Abstract
The present volume joins contributions to early modern debates on nature and norms in thought with decidedly contemporary perspectives, thereby hoping to shed new light on developments in early modern philosophy as well as enrich current discussions on the relation between nature and norms. Clearly, the relation between mind and world poses perennial problems and debates. How do we explain that thoughts and other mental states have content? What makes it the case that some thought is about this rather than that thing? Do our perceptions and thoughts match the world? How do we categorize things? Do our concepts carve up nature at its joints? Is thinking a kind of action? Where does it take place? Is it embodied? What makes thoughts and sentences true or false? Do beliefs aim at truth? Do true beliefs constitute knowledge? What makes our thoughts adequate? Can our beliefs fail to reach epistemic goals? Does thought depend on interaction with other thinkers? Can other animals think too? Do we need language to think? Can we ever be sure about anything?
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
See esp. Fodor (1987).
- 3.
See Brandom (1994).
- 4.
See Millikan (2004).
- 5.
- 6.
See, for instance, Brandom (2002).
- 7.
See Rorty (1979, 131–164).
- 8.
See, for instance, Tartaglia (2007).
- 9.
Hatfield (2005, 98).
- 10.
On the early modern debates on the lex naturae see Haakonssen (1998).
- 11.
- 12.
See Spinoza (1994, Ethica IV praefatio).
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Lenz, M., Waldow, A. (2013). Nature and Norms in Thought. In: Lenz, M., Waldow, A. (eds) Contemporary Perspectives on Early Modern Philosophy. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 29. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6241-1_1
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