Abstract
This chapter seeks to contribute to an understanding of the Hanson phenomenon by locating it in a global context. More specifically, it focuses on developments in Europe which in many respects parallel those in Australia: the rise of populism and neo-nationalism. I take two examples from two distinct phases of the emergence of right-wing populist repertoires: Phase One (1980s/90s): the populist -neo-nationalist right in Austria; Phase Two (current): the UK and Brexit . The term ‘repertoire’ is borrowed from social movement analysis and has the advantage of highlighting the open-ended and shifting nature of populism . Repertoires shift and are open to innovation. The chapter examines the pioneering phase in which small or peripheral countries (e.g., Austria, The Netherlands, and Australia) had a disproportionate influence, and how the repertoire developed there is adopted and adapted in the course of—and after—the EU referendum in the UK. The chapter concludes by arguing that populism and neo-nationalism have become increasingly mainstream; common property across the political spectrum. The broader context here is one in which nation states narrow their raison d’être, and the source of their legitimacy, as they increasingly focus upon a single task: the defense of borders, above all against migrants.
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Notes
- 1.
I have used the term right-populism in line with the usage in this collection. Most of the parties covered here could also be characterized as far right or radical right.
- 2.
Silvio Berlusconi ’s first coalition had already briefly included Lega Nord in the Italian government in 1994. In the Austrian case, the FPÖ had won more votes and seats in the 1999 election than had the ÖVP , coming in second to the SPÖ. The Chancellor in the coalition (Wolfgang Schüssel) was nevertheless from the ÖVP. Unlike the earlier Italian case, the inclusion of the FPÖ in the Austrian government triggered a strong—but ultimately ineffectual—negative reaction from leading EU politicians (falsely characterized as ‘EU sanctions’ in parts of the Austrian media and political discourse).
- 3.
The international prominence of the Austrian case is illustrated, for example, by the publication of an extended analysis by Jan-Werner Müller in the New York Review of Books (25 July 2016).
- 4.
For an informative media account of far-right networking in Europe, see Bernhard Odehnal’s piece in the Tages-Anzeiger, 5 May 2016.
- 5.
One example of a striking affinity across place and time that is certainly coincidental is that ‘Österreich zuerst’ (Austria first) was the name of a FPÖ-sponsored people’s initiative (Volksbegehren) in 1992, nearly a quarter of a century before “America first” became a Trump slogan.
- 6.
Elements of right-populist repertoire are, of course, much older than my foreshortened historical framework implies—e.g., going back to völkisch movements of the 19th century. Here I am concerned only with the revival of rightwing populism in post-war Europe.
- 7.
Pauline Hanson is interesting in this context because she is the one actor who appears in both phases of my tentative periodization.
- 8.
Some of these collective interests have close links to the major parties or, as in the case of the Bauernbund and ÖVP, are formally affiliated to a party.
- 9.
The FPÖ was founded in the mid-1950s, largely by ex-Nazis, including its founder Anton Reinthaller, who had been a SS officer.
- 10.
It should be noted, however, that German nationalist and authoritarian elements remain influential within the FPÖ; above all via (student and old-boy) fraternities (Burschenschaften) whose influence has, if anything, recently grown within the party.
- 11.
Thus two of the leading authorities on Austrian politics and rightwing discourse—Anton Pelinka and Ruth Wodak—could, with some justification, speak of “the Haider phenomenon” (Wodak and Pelinka 2002). This collection remains a useful source for a much fuller account of the developments sketched here.
- 12.
This was part of a response to a question asked by the journalists John Harris, John Domokos, Adam Sich and Renasha Khan, The Guardian online, 2 October 2017.
- 13.
This is the dominant framing, but there is a dissenting view; namely, that a pro- or anti-EU stance has less to do with differences between groups than with differences of personal values that are unsystematically distributed socially and spatially. See Kaufmann (2016).
- 14.
The label is a pun. The Eurostar is the name for the trains that link London to Paris and Brussels via the Channel Tunnel.
- 15.
The phrase has been used by Vernon Bogdanor, some of whose arguments are discussed below.
- 16.
See Watt and Wintour’s investigative piece in The Guardian, 25 March 2015.
- 17.
This point has been underlined by a YouGov poll in which they identified what they, rather melodramatically, called “Brexit extremism”: the stated willingness of many (mostly older) voters to accept “significant economic damage” as a price worth paying to Brexit (YouGov@YouGov 2017).
- 18.
The straightforward lie may be the £350 million. The figure ignores the UK’s rebate and, depending on which Treasury figures one takes, may overestimate the weekly contribution by c. £100 million. The UK Statistics Authority (2017) has noted its “disappointment” at the use of the £350 million figure.
- 19.
The SORA/ISA (2017) voter transition analysis showed a flow of voters from the Greens to the SPÖ (the Green Party failed to clear the 4% hurdle for entry into parliament), but also a flow of (particularly blue-collar worker) votes from the SPÖ to the FPÖ. The FPÖ received 59% of blue-collar votes and the SPÖ 19%, only 4% more than the ÖVP. This scenario is similar to the “left-behind” issue in the UK with left-of-center parties becoming increasingly middle class in their support base as working-class voters look elsewhere. These trends support Oesch’s and Rennwald’s (2018) contention that left-of-center parties are able to hold on to, or increase, support from “sociocultural professionals” but continue to lose working-class votes to the far right. An important difference between the UK and Austrian cases is that the FPÖ voter-base has a very different demographic from the Brexit vote: 30% of FPÖ voters in 2017 were under 30 and only 19% over 60. In contrast, the SPÖ had a 17% share of the under 30 vote and 34% among the over 60s (see SORA/ISA 2017).
- 20.
The vote of the social and Christian parties collapsed in the Czech election, 20–21 October 2017. The ANO, under the leadership of billionaire Andrej Babiš, won the largest share of the vote (29.6%) on an anti-corruption and EU-sceptical ticket.
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Scott, A. (2019). Shifting Repertoires of Populism and Neo-Nationalism: Austria and Brexit Britain. In: Grant, B., Moore, T., Lynch, T. (eds) The Rise of Right-Populism. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2670-7_11
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