The Liar Paradox (And Other Logico-Semantic Issues)

  • María José Frápolli
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 29)


Possibly, the simplest formulations of the Liar Paradox are (1) and (2),


Logical Form Propositional Content Propositional Variable Logical Language Truth Predicate 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • María José Frápolli
    • 1
  1. 1.PhilosophyUniversity of GranadaGranadaSpain

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