Abstract
The rise of China, the return of Russia as a great power and the question of the extent of their cooperation raise many concerns, in general as well as in regard for the regional implications. Hereby the Arctic is coming more and more into focus as an area, where competition between the great powers is likely to grow over the next few years. Against this backdrop, this chapter shows the overall framework of Sino-Russian cooperation in the economic as well as in the military dimension and continues to put the specific Arctic dimension of both domains into focus. By shading light on, how the cooperation of both powers materializes in the High North, it explains the background and interests of both Moscow and Beijing in their own and collaborative efforts. Eventually, conclusions are drawn on the likelihood of an upcoming alliance and its geopolitical consequences for the High North.
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Notes
- 1.
If military power in a globalized world—among other criteria—is correctly understood as to a large extent being derived from the naval power a country holds, than China is closing in rapidly and is going to reach the brink of a superpower status rather soon, likely around 2030 if Beijing manages not only to build more and more modern warships, but to gain a broader network of Chinese military installations, among other criteria, to be established globally.
- 2.
Still quite critical on the assessment of China’s real significance globally in China goes Global (Shambaugh 2013), the same renowned expert—pars pro toto—made up his mind gradually in reflecting the more offensive and direct projection of interests by China in recent years; cf. to Shambaugh (2016: 1): “China has reached a series of key turning points in its developmental path and dramatic national transformation.”
- 3.
In the conventional naval sector China clearly passed the Russian capacities quite some time ago. Whereas Beijing commands more than 300 ships in good conditions for blue water, Russia’s fleet of about 200 units is expected to have not more than 25% in a ready to use status for the High Seas or rather Green water (Paul 2019: 5f).
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
The Malacca dilemma is a phrase for the overall dependance of China on this narrow strait, which could be blocked easily and counts for roughly 80% of Beijing’s hydrogen imports, making this vital SLOC highly vulnerable in case of conflict.
- 7.
A very good overview and analysis on the topic to be found at Rudolf (2014), who lists 14 contracts and 3 in status notifications/ongoing negotiations for the time being.
- 8.
There is abundance of reports on that, cf. e.g. to The Guardian (2014).
- 9.
“Russia China’s junior partner” delivers astonishing 43.100.000 hits at google. (Dec 13th, 2019).
- 10.
Paul (2019: 6). Translated by the author.
- 11.
The following is an edited version of a list of security related cooperation projects between Moscow and Beijing, being presented by Sarah Kirchberger at her presentation at the Baltic Sea Strategy Forum of ISPK in Kiel, October 2019.
- 12.
The question of China’s first fully owned polar satellite station, the Kiruna North Polar Ground Station (CNPGS) it opened up in December 2016, makes this point disputable. According to Swedish Defence Research Agency, it is clearly an installation for dual use interest of investments; cf. to Global Risk insights (2019).
- 13.
The following is derived from an article at Wirtschaftswoche (2019), and cross checked with various, also very recent internet resources.
- 14.
Details on that to be found at Filimonova (2018).
- 15.
In this worth reading article the way toward the idea of a PSR as well as Chinese economic interest in Arctic projects, including Yamal and other LNG projects as well as transport corridors is discussed in detail.
- 16.
Numbers given here are derived from reporting on the Arctic Circle China Forum in Shanghai in June 2019, referenced as Arctic Today (2019).
- 17.
- 18.
Secret services sources were not available for this study and in case would not have been eligible for publication in an academic handbook based on exclusive use of open data and information.
- 19.
For the most recent (Dec. of 2019), highly fact based discussion on China’s Arctic maritime, especially submarine related interests and endeavors see Brady (2019).
- 20.
Confer also to Sukhankin (2018). In his article, a quotation from China’s Polar Institute is cited, which reads “[the TSR] will relive us [China] from the necessity to cross the territorial waters of both Russia and China”. And Sukhankin goes on: “Indeed, in summer of 2017, Chines icebreaker Snow Dragon successfully tested a passage across the North Pole (…) explicitly beyond both Russian and Canadian/US territorial waters”.
- 21.
Some details on that to be found at Martinson (2019).
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Weber, J. (2020). Limited Cooperation or Upcoming Alliance? Russia, China and the Arctic. In: Weber, J. (eds) Handbook on Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic. Frontiers in International Relations. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45005-2_20
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