Abstract
Administrators at private universities wish to send new alumni off with a sense that their alma mater truly values them specifically and undergraduate education generally. The turnout of professors at departmental diploma ceremonies sends a visible signal about their interest in the new graduates. Yet attendance at these ceremonies may involve inconvenience or perhaps even substantial opportunity costs. The two departments with which I am most familiar at my university deal with this public goods problem in very different ways. The political science department has developed a strong norm that usually turns out the entire faculty for the diploma ceremony year after year. The economics department has not had an attendance norm in recent years. Several years ago, prompted by several graduations with embarrassingly small faculty turnouts, the chair of the economics department increased attendance substantially by introducing a financial incentive system: each professor contributes a sum of money to an interest- bearing departmental account in September; those who attend the diploma ceremony share equally in the money accumulated in the account
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Alchian, Armen and Harold Demetz. (1972). “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization.” American Economic Review 62(5): 777–795.
Alesina, Alberto. (1988). “Macroeconomics and Politics.” In Stanley Fisher (ed.), NEBR Macroeconomic Annual (pp. 13–52). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Axelrod, Robert. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Baumgartner, Frank R. and Bryan D. Jones. (1993). Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Boardman, Anthony E. and Aidan R. Vining. (1989). “Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises.” Journal of Law and Economics 32(1): 1–33.
Brandi, John. (1988). “On Politics and Policy Analysis as the Design and Assessment of Institutions.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 7(3):419–424.
Bromley, Daniel W. (1989). Economic Interests and Institutions: The Conceptual Foundations of Public Policy. New York: Basil Blackwell
Calvert, Randall L. (1993). “Communication in Institutions: Efficiency in a Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Hidden Information.” In William A. Barnett, Melvin J. Hinich, and Norman J. Schofield (eds.), Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation (pp. 197–222). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Coase, Ronald. (1937). “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica 4 (November): 386–405.
Demsetz, Harold. (1967). “Toward a Theory of Property Rights.” American Economic Review 57(1): 347–359.
Eggertsson, Thrainn. (1990). Economic Behavior and Institutions. New York: Cambridge University Press
Gormley, William T., Jr. (1987). “Institutional Policy Analysis: A Critical Review.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 6(2): 153–169.
Hardin, Russell. (1982). Collective Action. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press
Heckathorn, Douglas D. and Steven M. Maser. (1987). “Bargaining and the Sources of Transaction Costs: The Case of Government Regulation.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3(1): 69–98.
Hodgson, Geoffrey. (1988). Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for a Modern Institutional Economics. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press
Holmstrom, Bengt and Jean Tirole. (1989). “The Theory of the Firm.” In Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 1 (pp. 61–133). New York: North-Holland.
Hood, Christopher C. (1986). The Tools of Government. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers
Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling. (1976). “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economies 3(4): 305–360.
Knight, Jack. (1992). Institutions and Social Conflict. New York: Cambridge University Press
Krehbiel, Keith. (1991). Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Kreps, David M. (1990). “Corporate Culture and Economie Theory.” In James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle (eds.), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (pp. 90–143). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lewis, David K. (1969). Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Libecap, Gary D. (1989). Contracting for Property Rights. New York: Cambridge University Press
Litwack, John M. (1991). “Legality and Market Reform in Soviet-Type Economies.” Journal of Economie Perspectives 5(4): 77–89.
March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. (1989). Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics. New York: Free Press
McChesney, Fred S. (1990). “Government as a Definer of Property Rights: Indian Lands, Ethnic Externalities, and Bureaucratie Budgets.” Journal of Legal Studies 19(2): 297–335.
McCubbins, Matthew D., Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast. (1989). “Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies.” Virginia Law Review 75(2): 431–498.
McKelvey, Richard D. (1976). “Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control.” Journal of Economic Theory 12(3): 472–482.
Milgrom, Paul R., Douglass C. North, and Barry Weingast. (1990). “The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs.” Economies and Politics 2(1): 1–23.
Miller, Gary J. (1992). Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglass C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press
North, Douglass. C. and Barry R. Weingast. (1989). “Constitutions and Credible Commitments: The Evolution of the Institutions of Public Choice in 17th Century England.” Journal of Economie History 59(4): 803–832.
Ostrom, Elinor. (1986). “An Agenda for the Study of Institutions.” Public Choice 48(1): 3–25.
——. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press
Plott, Charles. (1967). “A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under Majority Rule.” American Economie Review 57(4): 787–806.
Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. (1989). “Constitutional Design and Citizen Electoral Control.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 1(2): 107–130.
Riker, William H. (1980). “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions.” American Political Science Review 74(2): 432–446.
——. (1982). Liberalism Against Populism. San Francisco: Freeman
——. (1986). The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
Riker, William H. and Itai Sened. (1991). “A Political Theory of the Origin of Property Rights: Airport Slots.” American Journal of Political Science 35(4): 951–969.
Riker, William H. and David L. Weimer. (1993). “The Economie and Political Liberalization of Socialism: The Fundamental Problem of Property Rights.” Social Philosophy and Policy
Rodrik, Dani and Richard Zeckhauser. (1988). “The Dilemma of Government Responsiveness.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 7(4): 601–620.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. (1978). Corruption: A Study in Political Economy. New York: Academic Press
Ross, Stephen A. (1973). “The Economie Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem.” American Economie Review 63(2): 134–139.
Sappington, David E.M. (1991). “Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships.— Journal of Economie Perspectives5(2): 45–66
Schotter, Andrew. (1981). The Economie Theory of Social Institutions New York: Cambridge University Press.
Sened, Itai. (1991). “Contemporary Theory of Institutions in Perspective.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 3(4): 379–402.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. (1979). “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models.” American Journal of Political Science 23(1): 27–69.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. (1984). “When Do Rules of Procedure Matter?” Journal of Politics 46(1): 206–221.
Sugden, Robert. (1986). The Economics of Rights, Co-operation, and Welfare New York: Basil Blackwell.
Taylor, Michael. (1982). Community, Anarchy and Liberty. New York: Cambridge University Pres
Ullmann-Margalit, Edna. (1977). The Emergence of Norms. Oxford: Clarendon Pres
Umbeck, John R. (1981). A Theory of Property Rights with Applications to the California Gold Rush. Ames: Iowa State University Press
Vining, Aidan R. and Anthony E. Boardman. (1992). “Ownership Versus Competition: Efficiency in Public Enterprise.” Public Choice 73(2): 205–239.
von Hagen, Jügen. (1991). “A Note on the Empirical Effectiveness of Formal Fiscal Restraints.” Journal of Public Economics 44(2): 199–210.
——. (1992). “Budgetary Procedures and Fiscal Performance in the European Community.” Indiana Center for Global Business, Indiana University, Discussion Paper No. 91 (May).
Weaver, R. Kent and Bert A. Rockman (eds.). (1993). Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Weimer, David L. (1992). “Claiming Races, Broiler Contracts, Heresthetics, and Habits: Ten Concepts for Policy Design.” Policy Sciences 25(2): 135–159.
——. (1992). “The Craft of Policy Design: Can It Be More Than Art?” Policy Studies Review 11(3/4): 370–388.
Weimer, David L. and Aidan R. Vining. (1989). Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall
Wildavsky, Aaron. (1973). “If Planning Is Everything, Maybe It’s Nothing.” Policy Sciences 4(2): 127–153.
Williamson, Oliver E. (1985). The Economie Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1995 Springer Science+Business Media New York
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Weimer, D.L. (1995). Institutional Design: Overview. In: Institutional Design. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 43. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0641-2_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0641-2_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-4279-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-0641-2
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive