

Brazil and Japan indulge in deepened dialogues in several domains. Remarkably, the private sectors of both countries took a fundamental initiative. In 1972, a group of Japanese business leaders representing the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) was invited by the Brazilian government to exchange views with the Brazilian business persons and government officials. This trip resulted in creating the Joint Meeting of the Brazil–Japan Economic Cooperation Committees Brazil–Japan, whose first meeting was held in 1974 in Rio de Janeiro. For the Brazilian part, the Brazilian National Confederation of Industries (CNI) has become Keidanren’s counterpart. The meeting was held in conjunction with important events such as visits of heads of state and critical policy changes. Since 2010, it has been held alternately in Brazil and Japan every year (Horisaka 2016).

Japan’s strategic partnership diplomacy started under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s administration (April 2001–September 2006) (Shiraishi 2014). In September 2004, President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva and Prime Minister Koizumi met in New York with the representatives of Germany and India. They announced a joint statement that advocated the reform of the United Nations (UN) Security Council and cooperation for the candidature of the four countries. In May 2005, when President Lula visited Japan, the two leaders agreed to establish the Japan–Brazil Council for the twenty-first century; this proposal led to the creation of the Strategic Economic Partnership Wise-men Group in 2006. During the Lula administration, Brazil adopted the Japanese standard of digital television broadcasting system in 2006. After adaptations in Brazil, the Japanese–Brazilian Digital TV system (ISDB-Tb) was adopted by eighteen other countries, including eight in South America, five in Central America, three in Asia, and two in Africa.

After a short period of stagnation,⁹ Brazil–Japan relations were reinvigorated by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Brazil in 2014. Abe announced the three guiding principles of Japan’s policy toward Latin America: progress together, lead together, and inspire together. Chapter 2 of this volume elaborates the nature of strategic partnership between Brazil and Japan in great detail.

As leading democracies and economies in their respective regions that share common values such as democracy and fundamental liberties, Brazil, Japan, and the US announced Japan–US–Brazil Exchange (JUSBE) in November 2020. This alliance aims to develop trilateral cooperation in strengthening business environments, expanding foreign investments, promoting regional connectivity, supporting sustainable development and economic growth, and enhancing cybersecurity to promote vibrant digital economies based on an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet. They also agree to strengthen dialogue and cooperation that fortifies democratic governance in their countries and internationally. Although not explicit in any part of the statements, it should be clear that this alliance is aware of the growing presence of China in Brazil, primarily because of the global competition in the fifth-generation (5G) mobile communication system.

7 Areas of Interest in Brazil–Japan Cooperation

As an upper-middle-income country, Brazil is regarded as “graduated” from the official development assistance (ODA) in the development cooperation sphere. Hence, ODA provision to Brazil is limited to three priority areas defined in the development cooperation policy for Brazil (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2018):

• 1. Urbanization and environmental problems and disaster prevention.

• 2. Improvement of investment climate (human capital development).

• 3. Support for Brazil’s development assistance to third countries (triangular cooperation).

It is expected that Japan will expand the triangular cooperation with Brazil under the Japan–Brazil Partnership Program (JBPP) to form a partnership in development projects implemented in Latin America and the Lusophone African countries. Uehara (2016) points out that triangular cooperation, where Japan finances projects and Brazil contributes with the knowledge from own development experiences, also taking advantage of cultural proximity and the use of common language, is cost-effective in aiding less developed countries. Chapter 5 of this book will address this issue.

It is crucial to guide ODA and private investment progress coherently. Regarding the urbanization and environmental problems, participants of the 2020 Joint Meeting of the Brazil–Japan Economic Cooperation Committee from the Japanese private sector showed interest in the prospects of adopting low carbon mobility technology in Brazil and its related investment opportunities in such areas as transport equipment, transport services, urban development, disaster prevention, environmental control, and energy supply. Regarding the investment climate, the Committee focused on emerging activities in Brazil in the field of digital technology: promotion of startup firms aiming at innovative solutions to social problems, training of digital talent, and supporting research and development (Iijima 2020). Chapter 7 will discuss the transfer of the Japanese-style quality control method to improve Brazil’s investment climate.

Vargas (2019) observes that the new guiding principles of Japan’s policy toward Latin America (the three “togethers”) and Brazil–Japan strategic global partnership represent that the bilateral relation is repositioned to strengthen the ability of both countries to play leading roles in global issues. From such perspectives, the annual reports of the Strategic Economic Partnership Wise-men Group¹⁰ identify areas of common interest of Brazil and Japan in global challenges. For example, the 2021 report proposes cooperation in bioenergy and other renewable energy sources to achieve the goal of a carbon neutral society by 2050, which both countries have promised. It also suggests that the challenge of increasing global food demand opens an avenue for Brazil–Japan cooperation in innovative logistics, digital automation, improved production management skills, and the transfer of experiences and knowledge in sustainable tropical agriculture and biofuel production to other developing countries. It also notes intensifying global competition for competent people and proposed more human-to-human exchanges, especially involving leaders from Japanese–Brazilian (Nikkei) communities. In this regard, Chap. 6 of this book discusses the education of children of working Nikkei families in Japan.

Vargas (2019) argues that Brazil and Japan are interested in promoting international peace and security as a shared global agenda. Above all, the two countries have the common goal to occupy permanent seats in the UN Security Council. The two countries prioritize non-military resources for conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding based on pacifism. Vargas mentions that the collaboration of military engineers’ activities in UN peacekeeping operations for the reconstruction after conflicts and severe disasters is an example of their common interest. Brazil and Japan will contribute creatively to the Security Council, where power politics has been present throughout its history.

In the business realm, the Joint Meeting of the Brazil–Japan Economic Cooperation Committees Brazil–Japan mentioned above earnestly recommends to the governments of the two countries to start negotiation for Japan–Mercosur Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). This request was initially motivated by the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and Mercosur–EU Free Trade Agreement negotiations, which could place Japan in an inferior position in terms of competition with the US and European firms in the South American market (Horisaka 2016). Japanese business sector’s demand for Japan–Mercosur EPA is also partly triggered by the increasing presence of Chinese firms in Brazil and the signing of the South Korea–Mercosur Free Trade Agreement (FTA).

Amorim and Ferreira-Pereira (2021) identify that the strategic global partnerships with China and Japan signaled Brazil to explore more autonomy in its traditional “double standard” foreign policy to simultaneously pursue the alignment with the US-standard international principles and autonomous self-interest. They argue that the partnership with China, on the one hand, opens more room for maneuver economically and politically in projecting national autonomy from the US dependency. On the other hand, the partnership with Japan provided Brazil with an instrument for soft balancing Chinese presence in Brazil and Latin America. According to the authors’ assessment, the partnership with China has exacerbated the dependency on primary resources subjecting the country to volatile growth, thus negatively affecting the Brazilian autonomist goals. The partnership with Japan has engendered much fewer concrete gains than those expected as a counterbalance to China. They conclude that Bolsonaro’s presidency, because of not only his ideological orientation but also the unsatisfactory results from the partnership with China and Japan, pushed Brazilian foreign policy toward aligning with Washington. In this regard, structuring the relationship with Japan has a strategic value for Brazil’s pursuit of diplomatic autonomy.

8 Outline of This Book

This book consists of three parts, and the final chapter is a conclusion. Part I includes two more chapters concerning generic issues in Brazil–Japan relations.

In Chap. 2, Lessa and Oliveira point out that the Brazil–Japan relationship developed while both countries jointly explored common interests. Those interests are signaled by reducing the dependence on the US and financial and economic complementarity between the two countries. Japanese investments were complementary to Brazil’s industrial structure. Brazil was a major supplier of raw materials and agricultural products, while Japan met Brazil’s need for basic industrial products and capital goods for its industrialization process. They contributed to each other’s national development projects, including emblematic projects such as Usiminas steel mill, Ishibrás shipyards, and other large energy- and natural resource-intensive projects, such as Cenibra (cellulose), Tubarão (steel industry), Albrás (aluminum), and PRODECER (agricultural development of the semi-arid land). However, economic complementarity began to decrease in the early 1980s, partly due to Brazil’s severe economic crisis and the diminished importance of ensuring the supply of raw materials for Japan. In the first years of the twenty-first century, neither Brazil nor Japan prioritized each other’s foreign policy. However, President Lula’s visit to Japan in 2005 broke the ground for a renewed partnership. In particular, Brazil’s adaptation of the Japanese ISDB-T standard of digital television broadcasting created an opportunity for the Japanese–Brazilian Digital TV system (ISDB-Tb) to be implemented in South America (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela), Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua,), Asia (Philippines, Maldives, and Sri Lanka), and Africa (Angola and Botswana). Brazil and Japan also agreed on the constitution of the G4 in 2004 to cooperate in the UN Security Council reform. In 2014, during Prime Minister Abe’s visit, the Brazil–Japan relationship was elevated to the level of Global Strategic Partnership. Japan also shows constant interest in forming closer ties by signing an EPA. The need to avoid a very ubiquitous presence of China was responsible for the rapprochement of Japan to Brazil. The bilateral relationship between Brazil and Japan is tied with a unique “human bond” created by the Japanese who migrated to Brazil.

In Chap. 3, Campos de Pires and Kawai identify the overall trends in Japan’s ODA policies for the health sector in developing countries from 1990 to 2020 and its future post-COVID-19 prospects. Since the end of the Cold War, watershed events have constantly changed the landscape of international cooperation in the healthcare sector. Like other international aid donors, Japan has devised priorities and strategies for ODA based on a set of international and domestic factors in a constantly changing world. Numerous studies on Japan’s ODA have examined international and domestic factors that impact the country’s aid policy formulation. The authors aim to add to those studies by combining recent debates on international cooperation and foreign aid, the right to health, and world health system reforms to explore and analyze Japan’s ODA for health in developing countries. The guiding research questions were as follows: What were the major trends in Japan’s ODA policies in the health sector from 1990 to 2020? Which international health debates and international cooperation factors exerted influence on those trends? What are the prospects of Japan’s ODA, given the COVID-19 pandemic and its impacts? Their preliminary findings revealed that Japan’s ODA in the health sector from 1990 to 2020 centered on two main axes: infectious diseases and maternal and child health care, both of which are oriented toward strengthening the healthcare system. Given this goal, it seems relevant to consider that Japan’s health system assumes the need to provide UHC, a concept currently supported by the World Health Organization (WHO) in contrast to the universal health system. However, the implications of this choice on Japan’s ODA and developing countries’ health policies are yet to be fully understood. The COVID-19 pandemic has put substantial pressure on healthcare systems globally and on international cooperation for health; thus, it can affect and even change Japan’s ODA for the healthcare sector in developing countries.

Part II is about the Brazil–Japan cooperation in global challenges.

In Chap. 4, Masukata, Inoue, and Sant’Anna discuss global environmental governance. Both Brazil and Japan have been active in global environmental governance, have signed important multilateral environmental agreements, and have committed to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The two countries have been historical partners in development cooperation/assistance since 1959. Starting with a broad concept of development cooperation, this chapter aims to assess the contributions and impacts of this specific type of cooperative relation between the two countries. The research uses a global environmental governance analytical framework to evaluate the Japanese ODA. It interrogates its contribution to and impacts on environmental protection and sustainable development in Brazil. Through literature review, document analysis, and interviews, the authors identify development cooperation programs and projects implemented from 1981 to 2020 and present two cases, one in the Cerrado (PRODECER) and the other in the Amazon (SAF–Tomé-Açu), to analyze how global environmental commitments guide (or not) the provision of ODA. Such analysis is relevant to understand the global trends of environmental governance at the subnational and local levels. According to international commitments, the environmental dimension has been incorporated into ODA projects. However, more must be achieved to meet global environmental challenges.

In Chap. 5, Koyasu and Ramos discuss the triangular cooperation in international development with particular attention to Africa. Japan has engaged in African development through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) mechanism. Africa gains more importance for Japan as Japan develops a geopolitical project of the Free and Open Indo–Pacific (FOIP), which entails Africa at the western end. Brazil maintains historically and strategically essential relations with Africa, especially Portuguese-speaking countries. To think about the future of Japan–Brazil relations, it is a mutual benefit if Africa develops economically without being constrained by the political interventions of international superpowers. This shared value motivates cooperation. Koyasu and Ramos inquire about the possibility of strengthening the cooperation of Japan and Brazil while looking back at the history and achievements of triangular cooperation between Japan–Brazil, and African countries. Mozambique is a particularly relevant case as a Portuguese-speaking country facing the Indian Ocean.

Part III is about the Brazil–Japan cooperation in bilateral issues.

In Chap. 6, Bugarin and Yamazaki seek to find an efficient way to improve the educational environment for the children of Brazilian residents in Japan. The secondary objective is to identify a better way to improve these residents’ social and economic positions through further integration into the Japanese society. The authors believe that their potential to become a vital bridge between the two countries is significant. However, that potential is still not tapped sufficiently. Therefore, the goal of this analysis is more than simply improving the working and living conditions in Japanese society. It aims to promote career development. Educational background is essential to that end; education and acquisition of the Japanese language beginning in primary school are especially of utmost importance.

For this reason, our study focuses on the basic education (especially Japanese language education) of Brazilian children in Japan. We conclude that the style of “afterschool” is most efficient and socially equitable. We propose a public policy adopted by the Japanese government to induce Brazilian families to adopt the hybrid afterschool education system.

In Chap. 7, Hamaguchi and Miyazaki argue that Brazil faces fundamental challenges in social inequality, and in this regard, increasing higher quality jobs with human capacity development is the key. In this respect, Japan’s experience during the industrialization in the post-Second World War period is valuable. Until the 1980s, Brazilian industrialization was oriented toward the domestic market. Although competitive pressure was weak, exporting companies and local subsidiaries of multinationals deployed the Japanese quality control model, which was considered the hallmark of the Japanese industry’s competitiveness. Individual companies and local business associations were the leading promoters of quality control, with the collaboration of JUSE. The first boom fell short of expectations because of the lack of understanding of corporate managers and some intercultural problems faced by workers in introducing Total Quality Control. The market liberalization since the 1990s set a new ground for competitiveness-seeking quality control, supported by the government. The second boom did not materialize because of the industrial paradigm change for machine-based productivity gains, while Japanese-style quality control is human-based. However, we find that Japanese-style quality control has been effectively used in non-industrial sectors such as public administration and healthcare. We argue that Japanese technical cooperation capitalizing on quality control methods will enhance Brazil’s labor productivity and social well-being.

To conclude, Chap. 8 summarizes our arguments and discusses proposals for policy in detail.

Notes

• 1. According to Feng and Huang (2014), it was the first strategic partnership for China. Since then, building strategic partnerships has become one of the most notable dimensions of Chinese diplomacy.

• 2. The first meeting was held in 2006.

• 3. The debate in U.S. on whether the Chinese rise in Latin America would interfere the U.S. interest is also divided. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission invited specialists for the Hearing on “China in Latin America and the Caribbean” on May 20, 2021. In this occasion, US Army War College professor R. Evan Ellis describes “China as an incubator for anti-US leftist populism” and “it has been leftist populist regimes which have hosted China’s building of the first national surveillance system in the region,” which “creates a dangerous reinforcing cycle of exporting of “digital authoritarianism” (Ellis 2021). Boston University professor Rebecca Ray contests to the “debt trap” and “environmental degradation” argument related to Chinese investment, arguing that the outcomes depend on institutional capacity of recipient countries. She proposes that rather than forcing Latin American countries to turn away from Chinese investment, a closer engagement with China, while helping the government for institutional capacity building, will serve U.S. interest (Ray 2021).

• 4. https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-japan/ (access data March 7, 2022) and https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2021/en_html/chapter1/c010002.html (access data March 7, 2022).

• 5. Japan insisted on the participation of India in RCEP. But India pulled out of the pact in the last stage of negotiation.

• 6. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100167362.pdf (access data March 7, 2022).

• 7. The Brazil–US relation was deteriorated after it was revealed in 2013 that the U.S. National Security Agency bugged phone calls of the former President Dilma Rousseff, which provoked the cancellation of President Rousseff’s visit to the U.S.

• 8. This estimate is provided by the Association of Nikkei and Japanese Abroad (http://www.jadesas.or.jp/en/) (access data March 7, 2022).

• 9. President Dilma Rousseff, who faced internal political crises, canceled visit to Japan in 2013 and 2015.

• 10. Reports are available from https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/brazil/jb_kaigi_0703.html (in Japanese).