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Reason to Believe

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Logic, Rationality, and Interaction (LORI 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 10455))

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Abstract

In this paper we study the relation between nonmonotonic reasoning and belief revision. Our main conceptual contribution is to suggest that nonmonotonic reasoning guides but does not determine an agent’s belief revision. To be adopted as beliefs, defeasible conclusions should remain stable in the face of certain bodies of information. This proposal is formalized in what we call a two-tier semantics for nonmonotonic reasoning and belief revision. The main technical result is a sound and complete axiomatization for this semantic.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We write \(w\in P\subseteq W\) as \(\mathcal {F},w\,\models \, P\).

  2. 2.

    The validity of a formula in this framework is defined in the usual way.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. ILLC, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands

    Chenwei Shi

  2. Universität Bayreuth, Bayreuth, Germany

    Olivier Roy

Authors
  1. Chenwei Shi
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  2. Olivier Roy
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Chenwei Shi .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam , Amsterdam, Noord-Holland, The Netherlands

    Alexandru Baltag

  2. Department of Philosophy, The University of Auckland, Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

    Jeremy Seligman

  3. Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University , Sapporo, Japan

    Tomoyuki Yamada

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Shi, C., Roy, O. (2017). Reason to Believe. In: Baltag, A., Seligman, J., Yamada, T. (eds) Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10455. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55665-8_51

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55665-8_51

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-662-55664-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-55665-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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