Abstract
Merleau-Ponty’s last work, posthumously published unfinished manuscripts, was supposed to be, according to his editor Claude Lefort, only the introductory part of a larger, rather comprehensive work entitled Le Visible et l’Invisible. As the working notes from this last period testify, the author had the intention of building a new ontology which would encompass the results of the phenomenological research of his previous writings, primarily those of Phenomenology of Perception. This ontology would as its leading principle accept the primacy of perception, the fundamental predication of his thought, and with that all those deep consequences which proceed therefrom. The main point is the preorientation of philosophical interest toward the ontological implications of an interrogation of the life-world (Lebenswelt) that goes beyond scientific dogmas and the blind reign of cultural formations in general, seeking the sphere of original experience, where corporeity, temporality, intersubjectivity, etc. appear as philosophically relevant themes. However, it should be pointed out that this “continuity” in Merleau-Ponty’s thought — namely, the position that ontology should be loyal to its own birthplace, so that phenomenology may of itself be completed — implies all that the radicalism of turning phenomenology into ontology involves. In other words, a radical shift in this searcher’s position did take place and is not to be denied by the insight that he became more and more concerned with a deeper penetration into the hidden foundations and development of the main theses of his previous writings, and was not undertaking their refutation.1
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Cf. Bernard Sichère, Merleau-Ponty ou le corps de la philosophie (Paris: Grasset 1982), p. 181.
M. Merleau-Ponty, Signes (Paris: Gallimard 1960), p. 202. (English translation: Signs (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1964), p. 160.)
Claude Lefort, Sur une colonne absente (Paris: Gallimard 1978), p. 8.
M. Merleau-Ponty, Le visible et l’invisible (Paris: Gallimard), p. 18. (English translation: The Visible and the Invisible (Evanston: 1968), p. 4.)
M. Merleau-Ponty, Sens et non-sens, Nagel (Paris: 1966), p. 168. English translation: Sense and Non-Sense (Evanston: 1964), p. 96.
Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie I, Husserliana III (The Hague: 1950), p. 57.
Cf. Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, Felix Meiner (Hamburg: 1972), p. 23.
E. Husserl, Ideen I, op. cit., p. 256.
Ibid., p. 257.
Ibid., p.258.
Ibid., p. 260.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 289.
E. Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, Husserliana VI (The Hague: 1954), p. 265.
M. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, op. cit., p. 15.
Ibid., p. 16.
Ibid., p. 34.
Ibid., p. 30.
Ibid., p. 34.
E. Husserl, Die Krisis, op. cit., p. 184.
M. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, op. cit., p. 103.
Ibid., p. 41.
Ibid., p. 73.
In The Visible and the Invisible is glimpsed the necessity of a sort of hyper-reflection (sur-réflexion) as a reflection that would surpass itself by leaving the immanence in which it cannot be posited to be self-sufficient, by taking into consideration that which always unnoticeably evades it in the all-included proceedings of explication, namely, that inexhaustible unreflected experience which for reflection has as the source of its characterization its failure to found the existing world upon the thought of the world. The transcendentality of the pre-scientific mythical world should inspire the overcoming of reflection, but only as an overcoming of itself which fulfills the unavoidable demand for the solution of the problem of the genesis of reflective idealization. (Cf. p. 46 et passim)
E. Husserl, Die Krisis, op. cit., p. 176.
M. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, op. cit., p. 45.
Ibid., p. 85.
M. Merleau-Ponty, Résumés de cours, Collège de France 1952–1960, (Paris: Gallimard 1968), p. 179.
M. Merleau-Ponty, Sense and Non-Sense, op. cit., p. 94.
This definition of philosophy’s core was emphasized in his previously proposed titles for the manuscript: Être et sens, Généalogie du vrai, and finally L’origine de la vérité. The last title was a paraphrase of the title of Husserl’s well-known study of the origin of geometry, which belongs to the phenomenology of die Lebenswelt. This new theory was supposed to be a phenomenological description of the genesis of sense, meaning, the idealization of reflection, and of culture in general, but not through regressive inquiry (Rückfrage) as in this study, that is, not through an inquiry that would take as its point of departure the horizon of the science and the cultural creations of the contemporary world in order to reach the undisclosed origin but, on the contrary, through one that starts from “below”, and goes in the opposite direction. Thus, the thematically orientated domain in which Merleau-Ponty’s last writings are rooted was explicitly opened by the lecture given to the Collège de France in the school year 1959/60, the theme of which was the translation and interpretation of two of Husserl’s later pieces: Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie als intentionalhistorisches Problem and Umsturz der kopernikanischen Lehre.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1989 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Vlaisavljević, J. (1989). The Interrogation of Perceptive Faith. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) Man within His Life-World. Analecta Husserliana, vol 27. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2587-8_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2587-8_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7669-2
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2587-8
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive