Skip to main content

Institutional Design: Overview

  • Chapter
Institutional Design

Part of the book series: Recent Economic Thought Series ((RETH,volume 43))

Abstract

Administrators at private universities wish to send new alumni off with a sense that their alma mater truly values them specifically and undergraduate education generally. The turnout of professors at departmental diploma ceremonies sends a visible signal about their interest in the new graduates. Yet attendance at these ceremonies may involve inconvenience or perhaps even substantial opportunity costs. The two departments with which I am most familiar at my university deal with this public goods problem in very different ways. The political science department has developed a strong norm that usually turns out the entire faculty for the diploma ceremony year after year. The economics department has not had an attendance norm in recent years. Several years ago, prompted by several graduations with embarrassingly small faculty turnouts, the chair of the economics department increased attendance substantially by introducing a financial incentive system: each professor contributes a sum of money to an interest- bearing departmental account in September; those who attend the diploma ceremony share equally in the money accumulated in the account

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Alchian, Armen and Harold Demetz. (1972). “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization.” American Economic Review 62(5): 777–795.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alesina, Alberto. (1988). “Macroeconomics and Politics.” In Stanley Fisher (ed.), NEBR Macroeconomic Annual (pp. 13–52). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Axelrod, Robert. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baumgartner, Frank R. and Bryan D. Jones. (1993). Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boardman, Anthony E. and Aidan R. Vining. (1989). “Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises.” Journal of Law and Economics 32(1): 1–33.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brandi, John. (1988). “On Politics and Policy Analysis as the Design and Assessment of Institutions.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 7(3):419–424.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bromley, Daniel W. (1989). Economic Interests and Institutions: The Conceptual Foundations of Public Policy. New York: Basil Blackwell

    Google Scholar 

  • Calvert, Randall L. (1993). “Communication in Institutions: Efficiency in a Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Hidden Information.” In William A. Barnett, Melvin J. Hinich, and Norman J. Schofield (eds.), Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation (pp. 197–222). New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coase, Ronald. (1937). “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica 4 (November): 386–405.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Demsetz, Harold. (1967). “Toward a Theory of Property Rights.” American Economic Review 57(1): 347–359.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eggertsson, Thrainn. (1990). Economic Behavior and Institutions. New York: Cambridge University Press

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gormley, William T., Jr. (1987). “Institutional Policy Analysis: A Critical Review.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 6(2): 153–169.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hardin, Russell. (1982). Collective Action. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Heckathorn, Douglas D. and Steven M. Maser. (1987). “Bargaining and the Sources of Transaction Costs: The Case of Government Regulation.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3(1): 69–98.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hodgson, Geoffrey. (1988). Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for a Modern Institutional Economics. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Holmstrom, Bengt and Jean Tirole. (1989). “The Theory of the Firm.” In Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 1 (pp. 61–133). New York: North-Holland.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Hood, Christopher C. (1986). The Tools of Government. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers

    Google Scholar 

  • Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling. (1976). “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economies 3(4): 305–360.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Knight, Jack. (1992). Institutions and Social Conflict. New York: Cambridge University Press

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Krehbiel, Keith. (1991). Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kreps, David M. (1990). “Corporate Culture and Economie Theory.” In James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle (eds.), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (pp. 90–143). New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, David K. (1969). Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Libecap, Gary D. (1989). Contracting for Property Rights. New York: Cambridge University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Litwack, John M. (1991). “Legality and Market Reform in Soviet-Type Economies.” Journal of Economie Perspectives 5(4): 77–89.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. (1989). Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics. New York: Free Press

    Google Scholar 

  • McChesney, Fred S. (1990). “Government as a Definer of Property Rights: Indian Lands, Ethnic Externalities, and Bureaucratie Budgets.” Journal of Legal Studies 19(2): 297–335.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McCubbins, Matthew D., Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast. (1989). “Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies.” Virginia Law Review 75(2): 431–498.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McKelvey, Richard D. (1976). “Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control.” Journal of Economic Theory 12(3): 472–482.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Milgrom, Paul R., Douglass C. North, and Barry Weingast. (1990). “The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs.” Economies and Politics 2(1): 1–23.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Miller, Gary J. (1992). Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • North, Douglass C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • North, Douglass. C. and Barry R. Weingast. (1989). “Constitutions and Credible Commitments: The Evolution of the Institutions of Public Choice in 17th Century England.” Journal of Economie History 59(4): 803–832.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom, Elinor. (1986). “An Agenda for the Study of Institutions.” Public Choice 48(1): 3–25.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ——. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Plott, Charles. (1967). “A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under Majority Rule.” American Economie Review 57(4): 787–806.

    Google Scholar 

  • Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. (1989). “Constitutional Design and Citizen Electoral Control.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 1(2): 107–130.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Riker, William H. (1980). “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions.” American Political Science Review 74(2): 432–446.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ——. (1982). Liberalism Against Populism. San Francisco: Freeman

    Google Scholar 

  • ——. (1986). The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Riker, William H. and Itai Sened. (1991). “A Political Theory of the Origin of Property Rights: Airport Slots.” American Journal of Political Science 35(4): 951–969.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Riker, William H. and David L. Weimer. (1993). “The Economie and Political Liberalization of Socialism: The Fundamental Problem of Property Rights.” Social Philosophy and Policy

    Google Scholar 

  • Rodrik, Dani and Richard Zeckhauser. (1988). “The Dilemma of Government Responsiveness.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 7(4): 601–620.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rose-Ackerman, Susan. (1978). Corruption: A Study in Political Economy. New York: Academic Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross, Stephen A. (1973). “The Economie Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem.” American Economie Review 63(2): 134–139.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sappington, David E.M. (1991). “Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships.— Journal of Economie Perspectives5(2): 45–66

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schotter, Andrew. (1981). The Economie Theory of Social Institutions New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Sened, Itai. (1991). “Contemporary Theory of Institutions in Perspective.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 3(4): 379–402.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shepsle, Kenneth A. (1979). “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models.” American Journal of Political Science 23(1): 27–69.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. (1984). “When Do Rules of Procedure Matter?” Journal of Politics 46(1): 206–221.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sugden, Robert. (1986). The Economics of Rights, Co-operation, and Welfare New York: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, Michael. (1982). Community, Anarchy and Liberty. New York: Cambridge University Pres

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ullmann-Margalit, Edna. (1977). The Emergence of Norms. Oxford: Clarendon Pres

    Google Scholar 

  • Umbeck, John R. (1981). A Theory of Property Rights with Applications to the California Gold Rush. Ames: Iowa State University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Vining, Aidan R. and Anthony E. Boardman. (1992). “Ownership Versus Competition: Efficiency in Public Enterprise.” Public Choice 73(2): 205–239.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • von Hagen, Jügen. (1991). “A Note on the Empirical Effectiveness of Formal Fiscal Restraints.” Journal of Public Economics 44(2): 199–210.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ——. (1992). “Budgetary Procedures and Fiscal Performance in the European Community.” Indiana Center for Global Business, Indiana University, Discussion Paper No. 91 (May).

    Google Scholar 

  • Weaver, R. Kent and Bert A. Rockman (eds.). (1993). Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution

    Google Scholar 

  • Weimer, David L. (1992). “Claiming Races, Broiler Contracts, Heresthetics, and Habits: Ten Concepts for Policy Design.” Policy Sciences 25(2): 135–159.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ——. (1992). “The Craft of Policy Design: Can It Be More Than Art?” Policy Studies Review 11(3/4): 370–388.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weimer, David L. and Aidan R. Vining. (1989). Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall

    Google Scholar 

  • Wildavsky, Aaron. (1973). “If Planning Is Everything, Maybe It’s Nothing.” Policy Sciences 4(2): 127–153.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, Oliver E. (1985). The Economie Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1995 Springer Science+Business Media New York

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Weimer, D.L. (1995). Institutional Design: Overview. In: Institutional Design. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 43. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0641-2_1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0641-2_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-4279-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-0641-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics